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Abstract 
 
Title: Cyberhealth and Informational Wellbeing 
Author: John Michael Thornton 
 
In this dissertation, I present a new framework for conceptualizing the digital 
landscape inspired by the field of public health. I call this framework Public 
Cyberhealth. This framework is an alternative to the dominant cybersecurity 
paradigm, which frames cyberspace as a digital battleground. I argue that the 
philosophy of public health can be useful for thinking about the normative 
justification for—and ethical limits on—government intervention in cyberspace, 
while public health policy and institutions can serve as examples of how to manifest 
these higher principles (e.g. the WHO, ethical review boards). This Public 
Cyberhealth framework takes seriously non-malicious threats to network robustness 
and resilience (e.g. human error, buggy code, natural disasters), highlights the impact 
of network threats and interventions on health and wellbeing, and is more thoughtful 
about protecting individual rights compared to the dominant cybersecurity lens 
typically used by policymakers and IT professionals. 
 In addition to defining this alternative framework, I demonstrate how it may 
be used in three contexts. First, I explore how thinking about the digital landscape like 
a public health expert can help one to understand the role public goods play in 
maintaining robust digital networks. Second, I explore how this framework can help 
one to create polices which adequately account for how digital technologies impact 
health. And third, I define a theory of “informational wellbeing,” which seeks to 
capture the myriad of ways in which digital information and its use, control, accuracy, 
and accessibility impact personal wellbeing. The Public Cyberhealth framework is not 
only a useful and coherent way of thinking about technology policy, but also reveals 
interesting and surprising things about the nature of health, wellbeing, and identity in 
the digital age. 
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Introduction 
 
 
“[A] problem well put is half-solved…The way in which the problem is conceived 
decides what specific suggestions are entertained and which are dismissed; what data 
are selected and which rejected; it is the criterion for relevancy and irrelevancy of 
hypotheses and conceptual structures.”1  – John Dewey 
 
 
Today was a typical Wednesday. I woke up to my iPhone’s alarm and then read the 
news on half a dozen websites before getting up to make coffee. While I ate breakfast, 
I listened to music played on an Amazon Echo. As I finished breakfast, the gas 
company called about installing a smart meter. They verified my identity using my 
email address and phone number and sent the confirmation to my email account. As I 
checked my email, Gmail automatically reminded me to follow-up with my 
supervisor about an email I sent the previous week, and I noticed my accountant had 
sent over my tax return to be digitally signed. I paid for lunch with a contactless ID 
card and then bought a coffee with a digital wallet at the art museum. While walking 
around the museum, I took a couple of pictures with my phone, which were 
immediately uploaded to cloud storage, and I read the biography of the artist John 
Everett Millais on Wikipedia. Despite having deleted my Facebook account a few 
months back, never using Twitter or other social media, and engaging in the decidedly 
Victorian activity of a walk in a museum, I had interacted with over a dozen different 
digital devices and services before afternoon tea. Not to mention the legion of CCTV 
cameras capturing my stroll down the street and the half dozen or so state intelligence 
agencies who may have been tracking my banal online activity. 
 It is hard to overstate the importance of digital networks and digital 
information to life in the 21st century. For many the internet is where they socialize, 
fall in love, express themselves, and learn about the world. As of 2017, nearly half the 
 
1 John Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938), 
108. 
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world’s population has internet access.2 Furthermore, even many of those who do not 
personally use the internet still rely on the digital networks that underpin the global 
economy, voting systems, and critical infrastructure, such as telecommunications, the 
electrical grid, banking and finance, national defence, the oil and gas industries, 
transportation services, the water supply, and emergency services.3 In the coming 
decades, we will likely rely on digital technologies to an even greater degree as smart 
homes and cities, autonomous vehicles, biometric identification, and personal robots 
become more commonplace. Robust and resilient digital networks and devices are 
essential to the stability of modern life. In this dissertation, I will explore the myriad 
of ways in which these networks impact our lives and propose a new framework for 
conceptualizing the digital landscape inspired by the philosophy of public health. 
As I will use the terms ‘digital network,’ ‘robustness,’ and ‘resilience’ 
throughout this dissertation, it will be helpful to have a clear definition of each term 
up front. For the purpose of this work, a ‘digital network’ is defined as any network 
which transmits digital information between nodes. A ‘node’ can be a person using a 
digital technology, such as a computer or smartphone, or it can be a digital technology 
which operates in a largely autonomous fashion, such as a server or sensor. 
Meanwhile, ‘robustness’ is defined as the degree to which networks and devices are 
able to withstand malicious (e.g. malware), accidental (e.g. human error, buggy 
code), and natural threats (e.g. hurricanes). A robust network will also be a secure 
network by this definition, capable of repelling adversary-based attacks and keeping 
information safe. Lastly, by ‘resilience’ I mean a network’s ability to recover from a 
successful cyberattack, damaging accident, or environmental problem. Often this will 
entail having adequate back-up systems or the ability to bypass inoperable or insecure 
systems.   
Generally speaking, the primary goal of a digital network is to allow digital 
information to be accurately and confidentially transferred between nodes to fulfil a 
given purpose (e.g. visiting a website, sharing a picture, paying a bill). Digital 
 
2 International Telecommunications Union, “ICT Facts and Figures 2017,” 
International Telecommunications Union, July 2017, https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2017.pdf (accessed Jan. 13, 2019). 
3 Fred Kaplan, Dark Territory (New York: Simon and Schuster Paperbacks, 2016), 
41. 
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networks can fail to fulfil this goal for a number of reasons. Network infrastructure 
(including individual nodes) can be infected with malware, buggy software can 
malfunction, individuals can give away their passwords in phishing scams, or network 
infrastructure can be physically disrupted or destroyed—recent examples of the latter 
include sharks biting through transatlantic cables,4 a Georgian grandmother cutting 
off Armenia’s internet while scavenging for copper,5 and the disruption of Puerto 
Rico’s networks in the wake of Hurricanes Maria and Irma in 2017.6 Sometimes these 
failures are small in scale, for instance a bug may only affect a single user. In other 
cases, these failures can crash substantial portions of the internet, as in the case of the 
2016 DDoS attack on part of the Domain Name System (DNS),7 or shutdown critical 
infrastructure, as was the case with the WannaCry ransomware attack in 2017 that led 
to the temporarily closure of many NHS facilities.8 However, it is important to note 
that human errors or buggy code can be just as devastating as a skilled hacker. A few 
months after the 2016 Mirai botnet attack on the DNS, a fat-finger mistake by an 
 
4 Robert McMillan, “Sharks Want To Bite Google's Undersea Cables,” Wired, Aug. 
15, 2014, https://www.wired.com/2014/08/shark-cable/ (accessed Dec. 19, 2018). 
5 Tom Parfitt, “Georgian Woman Cuts Off Web Access to Whole of Armenia,” The 
Guardian, April 6, 2011, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/06/georgian-
woman-cuts-web-access (accessed Nov. 6, 2018). 
6 Nick Thieme, “After Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico’s Internet Problems Go from 
Bad to Worse,” PBS, Nov. 23, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/puerto-
rico-hurricane-maria-internet/ (accessed Nov. 6, 2018). 
7 Berkeley Lovelace Jr. and Antonio José Vielma, “Friday's Third Cyberattack on 
Dyn 'Has Been Resolved,' Company Says,” CNBC, Oct. 21, 2016, 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/10/21/major-websites-across-east-coast-knocked-out-in-
apparent-ddos-attack.html (accessed Feb. 15, 2019).; Ethan Chiel, “Here Are the Sites 
You Can't Access Because Someone Took the Internet Down,” Splinter, Oct. 21, 
2016, https://splinternews.com/here-are-the-sites-you-cant-access-because-someone-
took-1793863079 (accessed Feb. 15, 2019). 
8 Comptroller and Auditor General, “Investigation: WannaCry cyber attack and the 
NHS,” National Audit Office, HC 414 Session 2017–2019, April 25, 2018, 
https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Investigation-WannaCry-cyber-
attack-and-the-NHS.pdf (accessed Dec. 20 2018). 
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Amazon.com employee overloaded the company’s popular cloud services and 
disrupted hundreds of thousands of websites and internet connected products, such as 
smart light bulbs and thermostats.9 
Historically, philosophers have played a relatively minor role in defining how 
we think and talk about the digital landscape. Rather, the way we understand digital 
technologies, information security, network failure, and the various obligations of 
states, corporations, and individuals in cyberspace has largely been defined by 
computer scientists, engineers, defence agencies, novelists, filmmakers, online 
communities, and lawyers.10  
 One of the most significant conceptual frameworks we use to understand these 
technologies can be called the cybersecurity framework, or cybersecurity lens. At a 
high level, this lens frames the digital landscape as a battleground between good guys 
and bad guys.11 The good guys are law enforcement, your own country’s cyber 
defence forces, cybersecurity experts, and corporate IT departments. The bad guys, 
meanwhile, are cybercriminals, hackers, and other states’ intelligence agencies.12 In 
this hostile landscape, companies, individuals, and states are generally responsible for 
securing their own digital castle or homestead. In this sense, the framework can 
 
9 Amazon.com, “Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption,” Amazon.com, 
https://aws.amazon.com/message/41926/ (accessed Feb. 15, 2019).; Elizabeth Weise, 
“Massive Amazon Cloud Service Outage Disrupts Sites,” USA Today, 28 February 
2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2017/02/28/amazons-cloud-service-
goes-down-sites-scramble/98530914/ (accessed April 15, 2017).; Darrell Etherington, 
“Amazon AWS S3 Outage Is Breaking Things For A Lot Of Websites And Apps,” 
TechCrunch, Feb. 28, 2017, https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/28/amazon-aws-s3-
outage-is-breaking-things-for-a-lot-of-websites-and-apps/ (accessed April 2, 2017). 
10 I do not mean to imply that there is no philosophy being written on these topics. 
There is certainly philosophical work on privacy, personal information, and 
obligations in cyberspace. However, generally speaking there are far fewer 
philosophers working on these topics than lawyers, computer scientists, etc. 
11 Kaplan, Dark Territory. 
12 Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos and Adam B. Lowther, Conflict and Cooperation in 
Cyberspace: The Challenge of National Security, eds. Panayotis A. Yannakogeorgos 
and Adam B. Lowther (Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis, 2014). 
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loosely be described as ‘feudal.’ In order to secure their digital information and 
networks, states often employ offensive cyber capabilities, and a proposed bipartisan 
piece of legislation in the United States would empower corporations to do the 
same.13 Often these offensive capabilities are deployed with little regard for the 
broader effects on the network.14 While this way of conceptualizing the digital 
landscape emerged out of the Cold War and the need to protect military (and later 
corporate) secrets, it is not limited to cybersecurity experts.15 The popularity of this 
framework is in part due to its prevalence in popular media, including dozens of 
films, such as Tron (1982), War Games (1983), Sneakers (1992), Hackers (1995), The 
Net (1995), Enemy of the State (1998), The Matrix trilogy (1999, 2003, 2003), 
Swordfish (2001), Live Free or Die Hard (2007), and Skyfall (2012).  
 In some contexts, the cybersecurity lens is useful and appropriate. There are 
cybercriminals trying to steal personal information, military secrets, and corporate 
intellectual property, and one way to prevent that loss is by identifying those threats, 
arresting the perpetrators, and using offensive cyber weapons to disrupt adversaries’ 
systems. But this cybersecurity lens—inspired by law enforcement, criminal justice, 
and military intelligence—can also act as a set of blinders, leading one to 
underappreciate aspects of network robustness and resiliency which do not fit this 
adversarial narrative. For example, the cybersecurity framework does not address 
network failures caused by natural disasters, human error, or buggy code; the 
framework’s feudal notion of responsibility makes it ill-suited for mobilizing the 
collective action needed to respond to large-scale malware outbreaks; and it tends to 
downplay or ignore the myriad (but sometimes subtle) ways that poor network 
robustness and resiliency impact personal wellbeing. Together, these limitations 
suggest the cybersecurity lens is too narrow to serve as an overarching way for 
policymakers to conceptualize the digital landscape. 
While the cybersecurity lens may not be up to the task, there are reasons to 
believe that an overarching framework for conceptualizing our relationship to digital 
 
13 Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act, HR 4036, 115th Congress, 1st session (2017), 
https://www.congress.gov/115/bills/hr4036/BILLS-115hr4036ih.pdf. 
14 Peter Trim and David Upton, Cyber Security Culture: Countering Cyber Threats 
Through Organizational Learning and Training (Farnam: Gower Publishing, 2013). 
15 Kaplan, Dark Territory. 
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information and networks is needed to create effective, consistent, and justifiable 
technology policies. Without an overarching guide, technology policy has often been 
crafted as an ad hoc reaction to the latest security crisis. In turn, this has often led to 
conflicting cybersecurity strategies, spotty protection of individual rights, and 
ineffective international collaboration on matters of mutual concern.16 In the proper 
context, the cybersecurity lens is very useful, but all too often it is treated as the one 
true way to conceptualize the digital landscape.  
As mentioned above, the alternative framework I will present in this 
dissertation is inspired by the philosophy of public health. Although an approach 
inspired by the philosophy of public health may seem odd at first, the language of 
epidemiology and public health has been used to describe digital networks for 
decades. In 1993 David Chess, Jeffrey Kephart, and Steve White of the IBM Thomas 
J. Watson Research Center fleshed out the first biological analogy for self-replicating 
computer viruses as a way to think about using the tools of epidemiology to improve 
the health of computer networks.17 Brent Rowe, Tony Lentz, and Michael Halpern of 
RTI International expanded on this analogy to create an entire framework for 
comparing types of cyberattacks to their biological counterparts, borrowing ideas 
from public health like communicability, risk behaviours, and environmental 
exposures.18 This effort to systematize threats was aimed at helping cybersecurity 
experts categorize types of risk, suggest potential prevention strategies, and 
understand individuals’ risk preferences.19   
 
16 Elaine Sedenberg and Deirdre Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for 
Cybersecurity Information Sharing,” Berkeley Technology Law Journal 30, no. 3 
(2015): 6.; Nazli Choucri, Stuart Madnick, and Priscilla Koepke, “Institutions for 
Cyber Security: International Responses and Data Sharing Initiatives,” Working 
Paper Cybersecurity Interdisciplinary Systems Laboratory, MIT, October 2016, 
http://web.mit.edu/smadnick/www/wp/2016-10.pdf (accessed May 29, 2017). 
17 Jeffrey O. Kephart, Steve R. White, and David M. Chess, “Computers and 
Epidemiology,” Spectrum IEEE 30, no. 5 (1993): 20.  
18 Brent Rowe, Michael Halpern, and Tony Lentz, “Is a Public Health Framework the 
Cure for Cyber Security?,” Cross-Talk 25, no. 6 (2012): 31-32. 
19 Ibid., 30. 
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More recently, Robert May and Alun Lloyd have explored the similarities 
between how viruses spread in human and computer networks. Focusing on the work 
of physicists Romualdo Pastor-Satorras and Alessandro Vespignani, May and Lloyd 
identified that epidemic spreading in scale-free networks like the World Wide Web 
bore significant similarities to the spread of infection in sexual-partner networks and 
suggested future study of computer networks for those seeking to manage 
epidemics.20 These similarities have proved useful in helping to develop more flexible 
and automated cyber defences based on epidemiological strategies to combat 
infection.21 One specific application is Scott Charney’s development of device health 
certificates as a way to encourage digital herd immunity.22 While these comparisons 
of malware to biological viruses are useful and revealing, in this work I will deepen 
this analogy in new and illuminating ways by demonstrating that a public health 
inspired approach is not only useful for describing malware, but can also serve as an 
overarching guide to create technology policy which promotes health and wellbeing, 
while protecting individuals’ rights.  
I call this alternative approach “Public Cyberhealth.” By cyberhealth I mean 
the robustness and resiliency of a network, be it a home network or the entire internet. 
Whereas cybersecurity only refers to problems caused by adversaries,23 cyberhealth 
takes into account a network’s ability to withstand and recover from buggy code, 
natural disasters, and human error, in addition to malicious threats. In contrast to the 
cybersecurity framework described previously, Public Cyberhealth addresses both 
malicious and non-malicious cyber threats; highlights the ways in which cyber threats 
and interventions impact health, wellbeing, and individuals’ rights; and uses the 
 
20 Alun Lloyd and Robert May, “How Viruses Spread Among Computers and 
People,” Science 292 (2001): 1316. 
21 United States Department of Homeland Security, “Enabling Distributed Security in 
Cyberspace,” United States Department of Homeland Security, 2011, 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nppd-cyber-ecosystem-white-paper-03-23-
2011.pdf. 
22 Scott Charney, “Collective Defense: Applying the Public-Health Model to the 
Internet,” Security & Privacy IEEE 10, no. 2 (2012): 55. 
23 P. W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014), 34. 
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philosophy of public health to understand the normative justification for—and the 
ethical limits on—government interventions in cyberspace. Furthermore, this 
approach is not only a useful and coherent way of thinking about technology policy, 
but also reveals interesting and surprising things about the nature of health, wellbeing, 
and identity in the digital age. 
 
0.1 Structure 
The four chapters in this dissertation work together to demonstrate the coherence and 
utility of the Public Cyberhealth framework. First, in Chapter 1, I will demonstrate 
one application of the public health approach—the provisioning of public goods. 
While public goods are by no means unique to public health, the public goods which 
are relevant to promoting robust digital networks are similar to those which are 
relevant to public health, including monitoring programs, regulatory regimes, and 
herd immunity. Specifically, using the example of the Conficker computer worm, I 
will demonstrate how the containment of infectious diseases suggests useful ways to 
think about the containment of malware. The first similarity between these two public 
goods is that they are Global Public Goods (GPGs)—public goods which require 
global cooperation and produce global benefits. GPGs are unlike other public goods 
in that they require states to work together in a context where no one state possesses 
the authority to compel another state to act. A prime example is the World Health 
Organization’s monitoring of infectious diseases. The second similarity between these 
public goods is that they are participatory public goods. Unlike many public goods, a 
participatory public good requires the beneficiaries to participate in the creation of the 
good beyond merely paying their taxes. The paradigmatic participatory public good is 
herd immunity. In the public health context herd immunity requires one to get 
vaccinated, while in the digital context one must patch one’s devices. In both cases, 
once a certain percentage of the network is protected, it is significantly more difficult 
for infections to spread. While the containment of malware and the containment of 
communicable disease are not perfectly analogous, the philosophy of public health 
can help us think through how to fairly and adequately produce the public goods 
which promote cyberhealth. 
 Having demonstrated the utility of the public health approach for addressing a 
classic cybersecurity problem like malware, in Chapter 2 I will more formally and 
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comprehensively define the Public Cyberhealth framework using the method of 
Levels of Abstraction (LoA). This method, popularized by Luciano Floridi,24 is based 
on the concept that whenever we consider a given system, such as digital networks, 
we highlight certain variables, observables, and behaviours that are relevant to our 
goal and downplay those we deem irrelevant. The variables, observables, and 
behaviours we use to model the system comprise a ‘level of abstraction’ or LoA. This 
method is useful for clearly defining a framework’s purpose, outlining the 
assumptions of one’s framework, and for comparing the utility and coherence of 
competing frameworks.25 In this chapter, I will use the method of LoA to compare the 
competing frameworks of Cybersecurity and Public Cyberhealth, demonstrating the 
inadequacy of the former and the promise of the latter.  
 In Chapters 3 and 4, I will then further flesh out the Public Cyberhealth 
framework by exploring what it means to conceptualize the digital landscape with 
health and wellbeing front and centre. First, in Chapter 3, I will explore the ways in 
which poor cyberhealth impacts health. Demonstrating that poor cyberhealth has the 
ability to significantly impact health, 1) strengthens the normative justification for 
viewing the digital landscape through a public health inspired LoA and 2) strengthens 
the justification for governments to invest more heavily in the public goods for 
cyberhealth discussed in Chapter 1. In the first half of the chapter, I will outline a 
number of straightforward ways in which poor cyberhealth can impact our health, 
including the insecurity of critical infrastructure (e.g. dams, water treatment, 
emergency services, etc.), medical devices (e.g. insulin pumps, defibrillators), and 
hospital infrastructure. Despite their importance to health, these systems and devices 
are often running old operating systems and remain unpatched. I will then explore 
how a lack of reliable network access can exacerbate existing health inequalities 
caused by poverty and geographic isolation; poor and rural populations without 
network access may receive a lower level of healthcare, have less access to their 
doctors, and may miss important public health information.  
 
24 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011).; Luciano Floridi, The Ethics of Information (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013). 
25 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information. 
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In the second half of Chapter 3, I will then look at more unusual cases where 
cyberhealth should itself be considered a constituent part of what it means to be 
healthy. I will argue that when an artificial component (e.g. a digital pacemaker) is 
coupled to a biological system, one should assess the functioning of this coupled 
system when determining whether an individual suffers from a pathology. This may 
require us to consider an individual with a properly functioning pacemaker as 
essentially disease-free, while simultaneously considering a malware infected 
pacemaker a pathology in and of itself. These cases raise interesting questions about 
bodily integrity, the regulation of medical devices, models of technology ownership, 
and what it means to be healthy in the 21st century. While the philosophy of public 
health and biology do not provide a single clear way to answer these questions, they 
provide the vocabulary and theory to explore these topics in nuanced ways which are 
sensitive to how policy, interventions, and inaction impact health, wellbeing, and 
rights.  
 Having demonstrated the significant ways in which poor cyberhealth can 
impact health, in Chapter 4 I will explore how one captures the impact of poor 
cyberhealth (i.e. poor network robustness and resiliency) on the broader notion of 
wellbeing. In this chapter, I will propose a theory of “informational wellbeing,” based 
on Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s capability approach to wellbeing which 
seeks to capture the myriad ways in which digital information and its use, control, 
accuracy, and accessibility impact personal wellbeing. I will specifically focus on 
Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach, which is centred around one’s 
ability to achieve ten fundamental capabilities, such as the ability to live a natural life 
span, the ability to be healthy, and the ability to have bodily integrity. I will argue that 
an individual has a high degree of informational wellbeing to the extent they have 
achieved the ‘informational capabilities and functionings’ (e.g. the ability to control 
access to their personal information, etc.) which are necessary to achieve fundamental 
human capabilities (e.g. the ability to live a normal lifespan). Using my theory, one 
can assess how a given technology policy or intervention impacts a person or group’s 
wellbeing. This is useful for assessing the success of existing policies in wellbeing 
terms and for creating new policies and products which promote wellbeing. 
Capturing the impact of poor cyberhealth on wellbeing is particularly relevant 
for the discussion of public goods for cyberhealth discussed in Chapter 1. Not only 
can a theory of informational wellbeing help one to understand the value of such 
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goods—strengthening the justification for their production—but it can help one to set 
thresholds for determining when a given good has been adequately produced. For 
example, one can determine that a state’s digital voting infrastructure is sufficiently 
secure when it no longer prevents one from being able to achieve the fundamental 
human capability of being able to participate politically.  
 Finally, I will argue that in addition to being instrumental to the fundamental 
capabilities listed by Nussbaum, in at least two ways the concept of informational 
wellbeing should itself be thought of as a fundamental capability on par with the other 
capabilities on Nussbaum’s list. First, in a logical extension of my argument in 
Chapter 3, I will argue that if one accepts that digital devices can be considered a part 
of someone’s body, then the proper functioning of these devices (and the networks 
they use) partly constitutes an individual’s health status. Second, I will argue that 
informational wellbeing is essential to the ability to define one’s self, an ability which 
underlies Sen and Nussbaum’s eudaimonism. Using Daniel Dennett’s narrative theory 
of the self, I will illustrate the important role personal information plays in defining 
the self. Then, I will argue that when the self is conceived of informationally, having 
an adequate degree of informational wellbeing partly constitutes the ability to define 
one’s self. Both cases suggest that eudaimonists like Sen and Nussbaum should 
consider having an adequate level of informational wellbeing to be central to what it 
means to flourish.  
 
0.2 A Note on Scope 
Nearly any of these chapters could have been expanded into its own dissertation. 
There is a danger in this breadth. Many of the topics I write about—wellbeing, 
definitions of disease, public goods, cybersecurity—have been debated in vast bodies 
of literature. Inevitably some important questions and arguments will be glossed over, 
while others may be entirely ignored. However, this breadth helps to define the 
landscape and demonstrate the viability of a public health approach as a full-blooded 
alternative to the existing cybersecurity lens. Ultimately, I have tried to strike a 
balance. While the topics I have chosen exhibit the broad utility of such an approach, 
they also work as part of a cohesive argument. 
Finally, note that most of these chapters follow a pattern of, first, presenting a 
relatively uncontroversial but significant point, then, a more controversial and more 
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interesting point. While this was not initially intended, I think it is appropriate given 
that digital technologies are relatively new, ubiquitous, and often ignored by 
philosophers. As such, there is value in both pointing out the straightforward but 
significant impact these technologies have on our lives and speculating about how 
these new technologies may be changing what it means to be a human in ways we are 
only just beginning to recognize. In Chapter 3, for instance, I begin by highlighting 
the health impacts of insecure critical infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, and 
conclude with a discussion about whether a broken pacemaker should be considered a 
pathology. My hope is that even if you doubt aspects of my more controversial 
arguments, I will nonetheless succeed in demonstrating the value of thinking about 
the digital landscape in public health terms.  
The stakes are high. Given the growing ubiquity of digital technologies, the 
explosion of digital personal information, the rapid development of artificial 
intelligence, and the increasing sophistication of biotechnologies, the potential for 
digital technologies to impact health and wellbeing will only grow in the coming 
years. While conceiving of cyberspace as a battlefield is understandable, it should not 
be the default for policymakers or product designers when there is an alternative 
framework that puts the promotion of health and wellbeing front and centre.  
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Chapter 1: 
Public Goods for Cyberhealth 
 
 
Public goods are central to public health policies and interventions. Some of these 
public goods include the containment of infectious diseases, public education 
campaigns, herd immunity, fundamental health research, regulatory regimes, the 
draining of malarial swamps, information sharing programs, and disease 
surveillance.1 Public goods are characterized by being non-rivalrous and non-
excludable.2 When a good is non-rivalrous, my consumption of the good does not 
diminish your ability to benefit from the good. For example, when a malarial swamp 
is drained, the benefit I receive does not diminish the benefit you receive. Meanwhile, 
when a good is non-excludable, an individual who does not participate in creating the 
good cannot easily be prevented from gaining the benefit. For example, one cannot 
prevent an unvaccinated individual from benefitting from herd immunity even though 
they have not contributed to the production of the good.3 Public goods can be 
contrasted with private goods, such as a slice of cake. Private goods are rivalrous and 
excludable. If there is one slice of cake at a cafe and I buy it, you can no longer 
purchase it, and a café can withhold a slice of cake from you until you pay. 
Identifying when a good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous is valuable because 
goods that have these characteristics tend to be underproduced by private markets. As 
 
1 Richard Smith, Robert Beaglehole, David Woodward, and Nick Drager, eds.,Global 
Public Goods for Health: Health Economic and Public Health Perspectives (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003).; Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern, eds., 
Global Public Goods (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 264-304. 
2 John G. Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1975), 69.; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999), 235. 
3 Angus Dawson, “Herd Protection as a Public Good: Vaccination and our 
Obligations to Others,” in Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health, eds. Angus Dawson 
and Marcel Verweij (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 163. 
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a result, public goods are often produced with some form of public assistance (e.g. 
subsidies, tax incentives, direct provisioning).4 
Despite the similarities between communicable diseases and malware 
discussed in the Introduction,5 the theory of public goods plays a relatively minor role 
in cybersecurity policy and practice compared to its prevalence in the field of public 
health. As a result, many non-excludable and non-rivalrous goods, such as the 
containment of malware, are treated as if they were private goods. This, in turn, leads 
to those goods being underproduced compared to the level that would be best for 
society on the whole. In this chapter, I will argue that the similarities between the 
mitigation of malware and the containment of communicable disease 1) suggest that 
the theory of public goods should play a more significant role in how we think about 
and maintain robust and resilient digital networks, and 2) that public goods for public 
health are the best example of how to provision said goods. Specifically, I will argue 
that one can learn valuable lessons about how to adequately and equitably provision 
public goods for cyberhealth by studying historical attempts to provision public goods 
for public health (e.g. the creation of the World Health Organization) and by 
analysing the problem through the lens of the philosophy of public health.  
In Section 1, I will provide a more detailed overview of public goods, describe 
their role in public health, and argue for the importance of public goods for 
maintaining the cyberhealth (i.e. robustness and resiliency) of large digital networks 
like the internet. In Section 2, I will focus on one specific public good for 
cyberhealth—the containment of malware. Using the example of the Conficker 
computer worm, I will argue that the containment of malware, like the containment of 
communicable diseases, is both a Global Public Good (GPG) and a participatory 
public good. I will argue that these similarities suggest that the containment of 
communicable diseases can provide useful insight into how best to design policies 
and institutions to contain malware. Finally, in Section 3, I will discuss what 
obligations states, individuals, and corporations have to contribute to the production 
of public goods for cyberhealth.  
While some researchers, such as Deirdre Mulligan and Fred Schneider, have 
previously argued that cybersecurity should be thought of as a public good, this 
 
4 Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare.  
5 Lloyd and May, “How Viruses Spread Among Computers and People.” 
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analysis generally has not gone beyond a superficial acknowledgement that the 
benefits of cybersecurity are to some degree non-rivalrous and non-excludable.6 
However, this superficial analysis is insufficient for determining the best way to 
provision public goods for cyberhealth, as public goods are a diverse set of outcomes 
and services which avoid easy categorization—the category of public goods includes 
goods as diverse as lighthouses and the containment of TB. Some public goods are 
presumptively beneficial, meaning almost no one would choose to live without them 
(e.g. national defence), while others are discretionary (e.g. fireworks displays). Some 
public goods are best created by direct government provisioning, while others may be 
best created by changing individuals’ and companies’ incentives through tax breaks 
and regulations. And some public goods are intrinsically “public” (e.g. broadcast 
television), while others can be made excludable in certain contexts (e.g. 
information). In order for public goods to be a useful category in the development of 
technology policy, one must go beyond the simple economic definition.  
Having demonstrated the value of a public health inspired approach for 
addressing a classic cybersecurity threat like malware, in Chapter 2 I will 
comprehensively and formally define the Public Cyberhealth framework and argue 
that it can help policymakers create coherent, justified, and ethical technology policies 
in a wide variety of contexts. While beginning with a case study and then introducing 
the theory may seem a bit backwards, this more concrete discussion will help to 
provide context for the more abstract discussion to come.  
 
1.1 Externalities, Public Goods, and Networks 
To understand public goods, it is first important to understand the concept of an 
externality. Externalities, also referred to as external economies or spillover effects, 
can be defined as, “an event which confers an appreciable benefit (inflicts an 
appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties 
in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in 
 
6 Deirdre K. Mulligan and Fred B. Schneider, “Doctrine for Cybersecurity,” Dædalus 
140, no. 4 (2011): 70-92. 
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question.”7 Colloquially we can think of externalities as side-effects which result from 
a given action. For example, when an individual with the flu does not wash their 
hands, other people who they meet will be more likely to catch flu. In this example, 
the spread of the flu is a negative externality of one’s personal decision to not wash 
one’s hands. Meanwhile, if someone gets a flu shot, not only is that individual’s risk 
of getting the flu lowered, but others in their network also receive some small degree 
of protection. The protection received by others in the network is a positive 
externality.  
Public goods are special extreme cases of positive externalities where 1) there 
is essentially no additional cost to expand the beneficial side-effect to another person 
(i.e. the good is non-rivalrous)8 and 2) there is often no easy way to prevent someone 
from gaining the beneficial side-effect (i.e. it is non-excludable). Recognizing when a 
good is non-rivalrous and non-excludable is important because goods with these 
characteristics are typically underproduced by private markets compared to the 
socially optimal level—this inefficient distribution of goods is a kind of market 
failure.9 Private markets fail to efficiently produce public goods as in an open market, 
it is “grossly unrealistic,” to use John Head’s phrase, to expect individuals to 
voluntarily pay for a benefit that they will receive for free.10 This, in turn, reduces the 
incentive for affected parties (such as individuals or companies) to produce said 
 
7 James E. Meade, The Theory of Economic Externalities: The Control of 
Environmental Pollution and Similar Social Costs (Geneva: Sijthoff-Leiden, 1973), 
15. 
8 Deborah Spar, “The Public Face of Cyberspace,” in Global Public Goods, eds. Inge 
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc Stern (New York; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 350. 
9 John O. Ledyard, “Market Failure,” in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 
eds. Palgrave Macmillan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-349-95121-5_1052-2.; It is worth noting that market 
failure does not imply none of the good will be produced—toll roads could be 
produced by private companies—but rather that the good will be produced 
inefficiently and social benefit will be unrealized. 
10 Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare, 170. 
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good.11 For example, let us assume a company announced a plan to drain a malarial 
swamp for a community at a cost of $100,000. While the benefit the community will 
receive on the whole is worth that cost, each individual may not be adequately 
incentivized to contribute their fair share to the cost because they will receive the 
good for free, assuming the $100,000 cost is eventually met and the company drains 
the swamp. Accepting a given benefit, without contributing to its production is called 
free-riding.12  
Another classic public good for public health that suffers from free-riding is 
herd immunity. As more people in a population get vaccinated, the ambient protection 
unvaccinated individuals receive increases. As this ambient protection increases, so 
does the incentive to free-ride (i.e. not get personally vaccinated).13 In general, when 
too many people free-ride, the public good in question will often cease to be produced 
at the socially optimal level. In the case of herd immunity, this failure is particularly 
stark as the relationship between passive protection and the vaccination rate of a 
population is not linear.14 I will explore one’s obligations to contribute to public 
goods in greater depth in Section 1.3. 
Many goods that are valuable to public health efforts are non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous, including disease surveillance, fundamental research, public health 
campaigns, herd immunity, and regulations. In each case, private markets will tend to 
underproduce the good in question compared to the level which would be best for 
society. When private markets fail to adequately provision a good, the state (if it 
 
11 Richard Smith, Robert Beaglehole, David Woodward, and Nick Drager, preface to 
Global Public Goods for Health: Health Economic and Public Health Perspectives, 
eds. Richard Smith, Robert Beaglehole, David Woodward, and Nick Drager (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), IX. 
12 George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Obligation, (Lantham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, 1992), 42. 
13 Paul Fine, Ken Eames, and David L. Heymann, “Herd Immunity,” Clinical 
Infectious Diseases 52, no. 7, April 1, 2011: 911–916. 
https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/cir007. 
14 Ibid. 
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chooses to intervene) can either directly provision said good or change the underlying 
incentives of the market to boost production and/or consumption.  
At the national level, the production of public goods can be encouraged via a 
number of governmental mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms include providing 
subsidies to individuals to lower the cost of consumption, tying one good to another 
(e.g. only vaccinated children can attend public school), mandating technical 
solutions, enacting taxes or fines, changing default options, or even physical coercion. 
To promote herd immunity, for instance, states deploy a number of these strategies. In 
the United States, children must be vaccinated to attend public schools, public 
education campaigns encourage vaccination, the state incentivizes manufacturers to 
produce vaccines, and the Vaccine Injury Compensation Program is intended to 
reassure individuals that they will receive assistance in the case of a negative side-
effect.15 At the international level, only some of these tools may be available as there 
is no world government with the authority to unilaterally enforce penalties. I will 
discuss this issue in more depth in Section 1.2, when I discuss global public goods 
(GPGs). 
It is important to note that not all public goods are equally non-excludable and 
non-rivalrous. In fact, there are very few (if any) “pure” public goods—national 
defence may come closest. While the degree of excludability and rivalrousness of a 
given good will impact the type and degree of government involvement needed to 
correct market failure (e.g. direct provisioning vs. incentives), all goods which 
possess these traits are, to some degree, undersupplied by private markets compared 
to the level that would be socially optimal.16 
 
15 Lee Ventola, “Immunization in the United States: Recommendations, Barriers, and 
Measures to Improve Compliance,” Pharmacy and Therapeutics 41, no. 7 (2016): 
426–436.; Health Resources and Services Administration, “National Vaccine Injury 
Compensation Program,” Health Resources and Services Administration, October 
2018, https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-compensation/index.html. 
16 David Woodward, and Richard Smith, “Global Public Goods and Health: Concepts 
and Issues,” in Global Public Goods for Health: Health Economic and Public Health 
Perspectives, eds. Richard Smith, Robert Beaglehole, David Woodward, and Nick 
Drager (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 4-5.; Head, Public Goods and 
Public Welfare, 80-81.; Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc A. Stern, 
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1.1.1 Public Goods for Cyberhealth 
While digital networks can be entirely built and managed by private markets, many of 
the elements which promote cyberhealth (i.e. network robustness and resiliency) have 
the characteristics of public goods discussed above. Some of these public goods 
include network protocols, standards, encryption algorithms, cybersecurity 
knowledge, and the containment of malware. Some of these goods have traditionally 
been produced by public institutions (standards), while others have historically been 
treated as essentially private goods (the containment of malware). In each case, 
however, these goods are to varying degrees non-rivalrous and non-excludable.  
 One textbook example of a public good for cyberhealth is the creation of the 
Data Encryption Standard (DES). In 1972, the United States’ National Bureau of 
Standards (NBS)—now the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)—
determined the government needed an encryption algorithm for encrypting 
unclassified but sensitive material.17 The NBS requested proposals for a cipher 
meeting a rigorous set of criteria, and in 1974 IBM submitted a cipher which—after 
being tweaked by the NSA—was accepted. While the DES has since been replaced by 
stronger algorithms, it served as a national standard used across a wide range of 
industries for decades.18 Once the cipher was publically released, anyone could take 
advantage of it, and one individual’s use did not diminish another’s ability to use the 
cipher. As such, the DES was non-excludable and non-rivalrous.  
It is more controversial to declare cybersecurity itself a public good due to it 
being historically produced as if it were a private good. By cybersecurity I mean the 
state of a network being able to repel malicious attacks and preserve the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the digital information that is transmitted 
and stored on the network. However, upon closer examination, the benefits of 
cybersecurity are generally non-rivalrous and non-excludable, even as some of the 
 
“Introduction,” in Global Public Goods, eds. Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, and Marc 
A. Stern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), XX. 
17 Gallagher, Link, and Rowe, Cyber Security, 144. 
18 Ibid. 
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goods used to create a secure network are private goods (e.g. hardware).19 As is the 
case with public goods like herd immunity, the fact that the benefits of cybersecurity 
are non-rivalrous and non-excludable can lead to its underproduction. Describing the 
externalities which lead to the underproduction of cybersecurity by private markets, 
Gallagher, Link, and Rowe argue that any cybersecurity improvement a company or 
individual makes, especially of a proactive variety, will create “social benefits in 
excess of private benefits.”20 Examples of investments or behaviours which generate 
positive externalities include intrusion detection systems, automated security 
patching, and practicing safe browsing. When your computer is secure, there is one 
fewer node which can pass on malware to me, and one fewer machine which can be 
drafted into a botnet which could attack critical infrastructure. In both instances, I am 
gaining a benefit for which I am not paying. When determining how much one should 
invest in cybersecurity, an individual or company tends to consider their personal 
benefits and costs, while ignoring these broader social benefits. While these 
externalities are not in and of themselves public goods, in aggregate they lead to a 
safer digital environment which produces benefits which are non-rivalrous and non-
excludable. As digital networks underpin nearly all forms of critical infrastructure 
(e.g. water treatment, dams, banks, emergency services), the social benefits of 
cybersecurity are distributed widely. Even if one does not personally use the internet, 
one will likely benefit from the increased security of these critical networks.  
Having said this, rather than focus on cybersecurity itself—which is too large 
a topic for one chapter—for the remainder of the chapter I will focus on one important 
aspect of cybersecurity, the containment of malware and its similarity to the 
 
19 Johannes Bauer and Michel Van Eeten, "Cybersecurity: Stakeholder Incentives, 
Externalities, and Policy Options," Telecommunications Policy 33, no. 10 (2009): 
706-19.; Arben Asllani, Charles Stephen White, and Lawrence Ettkin. “Viewing 
Cybersecurity as a Public Good: The Role of Governments, Businesses, And 
Individuals,” Journal of Legal, Ethical and Regulatory Issues 16, no. 1 (2013): 7-14. 
19 Gallagher, Link, and Rowe, Cyber Security, 248.; Software occupies a middle 
ground between private and public goods. It can be thought of as a club good, like 
internet access itself. Club goods are non-rivalrous, but can be made excludable if the 
creator chooses, such as by requiring one to purchase a license.  
20 Gallagher, Link, and Rowe, Cyber Security, 248. 
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containment of communicable disease. While the public health approach is useful for 
addressing a wide range of issues related to network robustness and resiliency, this 
example will help demonstrate that even if one is only interested in archetypal matters 
of cybersecurity, there is value to using a public health lens. 
 
1.2 The Containment of Malware 
The containment of malware is particularly relevant for this discussion as 1) it is 
extremely important to robustness and resiliency of networks, 2) it displays the traits 
of a public good, and yet 3) it has largely been treated as if it were a private good 
capable of being adequately produced by private markets. As such, it is a likely 
candidate to be underproduced compared to the socially optimal level. Additionally, 
its similarity to the containment of communicable diseases suggests a public health 
approach can serve as a valuable template for how to adequately and equitably 
provision the good.  
Rather than speak in generalities, it will be helpful to focus on one specific 
malware threat—the Conficker worm. While there have been many more recent and 
harmful global malware threats (e.g. WannaCry, Mirai), the Conficker case is 
particularly well-documented, and thus it is a good example for understanding the 
roles the private and public sectors have traditionally played in containing malware.21 
My expanded treatment of this case study can be found in the cybersecurity policy 
book Rewired.  
 
1.2.1 The Conficker Infection 
On October 23, 2008, during the eighth annual meeting of the International Botnet 
Task Force, Microsoft released an out-of-band emergency security patch. The patch 
fixed a Windows vulnerability which could allow malware to spread between 
unprotected machines without any user interaction.22 While releasing an emergency 
 
21 Michael Thornton, “Containing Conficker,” in Rewired, eds. Ryan Ellis and Vivek 
Mohan (Hoboken: Wiley, 2019). 
22 The Rendon Group, “Conficker Working Group: Lessons Learned,” The Rendon 
Group, (2010), 
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patch cast a spotlight on the vulnerability, Microsoft had already seen the flaw 
exploited in the wild. On November 22nd, a month after the patch’s release, a new 
piece of highly-contagious malware—the Conficker worm—was first detected. In 
response, Microsoft issued a security alert recommending people immediately patch 
their systems. 
For the most part, Conficker A (as it would come to be called) simply hid 
among a computer’s background activity. However, when it was time to call home for 
instructions, the worm would contact 250 pseudo-randomly generated domains spread 
out across 5 Top Level Domains (TLDs).23 Behind any of those domains, the creators 
of the worm could be waiting to issue commands. A few weeks later a more 
sophisticated variant called Conficker B appeared which could propagate via thumb 
drives, disable Windows Automatic Update, block certain DNS look-ups, and call 
domains from eight TLDs.24 While individually these strategies were not new, it was 
unusual for so many features to be packed into a single piece of malware. More than 
one researcher described it as “elegant.”25 By the end of 2008, SRI International 
estimated between 1-1.5 million computers were infected.26 Over the following five 
months, three additional versions of the worm would be introduced. At its peak in 
2009, Conficker infected between 5 and 13 million machines.27 While the worm’s 
purpose was not clear, a botnet of that size could be used to disrupt critical 
infrastructure, including large parts of the internet.  
While Microsoft’s release of an emergency patch was a sign that the 
vulnerability was particularly dangerous, in general the cybersecurity community (and 
especially governments) were slow to recognize the scope of the problem. While in 
late 2008 the worm was being discussed with increased frequency on a number of 
 
http://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/wiki/uploads/Conficker_Working_Group_Le
ssons_Learned_17_June_2010_final.pdf (accessed Feb. 20, 2019). 
23 Common TLDs include .com, .org., .gov., etc. 
24 Dave Piscitello, “Conficker Summary and Review,” ICANN, 2010, 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/conficker-summary-review-07may10-
en.pdf. 
25 Ibid., 5. 
26 The Rendon Group, “Conficker Working Group: Lessons Learned,” 16. 
27 Ibid., 10. 
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cybersecurity e-mail lists,28 until early 2009 there was little organized activity within 
the private sector to control the spread of the worm. Governments, meanwhile, were 
entirely absent from the discussion. The security firm Qualys estimated that two 
months after the emergency patch was released 30 per cent of computers running 
Windows remained unpatched.29 The absence of government involvement should 
have raised red flags, given that the benefit of containing Conficker would be non-
rivalrous and non-excludable—one need not contribute to this effort to reap the 
benefit, and one person’s benefit would not diminish the benefit to others. 
A small number of security experts, who would later call themselves the 
Conficker Working Group (CWG), did notice that Conficker threatened the internet at 
large. Shortly after the worm’s appearance, they began to study the worm and devise 
ways to control it. Early members of the all-volunteer CWG, many of who knew each 
other from conferences and social media, included representatives of Microsoft, SRI 
International, and several companies which managed TLDs, as well as a number of 
independent security researchers and academics. Relatively quickly it was discovered 
that the domain names which could be used for command and control 
communications were not random. By running the domain name generation algorithm 
for a future date, the group could identify the domains that would be called and 
register the names themselves (often with personal credit cards) before the worm’s 
creators could use them for passing the botnet instructions. When infected computers 
called these domains, the CWG redirected the traffic to designated sinkhole servers30 
which were then used to map the spread of the infection. 
This strategy worked reasonably well until the introduction of the Conficker C 
variant in late February 2009. In reaction to the CWG’s sinkholing project, the 
creators of Conficker C designed the new version to generate a list of 50,000 domains 
every day from among a list of 116 TLDs. Unlike in the past, this list included not 
only general TLDs (e.g. .org, .biz) but over 100 country level domains (e.g. .cn, .fr). 
Each day an infected machine would attempt to contact 500 domains from this list of 
 
28 Ibid., 16. 
29 Ibid., 4. 
30 A sinkhole server is a server used by researchers or law enforcement to capture 
traffic intended for another source. When a machine attempts to call a given domain, 
the DNS server will reroute that call to the designated sinkhole server.   
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50,000. In order for the sinkholing strategy to continue to work, the organizations and 
companies managing these TLDs would need to work together to block 50,000 
domain names a day, forever. In some countries this practice was of dubious legality, 
and in some cases domains were already owned and operated for legitimate purposes. 
Additionally, the strategy relied on the International Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) agreeing to waive its fees for registering the domains—
something that had never before been asked. Despite these difficulties, the CWG—
now numbering hundreds of volunteers—was ultimately able to convince the relevant 
stakeholders to cooperate by leveraging personal connections, although a number of 
the companies that managed TLDs dragged their feet.  
This work went on with essentially no government involvement. Despite 
repeatedly trying to raise the alarm in Washington, the CWG was largely rebuffed. 
While leaders of the CWG eventually were able to meet with U.S. government 
officials, the U.S. government generally failed to understand the risk and was ill 
prepared to take any kind of active role in mitigation efforts. One member of the 
working group would later sum up the U.S. government’s role as “zero involvement, 
zero activity, zero knowledge.”31  
While the Conficker worm ultimately infected between 5-13 million 
machines, the catastrophe that was feared never came to pass. Having said this, it is 
unclear how much credit the CWG deserves. While the sinkholing effort was 
generally successful at keeping the creators of the worm from taking control of the 
botnet (a few domains did slip through), later variants of the worm possessed the 
ability to pass on instructions via peer-to-peer connections. Even if the sinkholing 
project was perfect, the creators of Conficker could have circumvented the CWG’s 
efforts by using this slower payload delivery system. Additionally, there was nothing 
stopping the creators from simply upping the number of domains that needed to be 
blocked. Would the organizations which manage TLDs voluntarily block 100,000 
domains a day? What about 500,000? Whether the heat became too much, or the 
effort too costly, the creators of the Conficker botnet never implemented their master 
plan (if there was one to begin with).  
Before dissecting the flaws in the CWG’s approach, it is worth noting their 
successes. The CWG’s greatest successes were rallying an unprecedented degree of 
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private sector collaboration and gaining cooperation from ICANN and the TLDs 
without any enforcement authority. Despite at times conflicting incentives, twenty 
private companies and a number of non-profits were mostly able to work together 
effectively. Decisions on information sharing and strategy were generally made by 
consensus and decisions on when to talk to the press were typically made as a group. 
While some key members were accused of sharing information with other 
stakeholders or the press for selfish reasons,32 these instances were relatively rare and 
ultimately not fatal to the overall project. CWG members cited the informal 
organization and lack of a hierarchy as major factors in keeping the group together. 
Additionally, the fact that many members knew each other via social media helped 
facilitate trust.33  
In the Lessons Learned report, the leaders of the CWG listed the following as 
failures or downsides to their model: remediation efforts (they did little to remove 
Conficker from infected machines), communication with ISPs, collaboration and 
information sharing with the U.S. government, public relations, a lack of 
accountability, a lack of a tasking authority, and balancing inclusion of stakeholders 
with efficiency.34 The last three entries on the list are perhaps the required cost of the 
informal organization and reliance on social networks that contributed to the group’s 
successes. In regard to government collaboration, members specifically mentioned 
U.S. government representatives being willing to take information (including 
plagiarizing CWG slides) without providing any information or resources in return.  
When thinking about the CWG or other private sector responses as a model 
for future large-scale malware control efforts, the most important questions are: How 
repeatable are the successes? and How fixable are the failures? First, I will consider 
the successes. 
While in the case of Conficker the private sector collaboration was impressive, 
the fact that companies often have conflicting incentives means there is always the 
risk that a collaboration effort like the CWG will break down as underlying incentives 
shift. Additionally, the incentives which brought private companies together for 
Conficker may be slightly different and less persuasive in the case of other large-scale 
 
32 Mark Bowden, Worm (London: Grove Press UK, 2011) 232. 
33 The Rendon Group, “Conficker Working Group: Lessons Learned.” 
34 Ibid., 34-36. 
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malware threats which nonetheless need attention. One fundamental conflict is 
between security companies, which sell remediation tools, and Microsoft, which seeks 
to patch vulnerable machines before they become infected. Companies will also 
always have strong incentives to talk up their own efforts in the media. This caused 
tensions within the CWG and surely would in future efforts as well.35 Additionally, 
there is no guarantee that TLDs would voluntarily and universally support future 
large-scale domain registration.36 While the sinkholing strategy was mostly successful 
in the case of Conficker, multiple TLDs dragged their feet and balked at the initial 
ask.37 As of 2018, there remains no enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance. 
On the whole, while the CWG’s successes were impressive and admirable within the 
context of this specific threat, it is unlikely that the same level of cooperation and 
collaboration can be counted on to control future threats—more dangerous threats 
may not be able to be contained by voluntary efforts, and less dangerous (or more 
highly targeted) threats may not sufficiently inspire broad collaboration.38 
I am equally pessimistic that the failures of the CWG’s model can be easily 
fixed. Without a leadership structure, it is almost impossible to effectively and 
repeatedly assign tasks and hold people accountable. Likewise, without organizational 
permanence it is difficult to build better working relationships with ISPs and 
governments. While loose networks of technical experts may be great at solving 
complex engineering problems and will surely be needed to address future threats, 
they are ill-suited to coordinating an ongoing international crisis response effort, let 
alone several simultaneously.  
In the Lessons Learned report, several participants suggested that if only the 
CWG had two to three full-time administrative resources, many of the flaws of the 
CWG’s structure could be fixed, but this ignores the fundamental issue that states 
cannot responsibly leave the protection of critical infrastructure to volunteers. The 
ICANN post-mortem specifically mentioned that one cannot rely on a similar calibre 
of volunteer the next time around and questioned the group’s ability to potentially 
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deal with two threats simultaneously.39 One member reinforced this concern, saying 
the only reason the Zeus Trojan spread so widely was that everyone was focused on 
Conficker.40 In Worm, Mark Bowden characterizes the members of the CWG as the 
X-Men—outsiders who possess almost supernatural skills and swoop in to save the 
day. The problem with the X-Men is that sometimes they save the planet and 
sometimes they start a civil war.  
Given that the benefit being produced is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, 
there are good reasons to believe that, in the long run, a public health approach to 
infections like Conficker will be superior to the ad hoc volunteer approach of the 
CWG. Specifically, a public health approach will be more reliable and more likely to 
act in the public interest. In the following section, I will describe how the containment 
of communicable diseases can serve as a template for how to adequately provision 
public goods for cyberhealth like the containment of malware. Then in Section 1.3, I 
will discuss what obligations states, corporations, and individuals have to contribute 
to the production of public goods for cyberhealth.  
 
1.2.2 Global Public Goods and Malware 
One of the primary reasons to think that a public health approach to the containment 
of malware may be useful is that both the containment of malware and the 
containment of communicable diseases belong to a special class of public goods 
whose benefits are global. While researchers and companies in the United States took 
the lead in the containment, all countries benefitted from the containment. Even if the 
CWG had wanted to restrict the benefit to countries who had contributed to the effort, 
they would have been unable to do so. As the benefit of containing Conficker is non-
rivalrous, non-excludable, and transcends national borders, it is what is called a global 
public good (GPG). These traits are not unique to Conficker—the containment of all 
large-scale malware outbreaks will have these traits. In the context of global health 
policy, Kaul, Grunberg, and Stern define GPGs as those whose: 
Benefits are quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one 
group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population 
groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or 
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at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing 
development options for future generations).41  
Classic examples of GPGs include the protection of the ozone layer, efforts to combat 
climate change, and, most relevant to this work, the containment of communicable 
diseases.  
In some ways, GPGs are not qualitatively different from national public 
goods. As William Nordhaus says, “They are only ones where the effects spill widely 
around the world and for a long time to come.”42 However, while most public goods 
are produced at the national level by national governments with the power to coerce, 
global public goods must be produced by the wilful collaboration of states. We can 
see this need for global collaboration in the case of Conficker. Even if the United 
States demanded that all TLDs managed within its borders participated in the 
sinkholing project, the worm could simply call a domain outside the United States for 
commands.  
As mentioned in Section 1, most public goods can be produced using a variety 
of tools (e.g. subsidies, direct provisioning, standards) as long as the national 
government has the will to do so, but in the international context the proliferation of 
actors and the lack of a global government make it much harder to achieve a 
consensus on appropriate action. The lack of a central authority also makes it difficult 
to coerce free-riding countries to contribute their fair share.43 Tools like withholding 
aid create additional ethical problems. As Nordhaus describes the problem, “there is 
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no legal mechanism by which disinterested majorities, or supermajorities short of 
unanimities, can coerce reluctant free-riding countries into mechanisms that provide 
for global public goods.”44 He calls this the ‘Westphalian dilemma,’ as it is inherent 
in our understanding of sovereign states. States must consent to any form of coercion 
by joining international agreements and organizations which establish binding 
responsibilities, but the non-excludability of any public good means there are 
substantial incentives for states to free-ride. Lastly, GPGs are also different from 
typical issues of international concern like tariffs or border issues in that they often 
require joint facilities as well as internal national policies to converge.45  
One can imagine a spectrum where public goods that can be adequately 
produced at the national level are on the left and public goods which can only be 
adequately produced by the global community on the right. Public roads may fall all 
the way to the left, while all the way on the right sits protection of the ozone layer. 
Somewhere in between are public goods which can be produced at the national level, 
but those national level solutions will be insufficient to bring about the optimal 
outcome. Generally, those on the right, like the protection of the ozone layer are 
intrinsically global, while those which fall somewhere in the middle are historically 
national public goods which have become global due to the opening of borders and 
the increasing interconnectedness of modern societies. The containment of 
communicable diseases and the containment of malware fall into this middle ground. 
While global collaboration may be required to achieve an optimal outcome, an 
individual state would still receive some benefit from vaccinating its population or 
protecting its essential networks even in the face of international apathy.46  
We can see this dynamic in the eradication of a disease like smallpox. In the 
United States, vaccination efforts controlled smallpox at the national level, such that 
the last naturally occurring outbreak occurred in 1949.47 However, only through an 
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aggressive international effort organized by the World Health Organization (WHO), 
could the United States ensure the disease would not be reintroduced. While the 
United States reaped substantial benefits from its national vaccination campaign, the 
socially optimal outcome could only be achieved through a global eradication 
campaign consisting of diligent monitoring and vaccination campaigns. That is to say, 
securing the “national” public good, required the production of a global public good, 
which could only be produced through global agreement. 
Similarly, in the case of Conficker, if a given state had required individuals 
and companies to install Microsoft’s security patch, individuals and companies in that 
state would have gained protection from certain harms. For instance, these patched 
machines could not be drafted into the Conficker botnet, nor could the worm be used 
to install other malware on these machines. However, if the worm remained 
uncontained in other countries, the country with a high patch rate could still be the 
victim of DDoS attacks from this international botnet. As an example, one could look 
to the Mirai botnet’s attack on Liberia’s internet in 2016. While relatively few of the 
devices that comprised the Mirai botnet were in Liberia, a DDoS attack on the 
country’s internet service providers was able to shutdown the country’s internet for 
several days.48  
As the containment of malware exists somewhere in the middle of the 
spectrum between national public goods and “pure” global public goods (e.g. 
protection of the ozone layer), one could imagine two paths forward. Either states can 
erect stronger borders and treat the containment of malware as a national public good, 
or they can keep open internet borders and engage in greater levels of international 
collaboration. While both paths are logistically difficult, the first may also be of 
limited effectiveness unless a state is willing to fully cut itself off from the internet, as 
illustrated by the case of Liberia and Mirai mentioned previously. As even states like 
China, with notoriously tight control on internet activity, remain connected to the 
internet, I will focus on the second option—increased international collaboration.  
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Since Conficker there have been some tentative steps towards greater 
international collaboration on digital matters of mutual concern (e.g. the Global 
Alliance against Child Sexual Abuse Online), but these efforts have typically been 
relatively small scale and created in an ad hoc manner. As states have generally 
chosen this open borders approach in the face of communicable diseases, public 
health efforts, such as the creation of the WHO and the International Health 
Regulations, are a valuable historical guide for how to produce public goods at the 
global level.  
 
1.2.3 The WHO and Disease Monitoring 
In broad strokes, the public health approach to containing communicable disease at 
the global level involved building consensus among states as to what constituted a 
shared risk, creating international institutions to monitor a limited number of diseases, 
and then using those institutions, such as the WHO, to continue to build consensus 
and broaden the mandate over time. According to Mark Zacher, the modern notion of 
disease surveillance originated in 1897 at the International Sanitary Conference when 
participating countries recognized the need for some kind of global disease 
surveillance.49 As the benefit of disease surveillance is non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, private market solutions were ill-suited to the task, and while individual 
states could monitor diseases within their own borders, these efforts were insufficient 
to mitigate the threat since diseases could easily cross borders.  
In 1902 the newly formed Pan-American Sanitary Bureau was charged with 
collecting and sharing information on disease outbreaks, and a year later the 
International Sanitary Convention was adopted which called for the creation of a new 
international organization to monitor diseases. The organization that was 
subsequently formed was called the Organisation Internationale Publique which along 
with the Health Organization of the League of Nations was a precursor to the WHO, 
established in 1948.50 With the introduction of the International Sanitary Regulations 
in 1951, the WHO began to require states to report cases of designated diseases to the 
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organization within twenty-four hours.51 These regulations were renamed the 
International Health Regulations in 1969. While originally only concerning four 
diseases, the IHR was revised in 2005 to require states to notify the WHO of all 
events that may constitute a public health emergency of international concern and to 
respond to requests for verification of information regarding such events.”52  
Over time the mandate of the WHO has continued to expand to encompass the 
production of numerous public goods that would likely be underproduced if 
production was left in the hands of either private markets or national health services 
acting in their own (national) self-interest. In addition to disease surveillance, the 
WHO serves as a centre for research, crisis coordination, training, standards for 
readiness and response, and information sharing.53 While GPGs need global 
collaboration to be produced, it is important to note that states play a fundamental role 
in the provisioning of GPGs. While the WHO provides logistical support and directly 
provisions some of these goods, the organization works in close collaboration with 
national public health agencies, such as the United States’ Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC), European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), 
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC), and Public Health 
England.  
The cyberhealth equivalent may involve building an international institution 
that is equivalent to the WHO—a World Cyberhealth Organization. As mentioned 
previously, many of the types of public goods which the WHO provides are also 
critical to cyberhealth, including fundamental research, crisis coordination, response 
and readiness standards, training, ongoing monitoring programs, and information 
sharing. While in this chapter I have focused on malware, many of these public goods 
could also mitigate the harmful network impacts of environmental threats or human 
error. A World Cyberhealth Organization would have ongoing relationships with the 
organizations, companies, and states that manage TLDs and internet infrastructure 
(e.g. DNS, security certificates, transmission lines, routing equipment), and would 
possess coercive tools not available to an ad-hoc volunteer group like the CWG. A 
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World Cyberhealth Organization would also address many of the organizational 
problems of the CWG by having the authority to delegate tasks and hold people and 
organizations accountable. This accountability would also extend to the organization 
itself as governmental and inter-governmental organizations ultimately—if 
indirectly—fall under the purview of elected leaders. In the case of the WHO, the 
governing body is comprised of representatives from all WHO member states.54 If the 
CWG had failed in its mission, there would have been no justifiable reason or 
mechanism to hold them accountable for their failure. Meanwhile, many of the 
strengths of the CWG could still be preserved by a World Cyberhealth Organization. 
If an issue exceeded the technical capabilities of the organization, specialized working 
groups of independent and private sector security experts could still be convened, but 
those groups would have institutional resources and legitimate authority to implement 
their solutions.  
Such an organization could also deploy preventative strategies, which were 
unavailable to the CWG. In the public health context, one example of this approach is 
the WHO’s standards on the prevention of drug use and non-communicable disease. 
In the case of drug use, the WHO encourages interventions targeting pregnant 
women, early childhood education, addressing mental health disorders, keeping 
children in school, mentoring programs, and media campaigns, rather than simply 
treating individuals after they have developed an addiction.55 Meanwhile, in regards 
to non-communicable diseases, the WHO recommends surveillance, reduction of risk 
factors, and the promotion of health across the life course as the most effective way of 
reducing premature death and disability.56 In the case of Conficker, a preventative 
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approach would have been preferable to the CWG’s reactive approach. While forcing 
people to patch their systems may have been overly burdensome,57 public education 
campaigns and tighter security standards could have sufficiently mitigated the risk—a 
botnet of half a million machines poses far less of a risk to critical infrastructure than 
one of 10 million.  
While it may seem like the conversation has shifted from the value of public 
goods to the value of prevention strategies, the two issues are closely related, for two 
reasons. First, when faced with threats like malware or contagious disease, individual 
actors acting in isolation (individuals, corporations, states) will tend to underinvest in 
preventative strategies (compared to the socially optimal level) because these 
strategies generate substantial externalities. As such, individual actors will not receive 
the full benefit of their actions. And second, private markets are often unable to 
implement preventative strategies to address global threats, as these strategies are 
ineffective without widespread international collaboration. As a result, preventative 
strategies can often only be deployed as part of a public response. 
While there is no World Cyberhealth Organization today, one may want to 
point to national institutions like the United States’ National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) as evidence that this public health 
approach to cybersecurity is already being explored at the national level. After all the 
NCCIC—part of the department of Homeland Security—is tasked with performing 
many of the functions I described previously (e.g. monitoring, crisis response, 
information sharing). However, while the creation of the NCCIC in 2009 suggests 
there is some recognition in the United States that the government should be 
providing public goods for cyberhealth, the organization is too small to effectively 
fulfil these functions. For example, as of 2016 the NCCIC only had seven 
cybersecurity advisors on staff to advise the private sector on the security of critical 
infrastructure—up from one in 2009.58 With such a small staff, it is not surprising that 
the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure is generally left in the hands of the private 
sector, despite these private companies often having conflicting incentives (e.g. 
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updating their systems eats into profits). Additionally, as part of the security 
apparatus, the NCCIC has its own conflicts of interest, at least from an international 
point of view. For instance, in certain cases it may be in the strategic interest of the 
United States to withhold certain information that would benefit the world 
community, such as the existence of certain vulnerabilities that have strategic value to 
intelligence agencies. While someone operating within a public health mindset would 
be predisposed to share such information, one operating within a security framework 
is more likely to keep such information close to the vest.  
While the history of public health suggests a few cyber threats of common 
concern can serve as the basis for greater collaboration over time, today there is little 
agreement about what those common threats may be. While some types of network 
risks, such as spam, botnets, and ransomware negatively impact most countries, other 
risks such as intellectual property theft have asymmetric costs—the United States and 
Europe tend to be victims, while China benefits59 by using stolen intellectual property 
to bypass expensive research and development.60 Part of the problem is that we often 
conflate cybercrime with asymmetric costs (e.g. IP theft, military spying) with those 
that negatively impact all states (e.g. ransomware, spam). As a result, China and 
Russia have generally been wary of joining international enforcement efforts. Singer 
and Friedman describe the issue saying, “The parallel would be treating the actions of 
a prankster with fireworks, a bank robber with a revolver, an insurgent with a 
roadside bomb, and a state military with a cruise missile as if they were all the same 
phenomenon simply because their tools all involved the same chemistry of 
gunpowder.”61 However, there are signs that greater collaboration is possible. The 
past two-decades has seen the creation of international and regional CERTs 
(Computer Emergency Response Teams), including AP-CERT (Asia Pacific), TF-
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CSIRT (Europe), and CERT/CC CERT (International);62 the formation of the U.S. 
E.U. Working Group on Cybersecurity and Cybercrime; and the Global Alliance 
against Child Sexual Abuse Online—a collaboration of 50 states working to reduce 
and combat child pornography.63 There is even evidence that traditional holdouts like 
Russia may begin to feel the cost of inaction as they become more reliant on digital 
networks. After Russian critical infrastructure, including governmental offices and 
railroads were disabled by WannaCry, Frants Klintsevich, the deputy chairman of the 
Russian Senate’s defence committee said, “Humanity is dealing here with 
cyberterrorism…It’s an alarming signal, and not just a signal but a direct threat to the 
normal functioning of society, and important life-support systems.”64  
The success or failure of voluntary arrangements like the WHO and IHR 
frequently has much to do with the nature of the production of the public good in 
question. In cases where the benefits or harms are additive, the benefit of a country to 
free-ride is substantial. An example of a harm which is additive is the emission of 
greenhouse gases. Whether or not Panama cuts its emissions has little baring on the 
overall levels of greenhouse gases, as they are only a minor producer. As such, they 
have a greater incentive to free-ride. For goods which have weakest link 
characteristics—where the system is only as strong as the weakest link—there is 
substantially less incentive to free-ride, as the good will only be produced if each 
country holds up its end of the bargain.65 These traits may help explain why climate 
change treaties like the Kyoto Protocol have generally failed, while countries have 
generally cooperated with the WHO in its work to contain communicable diseases—a 
public good which demonstrates weakest link characteristics. Conficker, like the 
containment of contagious disease, is a type of weakest link problem. In both cases, 
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national efforts to patch computers or vaccinate individuals help to mitigate the 
spread of the epidemic, but free-riding countries make it difficult to fully eliminate 
the threat, which may then emerge at a later time. In the case of Conficker, if a single 
TLD refused to sinkhole the relevant domains, the entire containment effort may have 
been useless. While not every piece of malware follows this pattern, perhaps countries 
can at least agree to work together to contain Conficker-like threats as a starting point.  
While other global organizations could serve as useful models of international 
collaboration, public health is a particularly promising model given that many of the 
public goods which are relevant to public health and cyberhealth can only be secured 
through the combined efforts of individuals, companies, NGOs, and states. The 
containment of polio, for example, involved an international monitoring regime, 
national health systems, the WHO, private vaccine manufacturers, public and private 
research, and individuals willing to be vaccinated. Global public goods which involve 
so many actors with potentially competing rights and incentives are relatively rare. 
Many that do exist come from the realm of public health—Polio eradication,66 TB 
control,67 antimicrobial drug resistance,68 environmental protection.69 These 
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examples, both the successes and failures, provide insight into how best to juggle 
individual rights, incentives, and obligations in the global context.  
The concept of GPGs is significant as it highlights certain difficulties which 
are inherent to goods which cross global boundaries. As with national public goods, 
calling something a global public good does not in any way remove the collective 
action problems, but the concept can be helpful as a tool for analysis and advocacy.70 
By more accurately describing the ways in which states’ interests are interconnected 
and by highlighting that national programs are often inadequate to address global 
problems, the concept can spur wealthier nations to invest in the production of the 
global public good in question, not out of altruism, but the more reliable motivation of 
self-interest.71 While there are a number of non-health related global public goods, 
global public goods for public health typically must balance a similarly diverse set of 
actors and factors as malware mitigation, and represents a historical example of the 
international community coming together over time to contain an emergent threat to 
global stability.  
 
1.2.4 Participatory Public Goods 
In addition to being GPGs, the containment of malware and the containment of 
communicable diseases are also what I will call participatory public goods. Whereas 
the term ‘global public good’ is used in the literature on public goods, ‘participatory 
public good’ is my own term. A participatory public good is a public good which can 
only be produced thorough the active participation of the beneficiaries beyond the 
mere provision of financial resources. As with GPGs, participatory public goods are 
also somewhat rare. Most paradigmatic public goods (both national public goods and 
global public goods) can be produced by a state or group of states without the active 
participation of the majority of the beneficiaries. Examples include monitoring 
programs, lighthouses, national defence, and standards; in each of these cases, all that 
is required for beneficiaries to enjoy the public good is that they pay their taxes so 
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others can provide that good. In Section 1, I introduced perhaps the most well-known 
and important participatory public good—herd immunity.72  
 The containment of malware is like herd immunity in that individuals must 
actively participate in the production of the good for it to be produced. In the public 
health context one must get vaccinated, while the containment of malware requires 
individuals to install security patches. As in the case of infectious disease, when a 
high percentage of the population has patched a digital vulnerability, it becomes much 
harder for worms to spread throughout a digital network.73 The only reason Conficker 
was able to spread as it did was that over 30 per cent of machines running Windows 
remained unpatched at the time of the worm’s appearance. As the CWG had no 
authority to coerce or incentivize individuals to patch their systems, they did not seek 
to raise the patch adoption rate. A public health inspired approach to containing 
malware could have nipped the problem in the bud by encouraging or requiring 
individuals and companies to update their devices. While ‘digital herd immunity’ may 
not stop highly targeted pieces of malware, it can significantly curtail the growth of 
some large botnets74 like the ones formed by Conficker or Mirai—the botnet which 
attacked the DNS in 2016. It is important to note that Conficker is not an edge case, 
individuals play an active role in containing many forms of malware. 
Using herd immunity as an example, at the national level the state could 
employ a range of incentives to encourage individuals and corporations to participate 
in the containment of malware.75 Similar to states limiting access to public schools to 
vaccinated children, internet access (or certain parts of the web) could be limited to 
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those with essential security patches.76 For individuals who cannot update their 
system for various reasons, exemptions could be given. Additionally, in recognition 
of the potential downsides of updating one’s device, the government could create an 
equivalent of the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program in the United 
States77 or the Vaccine Damage Payment scheme in the United Kingdom78 to pay out 
benefits to those who are significantly harmed by installing a required patch. In the 
case of the production of patches, the state could incentivize or simply mandate that 
companies support programs for a certain number of years. The former is broadly 
similar to government subsidies to pharmaceutical companies manufacturing low-
margin vaccines.  
Thus far, I have argued that public goods play an important role in network 
robustness and resilience and that the containment of malware is similar in many 
ways to the containment of communicable disease. As such, the containment of 
communicable disease can serve as a valuable example for states as they develop 
policies to adequately and justly contain certain kinds of malware, such as the 
Conficker worm. Up to now, I have mostly been focused on the practical problems of 
coordinating the provisioning of public goods for cyberhealth, given that these goods 
have two features which are not shared with canonical public goods—they are global 
and participatory. Having discussed what could be done to adequately provision these 
goods, in the next section I will turn to the obligation states, individuals, and 
corporations have to contribute to these goods.  
 
1.3 Obligation and Public Goods for Cyberhealth 
As Section 1 explained, the category of public goods contains a wide array of goods, 
everything from national defence to the eradication of polio to fireworks displays. 
While all of these goods may be underproduced by private markets compared to the 
 
76 Note that these national policies can still be part of an overarching global strategy, 
as discussed in the previous section. 
77 “National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program,” Health Resources & Services 
Administration, October 2018, https://www.hrsa.gov/vaccine-
compensation/index.html (accessed Dec. 13, 2018). 
78 Vaccine Damage Payments Act 1979, Chapter 17, 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1979/17/pdfs/ukpga_19790017_301114_en.pdf 
 49  
socially optimal level, states, corporations, and individuals surely do not have an 
obligation to always correct this market failure, i.e. there is no obligation for a state to 
produce or subsidize fireworks displays. Determining precisely which public goods 
states, corporations, and individuals may have an obligation to help provide will be 
heavily dependent on the political theory of a specific state, but there are two qualities 
of a public good that generally influence this calculation—the degree to which the 
good is essential and the degree to which it is excludable. First, I will look at the 
obligations of the state, and then I will turn to individuals and corporations. 
 
1.3.1 Obligations of the State  
While some public goods are clearly always discretionary, such as the aforementioned 
fireworks display, others are necessary to be able to live a minimally decent life and 
typically are considered among the primary responsibilities of the state. The least 
objectionable of these goods is national defence—generally, even libertarians believe 
that states have a responsibility to protect citizens from external threats. However, 
even if one is a libertarian, there are good reasons to believe a state has an obligation 
to ensure adequate production of certain public goods for cyberhealth that are 
essential to a state’s ability to wage defensive war. The most relevant of those goods 
is the cyberhealth of critical infrastructure—one cannot wage defensive war 
effectively if chemical plants, banks, dams, transportation, and manufacturing 
facilities are crippled. 
While national defence is the least objectionable of state obligations, most 
political philosophers accept that states have an obligation to provide at least some 
other basic functions. In addition to national defence, the most basic might be 
protection from a hostile environment and those which enable the satisfaction of basic 
bodily needs (e.g. clean water).79 The creation of these public goods is often central to 
 
79 George Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 16, no. 3 (1987): 241-259. Goods like clean water will 
sometimes be considered public goods and sometimes common goods or club goods 
depending on the degree of rivalrousness and excludability of the good in question. In 
a country with very limited water resources, clean water is closer to an exhaustible 
common good. Having said this, for the purposes of this argument rivalrousness is of 
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a state’s legitimacy within social contract theories, such as the those developed by 
James Buchanan,80 Gordon Tullock,81 and Michael Moeler.82 In Buchanan’s theory, 
national defence and the protection of rights are the most basic responsibilities—
forming the basis of the ‘protective state.’ But once states enter their post-
constitutional stage, one of the primary responsibilities of the state is to produce 
public goods for the benefit of society; the production of public goods is the basis of 
what Buchanan calls the ‘productive state.’83 As digital networks underpin nearly all 
forms of critical infrastructure, regardless of the specific public goods one feels a state 
has an obligation to produce there are reasons to think that states will also have an 
obligation to ensure the adequate production of public goods for cyberhealth. For 
instance, as I will argue in more depth in Chapter 3, as critical infrastructure and 
medical devices increasingly rely on digital networks, cyberhealth becomes 
increasingly important to an individual’s ability to access healthcare. This was starkly 
demonstrated when hurricanes Irma and Maria destroyed Puerto Rico’s internet and 
telecommunications infrastructure preventing many from getting urgent assistance. To 
get assistance, individuals needed to fill out a form online or over the phone, although 
 
secondary importance to excludability, and thus these distinctions are of minor 
importance. 
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83 Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan, 68.; While 
Buchanan’s commitment to contracts leads him to generally refrain from listing which 
goods should be publically produced, he lists the following goods as examples of 
those which most benefit from public interference in the market: herd immunity, 
national defence, soil erosion, college education, and public parks. James M. 
Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Public Goods (Chicago : Rand McNally & 
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for many people these services remained inoperable for many months.84 While 
relatively few people directly died from the storms, thousands ultimately 
unnecessarily died over the following weeks due to broken infrastructure.85 I will also 
argue in Chapter 3 that when digital devices are closely coupled to a biological 
system, as in the case of digital pacemakers and the circulatory system, the 
cyberhealth of these devices in part constitutes what it means to be healthy. In these 
cases, ensuring an environment with an adequate degree of cyberhealth is broadly 
akin to states ensuring the ability to live in a disease-free environment. As in the case 
of public health, states should be concerned with eliminating the most serious threats, 
not necessarily eliminating all malware.  
Despite the importance of cyberhealth to these fundamental responsibilities of 
the state, traditionally many states, including the United States, have allowed the 
private companies which manage critical infrastructure to determine which 
investments in robustness and resiliency are worthwhile. Singer and Friedman 
describe the problem in the United States saying: 
The CEO of one cybersecurity firm told us…that ‘The most critical of the 
critical infrastructure are the biggest laggers in cybersecurity.’ While much 
attention has been paid to securing areas like finance, where the incentives are 
more in alignment for regulation and investment, other areas of even more 
core importance and danger like water control, chemical industry, or the ports 
have almost none. In 2013, for instance, a study we helped guide of six major 
American ports found only one had any proper level of cybersecurity, due to 
the fact that the Coast Guard and Department of Transportation officials, who 
are in charge of regulating and protecting the ports, had literally no power or 
expertise in the area.86 
 
84 Oliver Milman, “Six weeks after Hurricane Maria, Puerto Ricans Still Waiting for 
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Whereas the dominant ‘feudal’ approach to cybersecurity described in the 
introduction treats the security and robustness of these networks as predominantly a 
private good, a public health inspired approach empowers the state to meet its 
obligations by providing the normative justification for intervening in cyberspace. 
While technological ignorance is an obstacle for a state to overcome, it is not an 
excuse for failing to meet its most uncontroversial obligations. 
In this section, I wanted to demonstrate that there are good reasons to think 
states have a responsibility to promote public goods for cyberhealth even if one holds 
a rather limited view of state power. However, throughout the rest of this dissertation, 
I will assume that states have a responsibility to provide a number of goods, including 
access to healthcare, access to education, safe environments in which to live, roads, 
and clean water. In this chapter, I explored one justification for states to provide these 
goods—the correction of market failure. In the following chapters, I will explore 
additional justifications for—and limits on—state action in cyberspace. In Chapter 2, 
I will explore the role Mill’s harm principle plays in defining spheres of public and 
private responsibility; in Chapter 3 I will explore the way poor cyberhealth impacts 
health; and in Chapter 4 I will explore the myriad of ways in which poor cyberhealth 
impacts personal wellbeing. 
 
1.3.2 Obligations of the Individual  
The indispensability of a public good is also important to consider when determining 
the obligations of human individuals to contribute to the production of public goods. 
This is particularly relevant for participatory public goods like the containment of 
malware that require individuals to perform certain actions beyond merely paying 
their taxes, as these goods typically place a higher burden on the individual. For 
example, to contribute to herd immunity one needs to get vaccinated. This in turn may 
require one to go to a pharmacy, clinic, or doctor’s office; pay for a vaccine; endure 
some physical discomfort; and face possible negative side-effects. As this is typically 
more onerous than paying one’s taxes, it would seem the benefits of a given 
participatory public good must be correspondingly higher in order for an individual to 
have an obligation to contribute to its production. In this section, I will explore what 
obligations an individual might have to contribute to the promotion of public goods 
for cyberhealth.  
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The general question of whether an individual is obligated to contribute to 
public goods has been looked at by many theorists including John Rawls and Robert 
Nozick, but I find George Klosko’s argument centred on ‘presumptively’ beneficial 
public goods to be most convincing. By presumptively beneficial goods, Klosko 
means goods which it can be presumed all people in a community want regardless of 
“what their rational plans are in detail.”87 As such, Klosko argues they are “public 
analogues of Rawls’ primary goods.”88 After laying out Klosko’s argument, I will 
apply it specifically to public goods for cyberhealth.  
 Klosko’s argument that individuals have an obligation to help produce certain 
public goods is based on the principle of fairness—the idea that “those who benefit 
from the cooperative efforts of others have an obligation to cooperate as well.”89 For 
example, if one wants to take advantage of a well being dug in one’s neighbourhood, 
then the principle of fairness would suggest that one has an obligation to contribute to 
the well’s creation. And if one does not contribute, then it is reasonable for others to 
exclude one from the benefit.90 While applying the principle of fairness to excludable 
goods is relatively “trouble-free,”91 it becomes trickier in the case of non-excludable 
goods (like the containment of disease and malware) because one cannot choose 
whether or not one will receive the benefit.  
The primary challenge to applying the principle of fairness to public goods is 
what Klosko calls the “limiting argument,”92 which is that the principle of fairness 
does not apply in the case of non-excludable goods unless, as Rawls argues, an 
individual has “voluntarily accepted the benefits.”93 Nozick, another proponent of the 
limiting argument, goes further than Rawls in his classic exploration of whether an 
individual has on obligation to participate in a neighbourhood public address 
 
87 Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” 246-247. 
88 Ibid., 246. 
89 Ibid., 242. 
90 Ibid., 243. 
91 Ibid., 243. 
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93 Examples of Rawls’ primary goods include rights, wealth, and the social bases for 
self-respect. (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 111-12.) 
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system.94 In this example, everyone in a neighbourhood is assigned a day to create 
entertainment for the PA system. Nozick argues that even if one accepts the benefit, 
say by opening up one’s window and listening to the day’s entertainment, one has no 
obligation to produce one’s own program of entertainment on one’s appointed day 
unless one supported the creation of the scheme. Nozick’s argument is based on the 
presumption that individuals should decide for themselves if they will be forced to 
have their liberty curtailed, and that putting an obligation on an individual is no small 
matter. Klosko accepts that the limiting argument may apply in Nozick’s example as 
the public good is discretionary—perhaps beneficial, but not presumptively so. 
However, he argues that when the public good is 1) presumptively beneficial, 2) 
worth the cost, and 3) non-excludable, then one does have political obligations to 
contribute regardless of whether one has “voluntarily accepted the benefits.”95  
One of Klosko’s primary examples is a resident of a country which is 
surrounded by hostile neighbours. The threat is such that the country has instituted 
mandatory military service. As the individual resident cannot be excluded from the 
protection, would never choose to live without the benefit of national defence, and the 
benefit is worth the burden on the average citizen, Klosko argues there is a political 
obligation to serve.96 If any criterion above is not met, then the obligation disappears. 
For instance, there is no obligation to contribute to a hopeless defence effort (e.g. the 
defence of the Alamo), as the expected benefit does not outweigh the expected cost.97  
Klosko’s two other examples are less extreme circumstances. The second 
scenario is a city with unhealthy levels of air pollution caused by automobiles. To 
mitigate the problem, the city enacts restrictions on automobile use and requires 
automobiles to be modified to curb air pollution. Meanwhile, the third scenario 
 
94 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), 93-95. 
95 Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” 249.; Rawls, A 
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96 Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation,” 249. 
97 As an aside, it is worth noting the irony that despite Klosko’s primary example 
coming from the arena of national defence, the cybersecurity mindset described in the 
introduction typically has treated cybersecurity as a private good, which individuals 
have no obligation to support. This is just one of a number of incoherencies within the 
cybersecurity framework that I will explore in greater depth in Chapter 2. 
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concerns an area beset by drought that enacts water restrictions on personal use to 
protect crops and avoid a famine.98 As was the case in the first scenario, in each of 
these cases Klosko argues an obligation exists to participate in the production of the 
good, given that breathing clean air and avoiding famines are presumptively 
beneficial goods, the contributions are worth the cost, and the goods are essentially 
non-excludable. 
Klosko’s argument tracks with our intuitions that there is no obligation in 
Nozick’s PA system example, but that there is an obligation to contribute to goods 
like national defence, which almost no one would choose to live without. While 
Nozick is right that there is no obligation to contribute to the neighbourhood 
entertainment, his reasoning is incomplete. It is not merely that the individual did not 
agree to participate, but that the benefit was the wrong kind of benefit to establish an 
obligation. 
Klosko’s argument may make it seem as if individuals have an obligation to 
contribute to relatively few public goods, as most public goods are not presumptively 
beneficial. However, Klosko argues that the obligation extends to goods that are 
essential to the production of presumptively beneficial goods, even if in other contexts 
those “access goods” may be discretionary. By access goods I mean goods that are 
necessary to being able to achieve other goods (e.g. vaccines are access goods for 
herd immunity). I will first apply this argument to non-participatory public goods and 
then turn to participatory public goods.  
In regards to non-participatory public goods, Klosko argues that discretionary 
goods like highways, railroads, airports, bridges, communication technologies, and 
harbours are practically indispensible to national defence.99 As such, it is reasonable 
to assume that the individual’s obligation to support the presumptively beneficial 
good of national defence persists even when that good is packaged with other goods 
of a discretionary nature—presuming the cost does not get too high relative to the 
benefits. As other presumptively beneficial public goods, such as clean water, 
likewise rely on a host of access goods, Klosko’s argument suggests individuals have 
an obligation to support a rather large number of seemingly discretionary government 
services.  
 
98 Ibid., 250. 
99 Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligation, 88. 
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If we turn to cyberhealth, there are a number of public goods which seem 
essential to the production of presumptively beneficial goods like national defence or 
water treatment. As mentioned above, the cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, 
including military and government networks seems to be one. Vulnerabilities to those 
networks would hamper the ability of a state to wage defensive war. For similar 
reasons, I would add maintaining robust internet infrastructure and encryption 
standards to that list. Further research would be necessary to determine if containing 
malware more broadly makes the cut, but there are reasons to think it should. While 
most of the time malware is more of a nuisance than a serious threat to critical 
infrastructure, large-scale botnets, such as those created by Conficker and Mirai, do 
have the ability to disrupt critical infrastructure. In 2007, it is suspected that Russian 
forces used botnets to launch DDoS attacks against Estonia during a time of military 
tension between the two countries, shutting down parts of Estonia’s internet for 
several weeks.100  
Where the containment of malware diverges from encryption standards or 
more robust infrastructure, is in being a participatory public good. As participatory 
public goods are typically more onerous for individuals to contribute to than non-
participatory public goods, they are more likely to fail Klosko’s second criterion. 
Having said this, the benefits of containing malware are such that I believe they 
typically exceed the costs. In order to actively participate in the mitigation of 
malware, individuals should patch their personal devices, practice safe browsing 
habits, and install real-time malware protection; on the whole these steps do not seem 
particularly burdensome compared to the benefits of both avoiding malware 
infections and contributing to the security of critical infrastructure. Additionally, 
states can craft policies to help people fulfil their participatory obligations, including 
educating or training individuals, subsidizing security software, and creating 
standards to simplify and standardize the process of installing security updates. There 
is an analogy in the case of states promoting herd immunity. In the UK, for instance, 
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the state provides most vaccines for free to lower the burden of participation.101 
Furthermore, as updating one’s system and practicing safe browsing habits also 
produces significant individual benefit, it seems reasonable to put the burden of proof 
on the objector to demonstrate that the costs exceed the benefit. As the costs can be 
significantly decreased by opting all users into automatic patching and real-time 
malware monitoring, it seems reasonable that if individuals have an obligation to 
support the production of cyberhealth via tax payments (as I argued previously), then 
they likely also have an obligation to contribute via these slightly more burdensome 
steps, although where the line should be drawn is open to debate. Perhaps, automatic 
patching is worthwhile, but insisting individuals practice safe browsing habits is not, 
given the cost to one’s freedom. My aim here is not to resolve these specific issues, 
but to show how thinking about cybersecurity in terms of public goods provides us 
with a way of thinking about how individuals’ enjoyment of the benefits of the 
internet can generate reciprocal obligations. 
 
1.3.3 Corporate Obligations 
In this section, I will assume that it makes sense to talk about corporations as having 
obligations.102 However, even if one does not accept this view, the arguments that 
follow may still be useful for thinking about the kinds of regulations that states may 
reasonably impose upon corporations. In addition to the obligations discussed above, 
which were grounded in the principle of fairness, in the corporate case I will also 
argue there are obligations derived from the general moral principle to not cause harm 
to others.103 I will refer to this principle as the harm to others principle.104 As with the 
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notion of corporate obligations in general, I will be assuming that it makes sense to 
ground corporate obligations in notions of fairness and harm prevention, while 
acknowledging that this is controversial. While the harm to others principle may have 
some relevance in the case of human individuals and their obligations to contribute to 
the mitigation of malware, it is more relevant in the case of corporate obligation as a 
human individual’s contribution to poor cyberhealth will only trivially harm others. 
By comparison, corporations’ poor security choices have the ability to cause 
substantial harm. For example, the DDoS attack on Dyn, Inc. (part of the DNS) was 
largely possible because of the poor security practices of a few Chinese device 
manufacturers.  
My argument in this section is based on Angus Dawson’s argument that 
individuals have an obligation to get vaccinated against serious diseases in order to 
protect others from harm. I will first introduce this argument, then I will adapt it for 
the case of malware, and finally I will suggest what this argument and the principle of 
fairness may mean for three types of businesses. I will only focus on the mitigation of 
malware in this section, as I will assume that like human individuals corporations 
have a clear obligation to contribute to at least some non-participatory public goods 
for cyberhealth through the payment of taxes, given the presumptively beneficial 
nature of national defence (or at least the stability which national defence provides). 
 
1.3.3.1 Vaccination and the Harm to Others Principle 
Dawson argues that when a state of herd immunity does not exist, then an individual 
has a moral obligation get vaccinated against serious diseases based upon the general 
moral principle to not cause harm to others. The essential formulation of Dawson’s 
argument, quoted directly, is: 
1. Contagious diseases that might result in (more than trivial) harm can be passed 
on to others through non-intentional action. 
2. Such a risk of harm can be reduced through vaccination of any potential 
source individual in advance (where a relevant vaccine exists). 
 
Public Health, eds. Angus Dawson and Marcel Verweij (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 166-167. 
104 This is the way Angus Dawson refers to this collection of principles. I will use this 
term as well, given his argument is the basis for my argument in this section. 
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3. We have a general moral obligation not to cause harm to others through our 
own actions and inactions. 
4. Given 1 and 2, an individual can reduce the risk of causing (non-trivial) harm 
to others through vaccination for (serious) contagious disease.  
Conclusion: Given 3 and 4, we are morally obligated to have vaccinations for 
(serious) contagious diseases (where available).105 
The similarities between malware and infectious disease, make this an appealing 
argument for thinking about corporate obligations to contain malware. Specifically, 
like communicable diseases malware can spread between devices, the harm malware 
can cause is not trivial, and effective mitigation strategies exist. 
Adapting Dawson’s argument for the purposes of mitigating malware, one gets 
the following: 
1. Malware that might result in (more than trivial) harm can be passed on to 
others through non-intentional action. 
2. Such a risk of harm can be reduced if the device has certain reasonable 
security features (e.g. up to date patches, strong passwords). 
3. We have a general moral obligation to not cause harm to others through our 
own actions and inactions. 
4. Given 1 and 2, corporations can reduce the risk of causing (non-trivial) harm 
to others by patching their own devices and adding reasonable security 
features to the devices they design and manufacture (if applicable). 
Conclusion: Given 3 and 4, technology producers have a moral obligation to 
patch their own devices and add adequate security features to their products.  
This argument should be appealing to those who accept that there is a general moral 
obligation to not harm others. If the people being harmed were the one’s knowingly 
buying products with poor security features, then the harm to others principle would 
likely not apply, but poor security practices can harm those who did not consent to 
being exposed to harm. In fact, due to the risk to critical infrastructure, poor security 
practices can even harm those who lack internet access.  
While this argument suggests a moral obligation for corporations to protect 
their devices and ensure the devices they produce have adequate security features, two 
caveats must be mentioned. First, Dawson argues that this obligation falls away when 
 
105 Ibid., 168. 
 60  
a state of herd immunity exists as getting vaccinated will add no additional benefit, 
but may cause harm to the individual getting vaccinated (e.g. negative side-effects).106 
And second, Dawson argues there is no obligation to get vaccinated against non-
communicable diseases like tetanus.107 In the case of malware, however, neither of 
these caveats apply.  
 First, we can dismiss the ‘no additional benefit’ argument because in the case 
of malware, herd immunity is much harder to achieve. As infected machines can pass 
on infections or launch attacks as part of a botnet from anywhere on the globe, local 
herd immunity is insufficient to mitigate the threat. In 2017, for instance, ten years 
after Conficker first appeared, there were over two million new infections 
worldwide.108 These new infections from all over the globe still could make up a 
single botnet capable of attacking targets anywhere. Given that in the case of malware 
we are always in a sub-herd immunity state, Dawson’s ‘no additional benefit’ 
argument does not come into play—there is always an additional benefit to protecting 
one’s devices.109 Second, unlike vaccines which target specific diseases, the malware 
protection strategies mentioned above work against a broad array of malware threats. 
Some very targeted malware attacks may be analogous to tetanus, but (in general) the 
same techniques are used to block most forms of malware (i.e. general security 
patches, safe browsing habits, real-time monitoring). One could imagine a parallel 
might be if there were a single all-purpose vaccine that worked against all types of 
disease. Based on Dawson’s argument, it seems plausible that there would be a moral 
obligation to get this vaccine because it generates a substantial public benefit by 
containing serious infectious diseases. The fact that it also would protect one from 
tetanus would not matter. 
 Having said this, the specific ways in which a corporation might be obligated 
to contribute to the mitigation of malware will be dependent on the type of business. 
First, let us consider a large accounting firm that has 100,000 employees, but does not 
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make technology products.110 In this case, the corporation’s obligations to mitigate 
malware are not fundamentally different from 100,000 individuals with internet 
connected computers. Like an individual, the corporation should keep their computers 
up to date, encourage their employees to practice safe browsing, and use real-time 
malware detection systems. While this firm may be more likely to be a victim of a 
targeted malware attack than the 100,000 individuals, most of the harm associated 
with such an attack is isolated to the firm and its customers.  
 The second type of business is a technology company making consumer 
technology products. For example, let us assume that they make internet connected 
webcams, the kind of products that were drafted into the Mirai botnet used to attack 
the DNS system in 2016.111 This company will have all the obligations of the first in 
regards to their own machines, plus obligations to ensure the devices they 
manufacturer are adequately secure based on the harm to others principle.  
 The third type of business is one that manages critical infrastructure, such as a 
nuclear power plant. While these businesses are not exempt from the obligation to 
mitigate malware derived from the principle of fairness and harm to others principle, 
the more important obligation is certainly to protect their own network’s integrity 
given that the failure of critical infrastructure is one of the main ways in which 
malware can cause significant harm. The obligation to sufficiently invest in their own 
network security, like the obligation to add adequate security features to 
manufactured devices, can be justified by the harm to others principle. Given the 
direct and significant harm that can result from the failure of critical infrastructure 
networks, this obligation is stronger than in the case of the device manufacturer 
discussed previously.  
 While in this section I have used the ‘harm to others principle’ to consider 
what obligations corporations might have to contribute to malware mitigation, another 
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way to look at this issue is through the related notion of Mill’s harm principle.112 The 
harm to others principle speaks to individuals’ obligations, while Mill’s harm 
principle guides the appropriate use of state power. Given that corporations can harm 
others through their poor cyberhealth practices, states may have an obligation to 
prevent this harm through punishment or regulation. I will revisit the question of the 
role of the state in cyberspace in 2.4.1, at which point I will explore the use of Mill’s 
harm principle in greater depth. 
 Having established that there are potentially obligations for businesses to 
mitigate malware and invest in cyberhealth, or at least grounds to legally require them 
to do so, a major obstacle to corporate investment in cybersecurity has been that we 
currently lack a good understanding of the specific value of various security strategies 
and the costs of cyberattacks. Challenges to estimating costs include identifying an 
appropriate time horizon, monetizing qualitative impacts, quantifying the risk, and 
determining the social discount rates applied to monetized future events.113 While 
these challenges should not stop corporations from investing in tried and true 
methods, such as keeping software up to date and following security standards, they 
may still lead to underinvestment overall compared to what their obligations require. 
While some companies may over-invest in cybersecurity, the evidence suggests that 
the vast majority underinvest and act as quasi free-riders.114 
 To help correct this underinvestment, it would be sensible for states to invest 
public funds in analytic tools to help measure the likelihood and costs of network 
threats (e.g. malicious attacks, human error, natural disasters) and the effectiveness of 
various types of cyberhealth interventions. These analytic tools could also help 
policymakers quantify the benefit companies receive from public cyberhealth, which 
could bolster the case for corporate obligations derived from the principle of fairness 
and serve as a basis for establishing appropriate regulations.  
In addition to these analytical tools, legislation can help ensure that companies 
do reap the costs of their insecurity by requiring public disclosure of breaches and 
 
112 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism and Other Writings, 1859, ed. Mary 
Warnock (Glasgow: Collins, 2003), 94-95. 
113 Bauer and Van Eeten, “Cybersecurity,” 714. 
114 Howard Kunreuther and Geoffrey Heal, "Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk 
and Uncertainty 26, no. 2 (2003): 231-49. 
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holding companies liable for the damage their insecurity caused to other nodes in the 
network. Holding the Chinese device manufacturers responsible for the harm caused 
to Dyn, Inc. and the thousands of websites affected by that attack would help shift 
these companies’ cost-benefit analyses to favour proactive strategies over reactive 
strategies. While reputational harm alone can help some of these externalities be 
internalized, Bauer and Van Eeten have found the “feedbacks were too weak, 
localized, or too slow to move agents' behavior swiftly towards more efficient social 
outcomes.”115  
 
1.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that the practices, philosophy of, and history of public health 
can serve as useful guides for thinking about the public goods which bolster 
cyberhealth. Specifically, I focused on one classic cybersecurity issue—the mitigation 
of malware. First, in Section 1, I provided an overview of public goods and 
introduced a number of public goods for public health, including most importantly the 
containment of infectious diseases. Next, I argued that many of the kinds of public 
goods which are valuable to public health also are valuable for promoting 
cyberhealth, including surveillance programs, information sharing programs, 
standards, and fundamental research. In Section 2, I then explored one specific public 
good for cyberhealth—the containment of malware—using the example of the 
Conficker worm. I argued that the containment of malware was similar to the 
containment of communicable disease in two primary ways. First, both are Global 
Public Goods—goods whose benefit spreads across international borders and which 
often can only be adequately produced via international efforts. The lack of a world 
government with coercive powers means that the provision of these goods relies on 
building international consensus and institutions which states are willing to grant 
authority and power. While public goods like the containment of malware and the 
containment of communicable diseases can be produced at the national level, these 
efforts will be limited in their success given the ability of malware and diseases to 
spread across borders. While acknowledging the differences between malware and 
communicable diseases, I argued that the creation of the WHO and the International 
 
115 Bauer and Van Eeten, “Cybersecurity,” 714. 
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Health Regulations could serve as an example of how to build international consensus 
over time around the containment of malware.  
The second main similarity is that the containment of malware and 
communicable diseases cannot be achieved merely through the payment of taxes, but 
rather individuals must actively participate in the production of the good. This 
requirement raised interesting questions as to what obligations individuals and 
companies have to contribute to the containment of malware. Using George Klosko’s 
response to the limiting argument, I argued that the principle of fairness suggests that 
individuals and corporations do generally have an obligation to contribute to public 
goods for cyberhealth if they are presumptively beneficial or enable presumptively 
beneficial public goods like national defence. Apart from the principle of fairness, I 
argued that corporations have additional obligations based on the ‘harm to others 
principle.’ First, I introduced Angus Dawson’s argument that individuals have an 
obligation to get vaccinated against serious infectious diseases based on the general 
obligation to avoiding harming others. Then, I applied this argument to the 
containment of malware, arguing that corporations have an obligation to patch their 
systems and ensure that any technology products they make have adequate security 
protections. In cases where the costs are potentially substantial and the benefits 
amorphous, I suggested a sensible first step would be for governments to invest more 
heavily in developing analytical tools and to change legislation to help internalize the 
costs of cybersecurity failures. These actions should at least allow companies and 
individuals to more accurately assess their own risk and adjust their cybersecurity 
investment accordingly. 
Finally, it is worth saying that the reason a public good is provided may be as 
important as whether it is provided at all, as many techniques that could be employed 
to secure networks would also destroy privacy and jeopardize notions of the open 
web. In this regard, public health is a more benevolent model than law enforcement or 
economics. This will be a central focus of Chapter 2. A tool like network monitoring, 
for instance, can gather information in an anonymous, minimized, and decentralized 
way which protects individual privacy (as it is in the public health context),116 or it 
can be used as a mechanism for crushing political dissent. When the motivation for 
 
116 Sedenberg and Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing.” 
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improving cybersecurity is merely economic or strategic, then often privacy and 
personal freedom end up sacrificed at the altar of security.  
In this chapter, I have presented a series of parallels and analogies between 
cyberhealth and public health that demonstrate the potential value of a public health 
inspired approach as an overarching framework for guiding technology policy. 
Having demonstrated one context in which such an approach is useful, in the next 
chapter, I will more formally define the public cyberhealth framework. This 
formalization will be useful for distinguishing Public Cyberhealth from the dominant 
cybersecurity lens, and for demonstrating that this approach is a cohesive and 
reasonably comprehensive way to conceptualize the digital landscape as a whole.
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Chapter 2: 
Two Levels of Abstraction 
 
 
In Chapter 1, I demonstrated the value of thinking about a paradigmatic cybersecurity 
issue, the mitigation of malware, in public health terms. Using the example of the 
Conficker computer worm, I argued that a public health approach, grounded in the 
theory of public goods, was superior to the existing paradigm, which generally treated 
malware mitigation as a private good. I then argued that the philosophy of public 
health can help one to understand the obligations of states, individuals, and 
corporations to contribute to public goods for cyberhealth, while public health 
institutions can serve as blueprints for how to provision said public goods. 
 While one may see the value of the public health approach for thinking about 
public goods for cyberhealth, one might rightfully ask whether a public health lens 
has broader utility for thinking about technology policy and our relationship to digital 
information. After all, it is not unusual that a specific learning from one field is useful 
in another. I was once at a conference where a data scientist described how the 
behaviour of trout helped him to better understand the movement of retail customers 
on a store floor, but no one is arguing that angling is the appropriate lens to 
understand all aspects of retail strategy. In this chapter, I will argue that the public 
health approach is not only useful for mitigating malware but can be a cohesive and 
reasonably comprehensive way to conceptualize our relationship to digital 
information. I will demonstrate this by formalizing the framework using the method 
of Levels of Abstraction (LoA), a method for clearly defining the variables, 
observables, and behaviours that comprise a framing device.  
First, in Section 1, I will introduce the method of LoA and explain its utility. 
Then, in Section 2, I will define what I call the Cybersecurity LoA. This will be a 
formal statement of what I have referred to informally as the cybersecurity mindset or 
lens. As a reminder, in the Introduction, I described this lens as focused on malicious-
attacks, and I argued that those using this approach tend to characterize cyberspace as 
a kind of battlefield. Once I have defined the main features of this LoA, I will 
evaluate its cohesiveness and utility. I will argue that the LoA’s limited scope make it 
inadequate as an overarching framework for creating technology policy, and that its 
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internal inconsistencies undermine its primary goal of keeping digital information and 
networks secure.  
In Section 3, I will then formally define the public health inspired alternative 
approach, which I will call “Public Cyberhealth.” In contrast to the Cybersecurity 
LoA, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is designed to address both malicious and non-
malicious threats to network robustness and resiliency, capture the impact of 
technology policies and interventions on health and wellbeing, and identify potential 
ethical conflicts. I will argue that this alternative framework corrects a number of the 
incoherencies of the Cybersecurity LoA, and not only is a better approach to thinking 
about cybersecurity (as seen in Chapter 1) but shows greater promise as an 
overarching framework for creating technology policies which improve individuals’ 
lives. Lastly, in Section 4, I will expand upon the discussion from 1.3 and explore 
how the Public Cyberhealth LoA can be used to understand the normative 
justification for—and ethical limitations on—government interventions in cyberspace, 
a necessity for crafting consistent and justified technology policies.  
The Public Cyberhealth LoA is intended to be useful to a number of actors, 
including (but not limited to) policymakers seeking to craft consistent, effective, and 
just technology policies; creators of technology products who wish to safeguard or 
improve their customers’ wellbeing; and ISPs aiming to improve the reliability of 
their networks while protecting individuals’ rights. As an alternative way of viewing 
the digital landscape, the Public Cyberhealth LoA can be used in a variety of ways. In 
some cases, the value may simply be in causing one to question the assumptions of 
the existing security paradigm, while in other cases the LoA may highlight a 
previously overlooked impact or suggest the applicability of a specific public health 
tool. While I will explore some of these applications in this dissertation, one should 
not assume these examples to be comprehensive.   
 
2.1 Levels of Abstraction  
The method of LoA has its roots in computer science, but has most recently been 
developed and popularized by Luciano Floridi.1 It is based on the idea that whenever 
one tries to answer questions about a given system, one highlights certain relevant 
variables, observables, and behaviours while ignoring those that are deemed 
 
1 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information. 
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irrelevant. In this sense it is simply a way of more formally describing the colloquial 
notion of framing a problem. As Floridi says, “[the method of LoA] should not be 
confused with some neo-Leibnizian dream of a calculemus approach to philosophical 
problems.”2 Rather than get too bogged down in theory, I will demonstrate how the 
method of LoA works by applying it to one issue which is frequently seen through 
different lenses—illegal drug use.  
As illegal drug use is a complicated societal issue it can be described in 
different ways depending on one’s goals. Two common frames applied to the problem 
are law enforcement and public health.3 If one is a police officer, one’s goal in 
understanding illegal drug use in a society may be to disrupt the drug economy by 
arresting drug users and sellers.4 In order to achieve this goal, one will highlight 
certain variables, observables, and behaviours of the system in question, while 
ignoring others. One might focus on variables such as drug users (who they are, 
where they live, etc.), sellers (who they sell to, their criminal connections), growers, 
and manufacturers; and one might focus on behaviours of the system such as how an 
influx of new drugs impacts the existing market. This collection of variables, 
observables, and behaviours could be called the “Law Enforcement LoA” for 
understanding and responding to illegal drug use. Meanwhile, if one is a public health 
expert, one’s goal might be to limit deaths by overdose and improve the health of 
drug users. In pursuit of this goal, one might focus on variables like treatment options 
for individuals, training for paramedics, the impact of drug use on families, life 
 
2 Ibid., 79. 
3 Hilgunn Olsen, “Open Drug Scenes and Police Strategies in Oslo, Norway,” Journal 
of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention (2017): 141-156.; 
Douglas N. Husak, “Drugs, Crime and Public Health: A Lesson From Criminology,” 
in Criminal Law, Philosophy and Public Health Practice, eds. A. M. Viens, John 
Coggon, and Anthony Kessel, 42-61 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 
https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139137065.003. 
4 For the purpose of this exercise, I will risk being overly simplistic. Surely, in many 
locations police have a number of goals, including the health of drug users.  
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expectancy, and health care costs;5 and one might focus on behaviours such as how an 
influx of new drugs burdens the healthcare system or affects health outcomes. This 
collection of variables, observables, and behaviours could be called the “Public 
Health LoA” for understanding illegal drug use. The law enforcement officer and the 
public health expert are both describing the same system of illegal drug use within a 
society, but their divergent goals lead them to focus on different aspects of the 
system. To one using the Law Enforcement LoA, a drug user may be a ‘criminal.’ 
Meanwhile, to one using the Public Health LoA, the same person is a potential 
‘patient.’ Which is the correct designation depends on the questions one is trying to 
answer. Often, states use both of these frames simultaneously as part of dual-track 
policies.6  
I will be engaging in a similar exercise in this chapter by formally defining the 
variables, observables, and behaviours of the cybersecurity and public cyberhealth 
frameworks, which can be used to conceptualize the digital landscape. Using the 
method of LoA to more formally define these approaches is useful for 1) clearly 
identifying the goal of a given framework, 2) spelling out one’s assumptions, 3) 
comparing competing frameworks, and 4) helping one build more useful models of 
the system in question.7 In particular, the method of LoA can be useful for forcing one 
to consider the implicit assumptions of dominant mindsets like the cybersecurity 
mindset. While the language of cybersecurity is ubiquitous, it is of course just as 
much of a LoA as the public health inspired alternative I am proposing. 
Formalization is most useful when dealing with smaller, more easily 
quantifiable problems, such as the selling of a used car.8 Sprawling concepts like 
society, for instance, may be simply too complicated to be usefully described using 
 
5 World Health Organization, “Management of Substance Abuse: Terminology & 
Classification,” World Health Organization, 
https://www.who.int/substance_abuse/terminology/en/ (accessed Mar. 1, 2019). 
6 Olsen, “Open Drug Scenes and Police Strategies in Oslo, Norway.” 
7 This process is even more essential when one frame is entrenched as the dominate 
paradigm. 
8 For smaller problems, there are often fewer variables, and one can create models 
that provide more predictable outcomes, such as the appropriate price for a used 
vehicle.  
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the method of LoA.9 Digital networks and their impact on human wellbeing fall 
somewhere in the middle. For more complex systems, like digital networks, properly 
speaking one will often describe them using what is called a Gradient of Abstraction 
(GoA), which is an interlocking group of LoAs that each describe a piece of the 
overall system. Technically, when I speak of the Cybersecurity LoA and Public 
Cyberhealth LoA, I will be speaking about Gradients of Abstraction comprised of 
practitioner LoAs (i.e. the way a IT professional might view the digital landscape), 
strategic LoAs (i.e. the way a CTO or organization head might view the digital 
landscape), legal LoAs, etc. However, this can quickly become very complex and 
difficult to effectively illustrate. As such, in this dissertation, I will present a 
simplified version of the Cybersecurity and Public Cyberhealth GoAs. As I will be 
using the simplified version, I will continue to use the term ‘level of abstraction’ 
rather than the cumbersome ‘gradient of abstraction.’10  
 
2.1.1 Evaluating LoAs 
While one can frame a given system in any number ways using the method of LoA, 
not all LoAs are equally useful or reliable. For instance, if one wanted to test out 
whether a new policy was going to improve health outcomes for users of illicit drugs, 
then one would not want to use the Law Enforcement LoA which lacked the relevant 
variables and observables to measure health impacts. As LoAs are used to build 
models of systems, which in turn can be used to test theories about that system, one 
can evaluate LoAs on their utility and coherence. Using these criteria one can both 
assess a LoA on its own merits and compare it to other competing LoAs describing 
the same system. Below I will describe what utility and coherence mean in this 
context. I will then use these concepts to assess the Cybersecurity LoA and the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 respectively.  
 
 
9 Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, 79. 
10 While the term Levels of Abstraction might suggest a hierarchical structure, the 
method of LoA does not assume or require that the system in question be structured 
hierarchically or that the levels used to model the system relate hierarchically.  
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2.1.1.1 Utility 
When evaluating the utility of a LoA one can speak of internal and external utility. I 
define internal utility as the degree to which a LoA is effective at achieving its stated 
purpose. In the case of the Public Health LoA for illegal drug use, for instance, we 
can ask if using the LoA improves health outcomes. Meanwhile, I define external 
utility as the degree to which the stated purpose of a LoA is useful to the broader 
goals of society. A Law Enforcement LoA for combating illegal drug use may result 
in many people going to jail, but does mass incarceration create more problems than it 
solves, all things considered?  
 
2.1.1.2 Coherence 
Coherence, meanwhile, can be broken down into three subcategories, logical 
coherence, operational coherence, and inter-LoA coherence, although only the latter 
two are relevant for this exercise, as both LoAs we will look at are logically coherent. 
By operational coherence I mean that the various observables and behaviours of the 
LoA work together to efficiently achieve one’s aim. This definition is similar to, and 
inspired by, Hasok Chang’s definition of pragmatist coherence—“a harmonious 
fitting-together of actions that leads to the successful achievement of one’s aims.”11 
Operational coherence differs from internal utility in that internal utility is about the 
end result, while operational coherence speaks to the process of arriving at that end 
result. For instance, as I will explore in more depth in the next section, one could 
argue that the Cybersecurity LoA does achieve its goal of securing digital information 
and networks, but does so in an inefficient, and at times self-defeating, manner. 
Having said this, frequently the two concepts cannot be fully separated, as a lack of 
operational coherence typically reduces the utility of a LoA. 
 Finally, by inter-LoA coherence I mean how well a LoA works with other 
established LoAs. In isolation, Ptolemy’s geo-centric ‘LoA’ for modelling the 
movement of celestial objects can be used to make reasonably accurate predictions 
about when certain celestial phenomenon will occur.12 However, the heliocentric 
 
11 Hasok Chang, “Pragmatic Realism,” Humanities Journal of  Valparaíso, no. 8 
(2016): 112. 
12 Stanley E. Babb, Jr., “Accuracy of Planetary Theories, Particularly for Mars,” Isis 
68, no. 3 (1977): 426-434. 
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model of Copernicus was ultimately more compatible with other LoAs used to 
describe the physical world including Newtonian physics.13 While one might interact 
with a LoA in relative isolation, no LoA is an island entire of itself. Inter-LoA 
coherence is certainly not sufficient to determine the quality of an LoA, but it is a 
useful check when used in conjunction with the other criterion mentioned previously.  
 
2.2 The Cybersecurity LoA 
Before defining the Public Cyberhealth LoA, I will first define the Cybersecurity 
LoA, which will serve as a point of comparison. As the cybersecurity lens is the 
dominant way we tend to conceive of cyberspace, defining this lens in more formal 
terms will hopefully reveal the assumptions inherent in this approach. While it may 
seem like cybersecurity is the natural way to discuss threats to network robustness, I 
hope to demonstrate that it is in fact a very specific and idiosyncratic way of 
conceptualizing cyberspace. One challenge of defining the Cybersecurity LoA, 
however, is that there is not one single cybersecurity framework or LoA. Someone 
working at the NSA might conceive of the problem of informational security 
differently than a computer scientist at the University of Cambridge; in my experience 
the latter are more concerned with protecting privacy and individual rights than the 
former. Therefore, there is a real danger that any attempt to formalize a single 
cybersecurity approach will be overly reductive or merely a straw man. 
 While the Cybersecurity LoA I will define in this section cannot represent all 
of the diversity within the cybersecurity community, I believe the variables and 
behaviours I will describe are broadly representative of how cybersecurity 
practitioners and policymakers in the United States, United Kingdom, and Europe 
think about cyberspace and information security.14 The variables, observables, and 
behaviours I have selected come from a review of cybersecurity literature, the public 
statements of technology policymakers, my personal experience working in the 
 
13 Roy Porter, The Scientific Revolution in National Context (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
14 While I will not go into it in this dissertation, one should note that describing the 
digital landscape as a battlefield not only shapes the behaviours of states, but also the 
behaviour of cybercriminals.   
 73  
technology industry, and discussions with computer scientists, lawyers, and 
practitioners at technology conferences in the United States and United Kingdom.15 
 
2.2.1 The Cybersecurity LoA 
The first step in defining a LoA is to define the purpose of the LoA. It is this purpose 
that, in theory, dictates which variables, observables, and behaviours are highlighted 
and which are ignored. While I will complicate this claim a bit later by arguing that 
the Cybersecurity LoA is heavily influenced by the pre-existing LoAs of criminal 
justice and military intelligence, the purpose of the Cybersecurity LoA is 1) to stop 
adversaries from gaining unauthorized access to digital information, networks, or 
devices and 2) to bring those who commit these illegal acts to justice. At the core of 
this idea is ‘the adversary’—a malicious actor. According to Singer and Freidman, if 
there is no adversary, then technically speaking there is no cybersecurity threat.16 
Natural disasters, human error, or poorly written code would not be considered 
cybersecurity threats, per se, although each could contribute to the susceptibility of a 
network to malicious attacks.  
Connected to the variable of ‘the adversary,’ are a variety of typed variables 
inspired by, or taken wholesale from, the domains of criminal justice and military 
intelligence, including tools and strategies to identify, capture, prosecute, and deter 
attackers. It is important to note that the Cybersecurity LoA did not spring forth fully 
fledged but evolved along with the threat of information theft. The primary eras of 
this evolution include the Cold War, the rise of digital corporate espionage in the 
1990s, and the emergence of cybercrime targeting private citizens in the early 
2000s.17 Each era saw new variables and observables added to address the emerging 
threat of malicious attacks. In the table below I have outlined a simplified version of 
the Cybersecurity LoA. 
 
15 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar.; Yannakogeorgos and Lowther, 
Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace: The Challenge of National Security; 
Kaplan, Dark Territory.; Gallagher, Link, and Rowe, Cyber Security.; Trim and 
Upton, Cyber Security Culture: Countering Cyber Threats through Organizational 
Learning and Training. 
16 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 34.  
17 Kaplan, Dark Territory. 
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Table 1 
Simplified Cybersecurity LoA 
Variables Valid Values Invalid or Minimized Values 
Adversary • Cybercriminal  
• State 
• Hacktivist 
• Advanced Persistent Threat (may 
or may not be state-aligned)  
 
Type of Threat • Worm 
• Trojan 
• Phishing 
• Other adversary based attacks 
• Non-adversary based threats 
(natural disasters, human error, 
fragile infrastructure) 
Cost of Attack • Financial value of information  
• Strategic value of information  
• Reputational harm 
• Financial cost of destruction of 
infrastructure 
• Impact on health and wellbeing,  
• Impact on other network nodes 
(negative externalities) 
• Impact on individuals’ rights 
Defensive 
Capabilities 
• Private network monitoring  
• Firewalls 
• Employee/Personal education 
• Public defence efforts (threat 
monitoring, public education 
campaigns)  
Cost of Defensive 
Efforts 
• Financial cost of preventative 
strategies 
• Employee/personal time 
• Health and wellbeing costs  
• Impact on other nodes on the 
network (negative externalities) 
• Impact on individuals’ rights 
Offensive 
Capabilities 
• Hacking back  
• Infiltrating adversary networks  
• Pre-emptive cyberattacks 
 
Cost of Offensive 
Efforts 
• Financial  
• Employee time 
• Provocation of additional attacks 
• Health and wellbeing costs,  
• Impact on other nodes on the 
network (negative externalities) 
• Impact on individuals’ rights,  
• Militarization of cyberspace 
Ethical 
Considerations 
• Proportionality of attacks • Impact on individuals’ rights 
• Obligations to others on the 
network 
Insurance • Insurance for financial costs • Insurance for non-financial harms 
(wellbeing, health) 
Possible Role of 
State (specifics 
depend on 
circumstances) 
• Limited information sharing 
• Limited assistance (CERTs)  
• Liability protection  
• Law enforcement (prosecution, 
extradition, punishment)  
• Strong regulations  
• Robust network monitoring 
• Crisis coordination  
• Mandatory information sharing 
Key Behaviours: 
1. Adversary must be present for there to be a cybersecurity threat 
2. Some (but not all) offensive capabilities may be limited to state actors 
3. Owner of network or information is responsible for its security 
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While this is a necessarily simplified picture, cybersecurity practitioners, 
policymakers, and strategists implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) use these 
variables, observables, and behaviours to make sense of the digital landscape. This 
includes estimating the likelihood and cost of various attacks, identifying potential 
vulnerabilities, devising defences, and planning counterattacks. While the 
Cybersecurity LoA can be used to devise a myriad of strategies, each are generally 
composed of the building blocks listed in the table above. For example, the Conficker 
Working Group might not seem to fit the feudal portrait I have painted. However, 
given the nature of the threat, an ad hoc coalition of hosting companies, security 
companies, internet governance organizations (e.g. ICANN), and Microsoft is exactly 
the kind response one should expect within a framework which limits state power and 
emphasizes financial and reputational harms. In the next sub-section, I will evaluate 
this LoA. Then, in Section 3, I will define the Public Cyberhealth LoA, which I am 
proposing as an alternative. 
  
2.2.2 Evaluating the Cybersecurity LoA 
While the Cybersecurity LoA is useful as a way of conceptualizing malicious attacks, 
I will argue that 1) its lack of operational coherence and limited focus on financial 
harm undermine its supposed goal of protecting digital information and networks, and 
2) its narrow focus on malicious attacks limits its external utility as an overarching 
way to conceptualize the digital landscape. In Chapter 1, I explored some of these 
issues in the specific context of Conficker. In this section, I will explore these issues 
as they relate to cybersecurity and the digital landscape more generally, beginning 
with a lack of operational coherence and internal utility.  
 
2.2.2.1 Internal Utility 
As a reminder, internal utility is an LoA’s ability to achieve the goal of the LoA. In 
the case of the Cybersecurity LoA, I defined the goal as: 1) to stop adversaries from 
gaining unauthorized access to digital information, networks, or devices and 2) to 
bring those who commit these illegal acts to justice. The Cybersecurity LoA fails to 
meet this goal as effectively as possible due to a lack of operational coherence and an 
incomplete accounting of the harms of cyberattacks. 
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 The Cybersecurity LoA lacks coherence in at least three primary ways. First, 
as discussed at length in Chapter 1, while cybersecurity (and security more generally) 
displays the characteristics of a public good, the Cybersecurity LoA treats 
cybersecurity as a private good to be supplied by the owner of the information, 
network, or device in question. While one can produce goods which exhibit the 
characteristics of being non-excludable and non-rivalrous via private markets, this 
production will be inefficient and will lead to the underproduction of the good in 
question compared to the socially optimal level.18 National security is the 
paradigmatic public good; therefore, it is particularly odd that cybersecurity—which 
is certainly a part of national security—is treated as predominately a private good. 
This incoherence can be seen clearly in the example of the Conficker worm discussed 
in Chapter 1. As the Conficker worm posed a threat to critical infrastructure all over 
the world, it was in the world community’s interest to contain the threat. However, 
working within the cybersecurity mindset, states left the problem to be dealt with by 
an ad hoc group of volunteers. Viewing the problem through the Cybersecurity LoA, 
the United States government treated the vulnerability as Microsoft’s problem; 
Microsoft released a patch, but left it up to individuals whether or not it would be 
installed; and many individuals did not feel the need to install the patch as Conficker 
posed little risk to their own devices. By framing shared network problems as private 
problems to be resolved largely through private actions, the LoA undermines its own 
goal of securing information, networks, and devices from malicious attacks. 
Individuals and less wealthy states are left particularly vulnerable to attack. For 
example, while the Mirai botnet temporarily disrupted access to many popular 
websites in the United States and Europe, it was able to almost completely shut down 
Liberia’s internet for several days.19 Here the feudal analogy may once again be 
evocative; in the case of an invasion, those behind the castle walls may be safe, while 
those outside are left to defend themselves with little more than pitchforks.  
 The second way in which the Cybersecurity LoA lacks coherence is by over-
emphasizing the importance of traditional law enforcement strategies, such as the 
identification, extradition, and prosecution of cyber criminals. While the 
Cybersecurity LoA generally downplays the role of the state, one area in which 
 
18 Head, Public Goods and Public Welfare, 80-81. 
19 Woolf, “Massive Cyber-Attack Grinds Liberia's Internet to a Halt.” 
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governments are expected to play a role is in the investigation and prosecution of 
cybercrimes after they have been committed. However, traditional law enforcement 
strategies are often of limited use in cyberspace.20 Apprehending and prosecuting 
individuals requires the ability to positively identify cyber attackers and extradite 
them to the country where the crime was committed. Identification is time and 
resource intensive,21 legal notions of responsibility online are frequently fuzzy,22 and 
false flag operations are common.23 As a result, the accused often has plausible 
deniability and most cyberattacks are never investigated. This is especially true of the 
types of criminals who target individuals. While the cybercriminals who attack major 
corporations may be brought to justice, the attacks which impact individuals are 
almost never investigated, as they do not justify the substantial cost of cyber 
forensics.24 More intensive and invasive network monitoring could improve 
attribution, but these strategies would certainly jeopardize individual rights. In the 
extreme, such policies may force individuals to give up the anonymity which helps 
enable fundamental rights like the freedom of speech and association.25  
Even in cases where positive identification can be made, often law 
enforcement cannot arrest the perpetrator as they fall outside of their jurisdiction. For 
example, the largest prosecution offices in Texas only reported having prosecuted a 
handful of individuals for cybercrimes between 2012-2017,26 despite there being over 
 
20 Mulligan and Schneider, “Doctrine for Cybersecurity,” 8-9. 
21 Nick Selby, “Local Police Don't Go After Most Cybercriminals. We Need Better 
Training,” Washington Post, April 21 2017, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/04/21/local-police-dont-
go-after-most-cybercriminals-we-need-better-training (accessed Jan. 10, 2019). 
22 Mulligan and Schneider, “Doctrine for Cybersecurity.” 
23 Andy Greenberg, “Russian Hacker False Flags Work—Even After They're 
Exposed, Wired, February 27, 2018, https://www.wired.com/story/russia-false-flag-
hacks/ (accessed March 22, 2019). 
24 Nick Selby, “Local Police Don't Go After Most Cybercriminals. We Need Better 
Training.” 
25 Mulligan and Schneider, “Doctrine for Cybersecurity,” 75. 
26 Selby, “Local Police Don't Go After Most Cybercriminals. We Need Better 
Training.” 
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21,000 cybercrime incidents in the state in 2017 alone.27 Additionally, in many cases, 
the most sophisticated cyberattacks are carried out by states themselves, which cannot 
be effectively punished through traditional legal approaches. As a result, while the 
law enforcement and criminal justice approaches to information security are 
appropriate given the very real and substantial criminal activity in cyberspace, 
traditional law enforcement strategies are often ineffective in the digital domain even 
at stopping straightforward criminal behaviour.  
I do not mean to imply that traditional law enforcement should play no role in 
cyberhealth. Rather, it needs to be downplayed compared to other more effective 
preventative strategies, even if we are concerned solely with reducing cybercrime. If 
anything, my appreciation of the role of law enforcement in cyberspace has only 
grown since I have been working on this dissertation. An example of this value can be 
seen in the 2017 joint effort by the FBI and Dutch National Police to shutdown two of 
the largest dark web marketplaces, AlphaBay and Hansa. On these marketplaces 
hacking tools were sold alongside, drugs, weapons, and other black-market goods. 
Before the FBI shutdown AlphaBay, Dutch National Police took control of Hansa, but 
allowed it to continue to operate for a period of time. This allowed them to monitor 
the illegal activity on the site for several weeks and capture the activities of all the 
new users fleeing from AlphaBay.28 However, this type of law enforcement action is 
very unusual, and traditional law enforcement techniques are generally of limited use 
for preventing cybercrimes and large-scale malware outbreaks.  
The final aspect of the Cybersecurity LoA that undermines operational 
coherence and internal utility is the state-sanctioned development and use of offensive 
cyber capabilities, which in the long run undermine defensive efforts. Unlike in the 
Public Cyberhealth LoA I will discuss next, within the Cybersecurity LoA there is 
often little distinction between defensive and offensive capabilities. One of clearest 
 
27 FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center, “2017 Internet Crime Report,” FBI’s 
Internet Crime Complaint Center, May 7, 2017, 
https://pdf.ic3.gov/2017_IC3Report.pdf (accessed March 12, 2019). 
28 Samuel Gibbs and Lois Beckett, “Dark Web Marketplaces AlphaBay and Hansa 
Shut Down,” The Guardian, 20 July 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/20/dark-web-marketplaces-
alphabay-hansa-shut-down (accessed Nov. 26, 2018). 
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cases where short-term security benefits were valued over long-term cyberhealth, was 
the United States’ and Israel’s development of the Stuxnet worm used to destroy 
Iranian nuclear centrifuges.29 Stuxnet was a sophisticated piece of software targeting 
the centrifuges’ SCADA industrial control systems—a cyber sniper shot that would 
have required many months or years of planning and code development.30 Once the 
worm broke into the wild, overnight the number of people who could develop such a 
weapon grew exponentially. Today, most countries possess some offensive cyber 
capabilities,31 yet such a development was not inevitable as evidenced by the 
international community’s collective efforts to place significant limits on other classes 
of weapon (e.g. biological and chemical weapons). The use of state-sanctioned 
offensive cyberweapons has made global collaboration more difficult at a time when 
it is needed more than ever to overcome the challenges related to identification and 
extradition discussed above. 
 In addition to a lack of operational coherence, the internal utility of 
Cybersecurity LoA is further diminished by the LoA’s downplaying of externalities 
and non-financial harms. Not accounting for certain harms is not incoherent, as LoAs 
are rarely meant to be entirely comprehensive, but ignoring these harms does lead to 
states, corporations, and individuals to undervalue cybersecurity investments, relative 
to the level that would be best for society as a whole. Even when these externalities 
are acknowledged, they often do not factor into an individual’s, corporation’s, or 
state’s cost benefit analyses, as each is responsible for their own security; within the 
Cybersecurity LoA you truly are not your brother’s keeper. When one only looks at 
one’s own economic costs, often the most sensible choice from a financial perspective 
is to either insure against losses or simply hope that one does not suffer a devastating 
attack. By failing to take externalities into account, states, corporations, and 
individuals collectively underinvest in cybersecurity compared to the socially optimal 
level.  
 
29 Brian Orend, “Fog in the Fifth Dimension: The Ethics of Cyber-War,” in The 
Ethics of Information Warfare, edited by Luciano Floridi and Mariarosaria Taddeo 
(Cham: Springer, 2014), 6-7. 
30 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 98 
31 Ibid. 
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In addition to downplaying externalities, those using the Cybersecurity LoA 
also typically fail to account for non-financial harms, such as the impact of 
cyberattacks and cybersecurity interventions on health and wellbeing. This 
undercounting of costs can exacerbate the underinvestment in cybersecurity. If the 
product being protected is a medical device, some non-financial impacts may be 
considered. However, as we will see in Chapter 3, in many cases medical devices 
have some of the weakest cybersecurity of networked devices. 41 per cent of the 
machines infected with Conficker in 2017—nearly ten years after the initial 
infection—were in the healthcare sector.32 
Note that throughout this dissertation when I speak of ‘financial harms’ or 
‘financial costs,’ I am referring to relatively direct monetary costs associated with 
cyberattacks or interventions. These include costs related to IP theft, employee 
salaries, software and hardware expenses, monetary theft, and destruction of property. 
While one can account for health and wellbeing impacts in financial terms, within the 
Cybersecurity LoA this is typically not done. As such, while recognizing that for 
policy purposes one might place dollar values on health and wellbeing impacts, I will 
continue to refer to health and wellbeing impacts as non-financial harms. 
While the Cybersecurity LoA could be modified to account for non-financial 
harms, in in this chapter I am seeking to define the Cybersecurity LoA as it is used in 
practice. I suspect that the reason non-financial impacts have largely been overlooked 
is that there is a shortage of tools for measuring how various cyber threats or 
interventions impact health or wellbeing. In Chapter 4, I will attempt to remedy one 
of those gaps by defining a theory of informational wellbeing that can be used to 
measure how personal wellbeing is impacted by digital information and it use, 
control, accuracy, and accessibility.   
 
2.2.2.2 External Utility of the Cybersecurity LoA 
Whereas internal utility considers the LoA’s ability to fulfil its goal, external utility 
considers whether that goal is useful in the context of a society’s broader needs.33 In 
this case, the Cybersecurity LoA is also somewhat lacking. This could be an 
 
32 O’Neill, “Conficker Worm Still Spreading Despite Being Nearly 10 Years Old.” 
33 Admittedly, this distinction can sometimes be hazy. The previous discussion related 
to unaccounted harms could also be discussed as a matter of external utility. 
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expansive discussion, but I would prefer to not disappear down that rabbit hole. For 
my purposes, I will simply accept that one goal of most societies or states in the 21st 
century is to effectively keep digital information secure and digital networks up and 
running. While the Cybersecurity LoA can be useful for addressing certain adversary-
based threats, it is less useful for addressing the threats associated with natural 
disasters, human error, bugs, poor product design, and bad technology policy, all of 
which harm network robustness and resiliency. Recent examples include a glitch in a 
Federal Aviation Association computer which grounded half the planes in the US in 
2011,34 the damage to Puerto Rico’s networks following hurricane’s Irma and Maria 
in 2017,35 and the fat finger mistake which brought down Amazon’s S3 cloud system 
(and with it a number of the Web’s most popular sites).36  
The Cybersecurity LoA is also of limited use for conceptualizing technology 
matters unrelated to network failure, such as the value of network access and the 
ethics of technology use. In regards to network access, while the Cybersecurity LoA 
can help one understand how adding a node to a network makes it less secure, it 
cannot help one to understand the physical, psychological, economic, and social cost 
of not having access to digital networks.37 I will look at this issue in greater depth in 
Chapters 3 and 4 as part of my elaboration of the Public Cyberhealth LoA. In regard 
to the second point, let us consider a question like whether there is a moral obligation 
to stop using Facebook. Matthew Liao argues that if Facebook is leading to the 
destruction of certain democratic norms (e.g. spreading fake news) or harms 
wellbeing, one may have a responsibility to leave the service. He argues that even if 
one does not actively engage in spreading fake news or other destructive behaviours, 
by contributing to Facebook’s analytics and bolstering its user count one may be an 
 
34 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 35. 
35 Thieme, “After Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico’s Internet Problems Go from Bad to 
Worse.” 
36 Amazon.com. “Summary of the Amazon S3 Service Disruption.” 
37 In the previous section I discussed how failing to account for these types of harm 
undermines the internal utility by leading to an underinvestment in cybersecurity. 
Here I am making the point that by failing to include these types of variables, the LoA 
cannot be used to think about technology issues beyond security.    
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accessory to harmful behaviour.38 With its focus on cyberattacks and information 
security, the Cybersecurity LoA is not useful for thinking through this type of 
dilemma as the relevant variables—such as impacts on wellbeing and rights—are 
downplayed or entirely absent from the LoA. By contrast, the public health inspired 
LoA with its greater focus on health, wellbeing, and individual rights is better suited 
for conceptualizing our relationship to digital information and devices on the whole.  
 
In this section, I described the Cybersecurity LoA and its main features, including a 
focus on the adversary, a focus on strategic and financial costs, and the use of 
offensive cyber capabilities in certain circumstances. I then assessed the utility and 
coherence of the LoA. I argued that its lack of operational coherence diminished its 
internal utility (i.e. its ability to protect information and networks from malicious 
attacks), while its narrow focus limited its value outside of the context of adversary-
based attacks. In the next section, I will outline the Public Cyberhealth LoA and then 
illustrate a number of its advantages over the cybersecurity alternative.  
 
2.3 The Public Cyberhealth LoA 
While the goal of the Cybersecurity LoA is: 
1) To stop adversaries from gaining unauthorized access to digital 
information, networks, or devices and 2) To bring those who commit these 
illegal acts to justice 
 the goal of the Public Cyberhealth LoA is: 
 To promote cyberhealth (i.e. network robustness and resilience) as part of 
broader societal efforts to promote health and wellbeing.  
Whereas the Cybersecurity LoA arose from the domains of military intelligence and 
criminal justice, the Public Cyberhealth LoA makes use of the vocabulary, 
philosophy, and tools of public health. As such, the Public Cyberhealth LoA 
downplays the importance of the adversary and business interests, while taking 
seriously non-malicious points of failure (bugs, human accidents, natural disasters, 
 
38 Matthew Liao, “Do You Have a Moral Duty to Leave Facebook?,” The New York 
Times, November 24, 2018, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/24/opinion/sunday/facebook-immoral.html 
(accessed Jan. 10, 2019). 
 83  
bad product design) and the impact of poor cyberhealth on health and wellbeing. In 
Chapter 1, I explored how this LoA can be used to address traditional cybersecurity 
issues like malware. In this section, I will demonstrate how this way of thinking can 
be used to frame the digital landscape more broadly.  
Unlike the Cybersecurity LoA, which was a formalization of the dominant 
way of conceptualizing the digital landscape, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is an 
original contribution of this thesis, albeit one inspired both by the field of public 
health and researchers like Deirdre Mulligan, Fred Schneider, and Elaine Sedenberg 
who have suggested the value of a public health approach to technology policy. This 
is the first attempt to formally define such an approach, and as such my intention is 
not to be exhaustive, but to capture the most important observables and behaviours. 
Bolded line items in the table below are those which appear in the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA but not in the Cybersecurity LoA.  
Table 2 
Simplified Public Cyberhealth LoA 
Variables Valid Values Invalid or Minimized Values 
Type of Threat • Human error 
• Fragile infrastructure 
• Natural disasters 
• Buggy code 
• Adversary based attacks 
• Adversary based attacks lose 
relative importance only in the 
sense that other threats are now 
made more prominent than in the 
Cybersecurity LoA 
Cost of Threat • Impact on wellbeing39  
• Impact on health40 
• Impact on other network nodes 
(externalities) 
• Impact on individuals’ rights  
• Financial value of information 
stolen 
• Strategic value of information 
stolen 
• Reputational harm  
• Financial cost of Destruction of 
Infrastructure 
• Financial costs and reputational 
harm lose relative importance due 
to addition of health, wellbeing, 
and rights considerations. 
Stakeholders • Individuals 
• Communities 
• States 
• Corporations 
• Non-Profits 
 
 
39 To be discussed in Chapter 4: Informational Wellbeing. 
40 To be discussed in Chapter 3: Health and Cyberhealth. 
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Defensive 
Capabilities 
• Public network monitoring 
• Public education campaigns 
• Infrastructure improvements 
• Herd immunity 
• Private network monitoring 
• Firewalls  
• Employee/Personal education 
• Public defensive capabilities 
supplement private capabilities 
Cost of Defensive 
Efforts 
• Wellbeing costs  
• Health costs  
• Impact on other nodes on the 
network (negative externalities) 
• Impact on individuals’ rights 
• Financial cost of preventative 
strategies 
• Employee/personal time 
 
Offensive 
Capabilities 
• Very few, if any, offensive 
responses are acceptable 
• Hacking back  
• Infiltrating adversary networks  
• Pre-emptive cyberattacks 
Cost of Offensive 
Efforts 
• Militarization of cyberspace  
• Provocation of additional attacks  
• Wellbeing costs  
• Health costs 
• Impact on other nodes on the 
network (negative externalities) 
• Impact on individuals’ rights  
 
• Financial  
• Employee time  
 
Ethical 
Considerations 
• Protection of individuals’ rights 
• Local values 
• Obligations to others on the 
network 
• Proportionality  
 
Insurance • Insurance for health impacts 
• Insurance for financial loss 
 
Possible Role of 
State (specifics 
depend on 
circumstances) 
• Production of public goods 
(information sharing, network 
monitoring, production of basic 
research, public education) 
• Crisis coordination 
• Protection of individual rights 
• Law enforcement (prosecution, 
extradition, punishment)  
 
• Liability protection 
• Law enforcement actions lose 
relative importance as 
preventative strategies gain in 
importance 
Key Behaviours: 
1. Impacts on health and wellbeing are given greater weight compared to business or military 
interests 
2. Use of the philosophy of public health, where applicable, to understand proportionality, 
engagement with local stakeholders, and the normative justification for government 
interventions   
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At a high level, the Public Cyberhealth LoA attempts to: 1) address a host of threats to 
network robustness and resiliency (e.g. accidents, buggy code, cyberattack, natural 
disasters, etc.), 2) take seriously the effect on human health and wellbeing of network 
failure, interventions, and technology policy, 3) downplay or even delegitimize the 
use of offensive cyber capabilities, and 4) explicitly consider the impact of both 
network failure and interventions on individual rights. It meets these goals by 
considering a broader array of variables and observables and using the philosophy of 
public health to think through the normative justification for—and ethical limits on—
intervening in cyberspace. While these changes are significant, it is important to note 
that many typed variables exist in both LoAs (e.g. Type of Threat, Defensive 
Capabilities). This similarity allows one to switch back and forth between the two 
LoAs (to some degree) for the purpose of debate or analysis. For example, in Chapter 
1, I initially described the Conficker infection using language more at home in the 
Cybersecurity LoA, and then I critiqued the response using the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA.   
In fact, much of the Cybersecurity LoA exists (in an altered form) within the 
Public Cyberhealth LoA. Just as public health experts must have a plan for dealing 
with biological weapons, the public cyberhealth expert must be prepared to deal with 
cyberattacks. This being said, the strategies one would devise if using the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA would likely look quite different from the strategies devised by a 
General or CTO using the Cybersecurity LoA. As Sedenberg and Mulligan argue, 
“adversarial considerations are simply less relevant when dealing with prevention and 
management orientations—in contrast to deterrence oriented strategies that are 
focused on intent—because harms manifest, and protections work, regardless of 
intent.”41 Even in cases where traditional tools of cybersecurity and criminal justice 
are the best tools for the job, the Public Cyberhealth LoA forces one to explicitly 
consider the impact on individual rights, health, and wellbeing; engage with relevant 
stakeholders; and think about how one’s actions or inactions will affect others on the 
network. In taking these variables into account, certain strategies such as security 
backdoors to assist law enforcement and many offensive capabilities will be 
 
41 Sedenberg and Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing,” 1705. 
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delegitimized, while other strategies, such as automatic patching, stronger security 
standards, and public education gain prominence.42  
While it is hard to assess the utility and coherence of the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA until it is used, one can make a few initial assessments. First, it does not possess 
the same incoherencies as the Cybersecurity LoA explored in Section 2.2. In 
particular, 1) it does not try to solve shared problems with private solutions, but 
recognizes a potentially broader role for states to provide public goods for 
cyberhealth, and 2) by downplaying the use of offensive cyber weapons, it 
discourages short term strategies that harm information security and human wellbeing 
on the whole and in the long run. Additionally, by highlighting impacts to health, 
wellbeing, and individual rights, it helps one to more fully account for costs and 
benefits while determining the appropriate level of cyberhealth investment. In Chapter 
3, I will explore some of the health impacts of poor cyberhealth, and in Chapter 4, I 
will explore how to measure the impact of technology policies, interventions, and 
network threats on personal wellbeing using a version of the capabilities approach to 
wellbeing.  
Second, in theory at least, the Public Cyberhealth LoA has greater external 
utility compared to the Cybersecurity LoA. While the latter only focused on 
adversary-based attacks, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is also useful for thinking about 
non-malicious threats, including natural disasters, human error, and buggy code. 
However, perhaps more importantly, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is useful for guiding 
technology policy beyond how to respond to network failure. After all, public health 
experts not only respond to acute epidemics, but conduct or support scientific 
research, collect and share health data, and address harmful social behaviours like 
smoking, overeating, and a lack of exercise. Similarly, the Public Cyberhealth LoA 
can be used to guide technology policy on a wide range of issues. Elaine Sedenberg 
and Deirdre Mulligan have demonstrated one such application of the public health 
inspired approach—the collection and sharing of cybersecurity information. Their 
 
42 Offensive cyber capabilities represent a broad spectrum of tools. While some forms 
of beaconing may be acceptable within public cyberhealth for attribution purposes, 
retaliatory attacks would likely not be acceptable, as in the long run this tit for tat 
strategy of escalating attacks reduces the security of the network as a whole.  
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work is a specific application of the kind of approach I seek to formalize and 
generalize in this dissertation. 
While Sedenberg and Mulligan do not explicitly use the concept of the ‘Public 
Cyberhealth LoA,’ they essentially design an information sharing scheme using the 
variables, observables, and behaviours listed in the table above. Specifically, they 
emphasize the protection of individual rights, the potential impacts on wellbeing, and 
the variety of stakeholders who may be impacted by various approaches.43 By 
studying the information sharing systems used by public health institutions, 
policymakers, and researchers, they derived four principles which can guide the 
development of cybersecurity information sharing systems: “expert and collaborative 
data governance, reporting minimization and decentralization, earliest feasible de-
identification, and limitations on use.”44 In addition to these principles, they 
recommend that cybersecurity information should be made available for public use 
and that cybersecurity information sharing practices should emphasize ethical 
research.45 These principles contrast with how cybersecurity information is currently 
shared. In the United States, which is the focus of their work, there are few 
restrictions on what types of cybersecurity information should be shared (including 
personally identifiable information), few restrictions on how shared information is 
used, and groups representing users and privacy advocates are often in a reactive role, 
rather than part of the governance process.46 
While Sedenberg and Mulligan are seeking to improve cybersecurity, the 
Public Cyberhealth LoA, as a generalization of their approach, can be used in a 
variety of contexts, including product design, data protection regulations, and 
infrastructure robustness. In Chapter 1, I explored one of these uses—thinking 
through the provisioning of public goods for cyberhealth. In Section 2.4, I will further 
explore how it can help us think about the normative justification for government 
interventions in cyberspace and the ethical limits on those interventions. And in 
 
43 Sedenberg and Mulligan, “Public Health as a Model for Cybersecurity Information 
Sharing.” 
44 Ibid., 1692. 
45 Ibid., 1730-1736. 
46 Ibid. 
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Chapters 3 and 4, I will use the Public Cyberhealth LoA to explore how cyberhealth 
impacts health and personal wellbeing.  
One may be tempted to argue that as the two LoAs do not have precisely the 
same goal, they should simply be deployed in different contexts; the Cybersecurity 
LoA can be used for adversary-based threats, while the Public Cyberhealth LoA can 
speak to other aspects of technology policy. While I believe these two frames can 
exist side by side in some form, it would be a mistake to think of them as non-
overlapping magisteria. In particular, many of the tools and strategies of cybersecurity 
undermine the strategies and goals of cyberhealth. For instance, the development of 
offensive cyber capabilities by those working in cybersecurity has contributed to a 
cyber arms race around the world, with many of the tools eventually falling into the 
hands of cyber criminals. Similarly, as stated before, treating other state actors as 
adversaries harms the collaboration needed for international monitoring programs and 
regulatory regimes. For these reasons, adopting the Public Cyberhealth LoA may also 
necessitate fundamental changes to the Cybersecurity LoA.  
 
2.4 Two Applications of Public Cyberhealth 
The exercise of formally defining LoAs is useful for clearly defining a framework’s 
purpose, outlining the assumptions of one’s framework, and for comparing different 
frameworks. Using this exercise, I highlighted the Cybersecurity LoA’s lack of 
operational coherence and limited utility as an overarching guide for understanding 
the digital landscape. I then argued that the Public Cyberhealth LoA avoids some of 
the incoherencies of the Cybersecurity LoA and is more broadly useful as a 
framework for guiding technology policy.  
 In this section I will further explore the “cash-value” of such an approach—to 
use William James’ term—by exploring two applications of the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA beyond the production of public goods discussed in Chapter 1 and the 
information sharing scheme developed by Sedenberg and Mulligan described in 
Section 2.3. Specifically, I will explore how using the Public Cyberhealth LoA to 
think about the digital landscape can help one to 1) distinguish which problems 
deserve public interventions and which are best left to the private sector, and 2) 
ensure that policies and interventions do not unnecessarily infringe upon individuals’ 
rights.  
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2.4.1 Spheres of Public and Private Cyberhealth 
As public health policies typically are enacted by governments47 and exist within 
legal systems, they must be justifiable within the context of a ‘defensible political 
theory.’48 The previous chapter articulated one important justifiable role of the state: 
to provide public goods necessary for sustaining a minimally decent life. In this 
section, we turn to consideration of the proper role and limits of states in other areas 
of health policy. By combining these various responsibilities and limits one can define 
a sphere of public cyberhealth, within which there is a normative justification for 
governments to promote network robustness and resiliency, and a sphere of private 
cyberhealth, which is best left to private individuals and the private sector to manage. 
First, I will look at how these spheres are defined in public health, and then I will 
apply this same way of thinking to the digital landscape.  
 
2.4.1.1 Shared and Overlapping Problems 
In much of the Global North the political system which bounds the proper use of 
governmental action is some form of liberal democracy, which, depending on the 
country, to a greater or lesser extent follows Millian notions of limited government. 
Within Millian liberalism, problems which justify public health interventions are 
generally those where one person’s health status can adversely affect the health of 
another.49 These problems can be called ‘shared’ problems.50 An archetypical shared 
 
47 While non-state actors like the Gates Foundation can perform some public health 
services, ultimately only governments can justifiably coerce populations, physically if 
needed. 
48 John Coggon. What Makes Health Public?: A Critical Evaluation of Moral, Legal, 
and Political Claims in Public Health (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 266. 
49 Coggon, What Makes Health Public, 25. 
50 Note I define ‘shared’ problems more narrowly than Jennings, as I am focused on 
the liberal context, while he uses it in the context of civic republicanism. Bruce 
Jennings, “Public Health and Civic Republicanism,” in Ethics, Prevention, and Public 
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problem is infectious disease—if I come in contact with someone with the flu, I am 
more likely to get the flu. In cases where the harm one individual poses to others is 
direct and substantial (e.g. Ebola), a narrow application of Mill’s harm principle—
which essentially states that a state can only limit a person’s freedom of action to 
prevent harm to others51—can justify intrusive governmental action like quarantine. 
In cases where the threat is less extreme, like chicken pox, there is less justification 
for an intrusive governmental response. In these cases, governments may still address 
the problem, but only through less intrusive means, such as public education. 
Shared problems can be contrasted with ‘overlapping’ problems. Overlapping 
health problems are those which we all might be concerned about, but where your 
health status does not influence my health status. For example, we all might care 
about weight management, but generally your weight will not impact my weight. 
While the default in liberal democracies is to leave overlapping problems to 
individuals and private markets, there are two types of overlapping health problems 
which are normally thought to justify government intervention—overlapping health 
problems which generate substantial negative externalities and external threats which 
harm or could harm a large number of people (e.g. natural disaster). An example of 
the first category might be widespread obesity. While weight management is an 
overlapping problem, widespread obesity can strain health systems, hurt the economy, 
and normalize unhealthy behaviours like eating fast food or drinking soda, all of 
which can indirectly harm others.52 In these cases, interventions can be justified under 
a softer version of Mill’s harm principle. However, as the risk posed to the general 
 
Health, eds. Angus Dawson and Marcel Verweij (Oxford: New York: Clarendon 
Press; Oxford University Press, 2007).  
51 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Utilitarianism and Other Writings, 1859, ed. Mary 
Warnock (Glasgow: Collins, 2003), 94-95.  
52 Youfa Wang, May A. Beydoun, Lan Liang, Benjamin Caballero, Shiriki K. 
Kumanyika, “Will All Americans Become Overweight or Obese? Estimating the 
Progression and Cost of the US Obesity Epidemic,” Obesity 16, no. 10 (2008): 2323-
2330. Note that the distinction between shared and overlapping problems is often not 
hard-and-fast (as can be seen in this example of obesity). Problems will often lie 
along a spectrum between these two poles.  Having said this, I believe the concepts 
are a useful heuristic for thinking about whether a state’s interventions are justifiable.  
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population by obese individuals is indirect, non-urgent, and relatively minor, only 
relatively unobtrusive interventions (e.g. nudging, public education) are justifiable.53 
Examples of the second category, meanwhile, include threats like natural disasters 
and environmental hazards. As discussed in Chapter 1.3, states are generally justified 
in addressing these threats as part of their responsibility to ensure individuals’ ability 
to live a minimally decent life.54  
 
2.4.1.2 Application to Digital Landscape 
Turning to the digital landscape, many of these same justifications can be used to 
define spheres of public and private cyberhealth problems, which can serve as the 
basis for consistent and justifiable technology policies. One of the simplest examples 
of a shared network problem is a computer worm like Conficker, which I discussed in 
Chapter 1. Conficker spread from computer to computer and could pass commands 
(in its later iterations) via peer to peer connections. This infection model looks very 
similar to communicable diseases and would be a good candidate to be framed as a 
public problem which justifies some liberty encroaching measures (e.g. requiring one 
to patch one’s devices) even within a stronger version of Millian liberalism. Not only 
is one’s own device at a greater risk of infection if it is closely connected to infected 
devices, but large numbers of infected devices could be wielded in a botnet that could 
endanger critical infrastructure. As a result, even unconnected individuals could be 
harmed. Note that while these issues are related to the ‘harm to others principle’ 
discussed in 1.3.2, they are not identical. The ‘harm to others principle’ is relevant to 
one’s individual obligations, while Mill’s harm principle governs the proper use of 
state power.  
While computer worms may be a shared problem, the short lifespan of laptop 
batteries looks like an overlapping concern. While everyone with a laptop might have 
the concern, my battery’s lifespan will not affect your battery’s lifespan. However, 
like obesity, if there was such an ‘epidemic’ of dying batteries that there were broad 
economic consequences, then perhaps liberty-encroaching interventions could be 
 
53 I will explore the concept of proportionality more in the following subsection when 
I discuss ethical limits on interventions. 
54 As mentioned in 1.3, the specific responsibilities of the state will depend on a 
state’s political system and the specifics of the threat.  
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justifiable under a more expansive, softer version of Millian liberalism, or as a way to 
correct a particularly pernicious market failure as discussed in Chapter 1.  
While the above example of an epidemic of dying batteries may seem a bit 
ridiculous, the example of obesity (a paradigmatic overlapping problem) being treated 
as a public health problem suggests that in highly connected networks very few 
ailments which affect a large segment of the population will not lead to some form of 
harm for the broader population. One case where this is relatively easy to see is in the 
case of national health services. As healthcare funding is coming from a collective 
pool all citizens pay into, the unhealthy life choices of one individual does in some 
minor way negatively impact all other taxpayers. In the context of the internet, which 
is defined by its interconnectedness, something similar seems to happen. While prior 
to the internet the security of one’s camera or thermostat was an overlapping problem, 
today the insecurity of these devices can lead to attacks like the DDoS attack on the 
DNS system in 2016 that negatively affected (albeit minimally) hundreds of millions 
of people.  
It might seem a bit weird to think of the cybersecurity of one’s thermostat as 
being a matter of public concern, but as more devices of a previously discrete nature 
become network connected, problems that were once overlapping in nature become 
shared. A parallel might be to think about a person on a desert island. If they have 
measles, it is not a public health issue as they are not connected to any other people. 
But if you drop that person in London, that person’s health status becomes a shared 
problem. By including variables for a broader array of harms and by placing 
particular emphasis on externalities, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is better suited to 
capturing how nodes affect one another compared to the Cybersecurity LoA, which 
tends to downplay externalities and the impacts of network threats on health and 
wellbeing. 
 If we combine this analysis with the discussion of public goods from Chapter 
1, one can define a sphere of public cyberhealth problems, which governments are 
justified in addressing, and a sphere of private cyberhealth problems, which are not 
within the proper purview of state action. 
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Table 3 
Public Cyberhealth Private Cyberhealth 
Shared Problems (e.g. infectious 
malware) 
 
Overlapping Problems with Substantial 
Negative Externalities (e.g. widespread 
internet outages) 
Overlapping Problems with Minimal 
Externalities (e.g. broken computer, 
targeted hacking) 
Production of Public Goods (e.g. basic 
research, standards, network monitoring, 
national defence) 
Production of Private Goods (e.g. buying 
a better router, a more secure computer, 
etc.) 
 
While I have only sparingly used the language of the method of Levels of Abstraction 
in this section, the above framework is firmly grounded in the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA, which takes into account a variety of threats, a variety of harms, and emphasizes 
the externalities which arise in connected systems. Someone using the Cybersecurity 
LoA would find it difficult to conceptualize many of these types of problems given 
that LoA’s focus on adversary-based threats and limited concept of harm. When one 
focuses on financial and strategic harms and downplays externalities, most problems 
will seem “private” in nature and hence outside the proper scope of state action.  
 
2.4.2 Ethical Limits on Interventions 
In addition to helping one to understand the normative justification for government 
intervention in cyberspace, the Public Cyberhealth LoA also helps one think about 
ethical conflicts which may arise in the course of these interventions by 1) helping 
one to identify potential ethical conflicts and 2) suggesting solutions to those conflicts 
from the field of public health ethics.  
 
2.4.2.1 Identifying Conflicts 
Those using the Cybersecurity LoA are often blind to potential ethical conflicts 
because their conceptual framework simply does not include (or at least minimizes) 
variables like stakeholders, the impact on individual rights, externalities, and the 
impact of interventions and policies on health and wellbeing. By highlighting these 
variables, those using the Public Cyberhealth LoA are capable of identifying ethical 
conflicts which exist but have previously gone unrecognized or underappreciated.  
 94  
One simple example is the case of updating the software that runs robotic 
prosthetics. While someone using the Cybersecurity LoA may treat the device like 
any other (albeit one of greater importance than an Xbox), one using the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA will be more likely to recognize the individual patient as an 
important stakeholder and recognize that both device insecurity and device updates 
introduce interesting questions about bodily integrity, device ownership, and consent. 
As I will explore in more depth in Chapter 3, empirical research suggests that such 
devices can be incorporated into one’s sense of one’s body.55 In these cases, is it 
ethical to simply stop supporting a product that is a part of someone’s body if it 
becomes unprofitable? Is it ethical to develop new models with more advanced 
features, if that means risking the stability of the old models? Is it ethical to 
automatically push an update that fixes a security vulnerability, but also changes the 
prosthetic’s functionality? Should one share information generated by this device, 
and, if so, with whom and for what purpose?56  
As some of the specific questions raised above regard technologies that are 
still on the horizon, they have not been fully considered in public health literature; 
however, publications like the WHO and USAID’s Standards for Prosthetics and 
Orthotics demonstrate the kind of thoughtfulness that is needed to ethically develop 
technology products. This set of standards defines a comprehensive list of 
stakeholders, provides guidance for working with local populations, and outlines 
users’ rights.57  
In next section, I will explore how two specific public health tools can help 
one think about the ethics of digital interventions. First, I will consider The 
Intervention Ladder, a tool developed by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics to think 
 
55 Abbe Brown, Shawn H. E. Harmon, Rory O’Connor, Sita Popat and Sarah 
Whatley, “Body Extension And The Law: Medical Devices, Intellectual Property, 
Prosthetics And Marginalisation (Again),” Law, Innovation and Technology 10, no. 2 
(2018): https://doi-org.ezp.lib.cam.ac.uk/10.1080/17579961.2018.1526853. 
56 While I will not be definitively answering the ethical questions raised above, I will 
return to some of these themes in Chapter 3, as I explore how cyberhealth impacts 
health. 
57 WHO and USAID, WHO Standards for Prosthetics and Orthotics, World Health 
Organization (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2017). 
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about proportionality. Then, I will turn to ethical review boards and their role in 
public health institutions.  
 
2.4.2.2 Public Health Strategies for Managing Ethical Conflicts 
As public health interventions may need to infringe upon individuals’ rights like 
personal freedom and privacy,58 public health philosophers and policymakers have 
developed a number of strategies to weigh the effectiveness of a specific intervention, 
the severity of the problem, and the impact on individuals’ rights.59 One way to stop 
the spread of a disease would be to lock everyone in their homes, but such a solution 
would be, in all but the most extreme scenarios, ethically unacceptable.  
While there is not a one to one comparison between the ethical conflicts 
within the two fields—quarantining a machine is not the same as quarantining a 
person—digital interventions which benefit the population may still infringe upon 
personal rights in a similar manner. In the last section, I mentioned how updating 
health devices can raise questions related to bodily integrity, and digital quarantining 
does restrict one’s freedom of association and potentially one’s freedom of 
movement—especially as virtual reality becomes more commonplace. For those with 
relatively few avenues to connect to the internet, this restriction could cause 
significant social and economic harm. In this section, I will outline how two tools 
from public health can help one balance effective solutions with the protection of 
rights in the digital context—the Intervention Ladder and ethical review boards.  
 
 
58 For example, quarantine restricts freedom of movement and association, mandatory 
vaccinations may violate someone’s bodily integrity or restrict their freedom of 
choice, and surveillance programs may share sensitive information about a person’s 
health history, including their sexual partners or drug use. 
59 Note, other fields also have a rich history of thinking about proportionality. For 
example, Just War theory can help one understand proportionality in the context of 
war. However, outside of that context, Just War theory is ill-suited to thinking about 
proportional response to cyber attacks. Thomas W. Simpson, “The Wrong in 
Cyberattacks,” in The Ethics of Information Warfare, eds. Luciano Floridi and 
Mariarosaria Taddeo (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014), 144.  
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2.4.2.2.1 The Intervention Ladder 
The first strategy is the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ Intervention Ladder which is 
designed to help one to think through “acceptability and justifiability” of various 
public health policies, and has been used to create public health policy in a wide 
variety of contexts including food labelling standards and transportation.60 While the 
Intervention Ladder is just one public health policy tool, and not universally used or 
accepted, it formalizes a general process of thinking about proportionality that is a 
hallmark of public health policy and philosophy. The way the ladder works is by 
providing a spectrum of actions from the least intrusive to the most. The higher up the 
ladder, “the stronger the need for justification and sound evidence for 
implementation.”61 From the Nuffield Council on Bioethics’ report on public health, 
the steps on the Intervention Ladder are: 
1) Do nothing or simply monitor the current situation. 
2) Provide information. Inform and educate the public, for example as part of 
campaigns to encourage people to walk more or eat five portions of fruit 
and vegetables per day. 
3) Enable choice. Enable individuals to change their behaviours, for example 
by offering participation in a NHS ‘stop smoking’ programme, building 
cycle lanes, or providing free fruit in schools. 
4) Guide choices through changing the default policy. For example, in a 
restaurant, instead of providing chips as a standard side dish (with 
healthier options available), menus could be changed to provide a more 
healthy option as standard (with chips as an option available). 
5) Guide choices through incentives. Regulations can be offered that guide 
choices by fiscal and other incentives, for example offering tax-breaks for 
the purchase of bicycles that are used as a means of travelling to work. 
6) Guide choice through disincentives. Fiscal and other disincentives can be 
put in place to influence people not to pursue certain activities, for 
 
60 “Intervention Ladder Informs Lords Behaviour Change Report,” Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, July 19, 2011, http://nuffieldbioethics.org/news/2011/intervention-
ladder-informs-lords-behaviour-change-report (accessed Dec. 7, 2018). 
61 John Krebs, “The Importance of Public Health Ethics,” Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 86, no. 8 (2008): 577-656. 
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example through taxes on cigarettes, or by discouraging the use of cars in 
inner cities through charging schemes or limitations of parking spaces. 
7) Restrict choice. Regulate in such a way as to restrict the options available 
to people with the aim of protecting them, for example removing 
unhealthy ingredients from foods, or unhealthy foods from shops or 
restaurants. 
8) Eliminate choice. Regulate in such a way as to entirely eliminate choice, 
for example through compulsory isolation of patients with infectious 
diseases.62 
The Intervention Ladder does not suggest any specific solutions for a particular 
problem, but rather lays out a set of options to facilitate thinking about what 
constitutes a proportional response. By assessing a suite of options rather than simply 
accepting the first that addresses the problem, one is more likely to find a politically 
and ethically acceptable balance between personal rights and population health. 
Additionally, it is a useful reminder that one should use the least serious intervention, 
even if a stronger reaction might be ethically justified. For example, hypothetically let 
us assume a tax on soda is justifiable given the health impacts of soda consumption. 
Ignoring the financial reasons a state may have to impose such a tax, if incentivizing 
someone to choose healthier options is equally effective, then a state should use that 
option first.  
While there is not space in this chapter for a full case study, I would like to 
sketch out how one might apply the Intervention Ladder to a cyberhealth issue by 
considering the problem of unprotected personal computers (PCs). In 2014, PCs with 
no anti-malware software (20% of PCs worldwide) were six times more likely to be 
infected than machines that ran up-to-date monitoring.63 Not only will individuals 
with infected machines be at greater risk of identity theft and other personal harms, 
but unprotected devices can be easily drafted into large botnets that can be used to 
endanger critical infrastructure, as was the case with the Conficker worm. Individuals 
may not update their devices because they fear the update may damage their 
 
62 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Public Health: Ethical Issues, XIX. 
63 Dennis Batchelder, et al., Microsoft Security Intelligence Report, volume 18. 
(2015), http://www.microsoft.com/security/sir/archive/default.aspx, 79-80. 
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machines, they may be unaware of the seriousness of being unprotected, or they may 
be unable to pay for anti-malware software or the bandwidth to download patches.64  
Using the Intervention Ladder as a guide, depending on the level of risk 
assessed, the following interventions could be applied in increasing level of 
intrusiveness:  
1) Do nothing. 
2) Educate the public about cybersecurity without infringing on their 
autonomy. 
3)  Provide all new PC owners with the option to enable anti-malware 
software.  
4) Nudge individuals towards protection by changing the default to opt-in 
new PC owners to anti-malware software and automatic updates.  
5) Subsidize anti-malware software and create a fund analogous to the 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program to pay for damage caused by 
patches.  
6) Charge unprotected users more for internet access.  
7) Internet Service Providers (ISPs) could restrict unprotected PCs to only 
allow access to verified safe websites. 
8) ISPs could fully restrict unprotected machines until they install anti-
malware software.  
As with the example of the soda tax, one should always run through the various 
options and typically deploy the least intrusive response that will get the job done, 
even if a more intrusive option may also be justifiable. 
A cyberhealth Intervention Ladder would likely need different steps than the 
one developed by the Nuffield Council. For example, in the digital context, charging 
unprotected individuals more for internet access may be more burdensome than 
restricting their access to safe websites. In the public health context, however, 
quarantines are more burdensome than fines in that they restrict an individual’s 
freedom of movement and association. However, even in its current form, the 
Intervention Ladder is a useful tool for thinking through how to balance risks, 
responses, and personal rights in cyberspace. 
 
64 Rowe, Halpern, and Lentz, “Is a Public Health Framework,” 30-38. 
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This public health approach, which assesses a wide variety of interventions 
and seeks to find the right balance between efficacy and ethical costs, is 
fundamentally different from the approach employed by those using the 
Cybersecurity LoA described in Section 2.2. As cybersecurity is treated as a private 
problem by those using the Cybersecurity LoA, companies choose the types of 
interventions which are in their self-interest, area of expertise, and legal authority. 
While an ISP can shut-off someone’s internet access, they cannot auto-enable 
application security updates, and they might have little direct interest in doing so even 
if they could. Singer and Friedman report that 27 per cent of internet providers do not 
attempt to track outbound attacks, and half of those that do track them take no action 
to mitigate these attacks.65 With limited capabilities and incentives which frequently 
diverge from the public interest, private companies are ill-suited to identifying and 
implementing the cyberhealth solution which best balances effectiveness and personal 
rights. Having said this, as companies are well-suited to balancing effectiveness and 
cost, they may play an important role in controlling the cost of public cyberhealth 
policies. For instance, if policymakers determine that ISPs should shut down the 
internet access of spammers and other sources of malware, the ISP itself is likely 
better suited to creating a cost-effective solution to meet that mandate than the 
policymaker. In many cases, specific cyberhealth measures, such as patching 
proprietary code, will only be implementable by private companies.  
It bears repeating that the Intervention Ladder is merely one formal 
articulation of the type of thinking that public health experts engage in as part of their 
day to day work within public health institutions. It is this type of thinking—
characterized by an awareness of ethics and a thoughtfulness about proportionality—
that the Public Cyberhealth LoA seeks to encourage by explicitly highlighting 
individual rights, non-financial forms of harm, and the impact of externalities on the 
broader network.  
 
2.4.2.2.2 Ethical Reviews 
Beyond the Intervention Ladder, this thoughtfulness about ethics can also be seen in 
the use of ethical reviews in public health institutions. The World Health 
 
65 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 175-177. 
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Organization’s Ethics Review Committee, for instance, formally reviews all WHO 
funded research which involves human subjects and provides guidance to member 
nations on internal ethical issues pertaining to public health.66 Similarly, the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention’s Public Health Ethics Unit seeks to raise 
awareness within the organization of ethical problems which public health 
interventions can cause and integrate this way of thinking into everyday work.67 It 
may seem trite to say the way to balance ethics and effectiveness considerations is to 
think about how one balances ethics and effectiveness considerations, but this basic 
level of ethical review used by public health institutions is almost entirely absent from 
the technology sector and technology policy. While researchers and developers at 
companies like Google’s Deep Mind have begun to think about the ethical issues 
which arise specifically in the field of artificial intelligence, this type of analysis is 
reserved for special cases. While runaway, superintelligent AIs get quite a bit of 
attention, everyday ethical concerns are often ignored. In fact, it is reasonable to think 
that the focus on ‘killer robots’ is a way of diverting attention from more everyday 
concerns, such as whether or not a product helps or harms customers, whether 
customers have consented to certain practices (e.g. Facebook running experiments on 
users),68 and whether customers are adequately informed if their data is compromised 
or purposefully shared with third parties. While the ethics of these practices may be 
occasionally discussed in the public sphere, they are less commonly discussed by 
those actually developing technology products on a day to day basis. The lack of 
discussion about these topics can, in part, be attributed to the downplaying of 
externalities, rights, and wellbeing in the Cybersecurity LoA. If one’s framework does 
 
66 World Health Organization, “Research Ethics Review Committee,” World Health 
Organization, http://www.who.int/ethics/review-committee/en/ (accessed May 16, 
2017). 
67 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Public Health Ethics,” Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, May 10, 2015, 
https://www.cdc.gov/od/science/integrity/phethics/ (accessed May 16, 2017). 
68 Vindu Goel, “Facebook Tinkers With Users’ Emotions in News Feed Experiment, 
Stirring Outcry,” New York Times, June 29, 2014, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-
emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-stirring-outcry.html 
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not include these variables, it is easy to assume that ethical reviews are unnecessary 
and merely a hindrance to technological progress. One can point to the recent collapse 
of Google’s Advanced Technology External Advisory Council as evidence that 
technology companies only pay lip service to many ethical concerns. The board, 
which was dissolved one week after being founded, had no authority to stop projects, 
was only to meet four times a year, and included a number of members with 
questionable qualifications—one of which seemed to be on the board primarily as a 
way of currying favour with conservative lawmakers.69  
Lastly, because of the direct impact public health interventions often have on 
individuals, there is more of a culture of involving a broad number of stakeholders in 
discussions surrounding specific interventions. This can take place at the individual 
level with informed consent procedures, at the local level with public health workers 
engaging communities around the treatment of HIV, and at the national level in a 
forum like the WHO. By contrast, the technology industry typically prefers to make 
decisions under a veil of secrecy rather than with meaningful public discussion, and 
frequently purposefully obscures their intent through impenetrable terms and 
conditions. These everyday capitalistic practices may have been acceptable and even 
appropriate when most technology problems looked more like overlapping problems, 
but as the internet has grown into the essential connective tissue of modern life these 
overlapping problems are increasingly of shared concern.70 While these practices are 
not a result of the Cybersecurity LoA, per se, it is worth highlighting as an example of 
how the public cyberhealth approach has broad applicability for reframing how we 
think about technology policy and corporate practice beyond the narrow scope of 
network failure.  
 
69 Kelsey Piper, “Exclusive: Google Cancels AI Ethics Board in Response to Outcry,” 
Vox.com, April 4, 2019, https://www.vox.com/future-
perfect/2019/4/4/18295933/google-cancels-ai-ethics-board (accessed April 5, 2019). 
70 For example, in the past if an individual’s data was taken or given away without 
consent only that individual may have been harmed. Today, that data may be used to 
help sway elections, as was the case with Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in 
Brexit and the 2016 US presidential election. As such, a previously overlapping 
problems becomes one of shared concern.  
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While it may seem a bit unlikely that a new framing device can replace a LoA 
as ubiquitous as cybersecurity, the history of public health once again provides some 
reason to think such a shift is possible. One historical parallel is the private control of 
water sources and the 1854 cholera outbreak in London. At the time of the cholera 
outbreak, many water sources were provided by private companies with minimal 
oversight. While the dominant theory of the time attributed cholera to miasma or bad 
air, by mapping incidents of the disease John Snow identified that a specific water 
pump on Broad Street was the likely source. He also identified that the company 
supplying the water was using water from sewage polluted sections of the Thames.71 
As people’s understanding of the importance of clean water grew, governments took 
on a larger role in the oversight of water quality. The people of London did not simply 
wait for the water companies to become public health campaigners and clean-up their 
act on their own. As the internet and other digital technologies become an ever more 
essential component of modern life—underpinning critical infrastructure and social 
interactions—our notions of corporations’ private rights and public responsibilities 
must be continually re-evaluated. The alternative is to accept that the digital 
landscapes in which we live and the security of the critical infrastructure on which we 
rely, will be designed to maximize profits rather than human flourishing.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In Chapter 1, I argued that the philosophy of public health and the history of public 
health institutions could help one to understand 1) the importance of public goods to 
network robustness and resilience and 2) the obligations of states, individuals, and 
corporations to participate in the production of said goods. In this chapter, I argued 
that this usefulness was not an anomaly, and that there is substantial value in viewing 
many technology matters through a public health lens.  
Using the method of levels of abstraction, I formally defined what I called the 
Cybersecurity LoA and the Public Cyberhealth LoA. The Cybersecurity LoA 
represented the dominant way corporations and states tend to think about the digital 
landscape. It was characterized by a focus on adversary-based risks and financial 
costs, a very limited view of state action, and the use of offensive capabilities. The 
 
71 Judith Summers, Soho: A History of London's Most Colourful Neighborhood 
(London: Bloomsbury, 1989), 113-117. 
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Public Cyberhealth LoA, meanwhile, considered adversary and non-adversary-based 
threats, highlighted non-financial harms and individual rights, downplayed the use of 
offensive capabilities, and was characterized by a greater awareness of externalities. I 
argued that not only is the Public Cyberhealth LoA more operationally coherent than 
the Cybersecurity LoA, but that it could also be used as a framework for guiding 
technology policy more generally.  
Lastly, I illustrated how one might use the Public Cyberhealth LoA to 
understand the normative justification for—and ethical limits on—government 
interventions in cyberspace. First, expanding on the discussion from 1.3.1, I explored 
how thinking like a public health expert can help one to define spheres of public and 
private cyberhealth, which could be used to determine whether governments were 
justified in addressing a specific digital problem. Then, I demonstrated how the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA surfaces ethical concerns that may be ignored by those using the 
Cybersecurity LoA and specifically argued for the value of the Intervention Ladder 
and ethical reviews for thinking about proportionality.  
In the chapters to come, I will continue to develop the Public Cyberhealth LoA 
by exploring the role digital technologies and information play in our health and 
wellbeing. These chapters will strengthen the justification for using a public health 
inspired lens and demonstrate what it means to take health and wellbeing into account 
when designing technology policies and products.
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Chapter 3: 
Health and Cyberhealth 
 
 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I introduced and then formalized an alternative framework for 
conceptualizing the digital landscape inspired by the philosophy of public health. I 
argued that the philosophy of public health could be useful for thinking about the 
normative justification for and ethical limits on government intervention in 
cyberspace, while public health policy and institutions could serve as examples of 
how to manifest these higher principles (e.g. the WHO, the Intervention Ladder, 
ethical review boards). This Public Cyberhealth LoA takes seriously non-malicious 
threats to network robustness and resilience, highlights the impacts of network threats 
and interventions on health and wellbeing, and is more thoughtful about protecting 
individual rights compared to the dominant cybersecurity lens typically used by 
policymakers and IT professionals. 
 In this chapter and the next, I will flesh out this framework by exploring in 
greater depth what it means to think about the digital landscape with human health 
and wellbeing front and centre. This continues the work begun in Chapter 2 of 
demonstrating that the Public Cyberhealth LoA is a full-blooded alternative to the 
cybersecurity lens. First, in this chapter I will explore how poor cyberhealth impacts 
health. Then, in Chapter 4, I will define a theory of ‘informational wellbeing’ that 
policymakers can use to assess how digital information and its use, control, 
accessibility and accuracy impact personal wellbeing. Together these chapters 
strengthen the justification for using the Public Cyberhealth LoA by revealing the 
extent to which technology policy and digital threats can impact health and wellbeing. 
The greater these impacts, the stronger the argument is for using a LoA which 
explicitly considers these variables when constructing technology policy and 
designing technology products. Additionally, I will argue that beyond affecting how 
we think about and assess technology policy, the Public Cyberhealth LoA also 
suggests we should reassess how we define the very concepts of health and personal 
wellbeing.  
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In this chapter, I will put broader wellbeing to the side and focus on health. In 
Section 1, I will outline why identifying certain cyberhealth issues as health or public 
health issues is important, and I will define what qualifies something as a health or 
public health issue. This will be an expansion of the description of public health 
issues introduced in 2.4.1. In Section 2, I will then describe the somewhat 
straightforward ways in which poor cyberhealth is a health issue or matter of public 
health. First, I will consider how the poor cyberhealth of critical infrastructure and 
medical devices can impact health. Then, I will touch on the ways in which internet 
access is becoming increasingly important to good health outcomes, and how poor 
network connectivity can exacerbate unjust health inequalities.  
In Sections 3 and 4, I will then explore more interesting (and controversial) 
cases where the poor cyberhealth of devices and networks can be the causal basis for 
disease. These cases arise when digital components become coupled to biological 
systems, as in the case of digital pacemakers. I will argue that for the purpose of 
determining if one is healthy, we should consider these coupled devices to be part of 
an individual’s body. As such, when a pacemaker works properly and one’s 
symptoms disappear, we should say one is healthy, and if a piece of malware reduces 
the functional efficiency of the pacemaker (and one’s circulatory system), then we 
should consider this drop in functional efficiency to be a separate pathology from the 
underlying condition which necessitated the pacemaker to begin with. I will argue that 
identifying certain cyberhealth issues as pathologies is valuable for two reasons. First, 
it potentially affects how one allocates funding for public health and cyberhealth, 
representing one concrete way in which viewing the digital landscape through the 
Public Cyberhealth LoA differs from the dominant cybersecurity lens. And second, it 
helps one to re-examine the meaning of familiar concepts, like health, disease, and 
bodily integrity in the digital age. 
It is worth noting that this novel conception of health is quite different from 
the arguments I made in Chapters 1 and 2 for applying the philosophy and tools of 
public health to technology policy. In previous chapters, the argument for applying 
the tools and philosophy of public health to technology policy was based on an 
analogy between digital networks and human networks—i.e. the ‘health’ of a digital 
network is in some ways similar to the health of a population. In Sections 3 and 4 of 
this chapter, the argument for using the philosophy of public health to craft 
technology policy does not rely on analogy— I will argue a pacemaker should be 
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treated as part of one’s body and a hacked pacemaker is a disease comparable to a 
torn ligament or TB. These two approaches are separable. One does not need to adopt 
this conception of health to think it is a good idea to use the Intervention Ladder to 
think about proportionality, and conversely one might think it makes sense to treat a 
pacemaker as a part of one’s body but think the cyberhealth of networks is not similar 
enough to population health to justify the creation of a cyber WHO. I do not think the 
separability is a weakness but rather is a sign that viewing the digital landscape 
through a public health lens has benefits in a variety of contexts. 
 
3.1 Health and Public Health—Privileged Categories 
Health is generally considered central to personal and collective wellbeing1 and is 
essential to being able to function in the world and pursue goals and opportunities.2 
Sudhir Anand has argued that this importance is recognized across cultures and time.3 
Given this significance, states and individuals rightly treat health issues seriously and 
public health—the “efforts of society as a whole to improve the health of the 
population and prevent illness”4—is a core function of any reasonably well-
functioning modern state. A right to health is even included in both the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights5 and the constitution of the WHO.6 While the inclusion 
of a right to health in these documents is a very contentious issue,7 the mere fact that 
it is considered appropriate by many is a sign of health’s significance. In Chapter 1 
 
1 Amartya Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1985). 
2 Sudhir Anand, “The Concern for Equity in Health,” in Public Health, Ethics, and 
Equity, eds. Sudhir Anand, Fabienne Peter and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004), 18. 
3 Anand, “The Concern for Equity in Health,” 17. 
4 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Public Health: Ethical Issues,” (London: Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics, 2007), V. 
5 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948): 
http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. 
6 World Health Organization, Basic Documents, 48th edition, (World Health 
Organization, 2014), 1. 
7 Jonathan Wolff, The Human Right to Health, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 
2012). 
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(Section 1.3.1), I included access to healthcare in a list of public goods which I 
believe states have an obligation to provide, given its importance to one’s ability to 
live a minimally decent life.  
Despite this importance, within the dominant Cybersecurity LoA described in 
Chapter 2, relatively little attention is given to the health impacts of poor network 
robustness and resiliency. When companies, states, and individuals fail to account for 
these potentially significant health effects, they are prone to underinvest in network 
robustness and resiliency compared to the socially optimal levels. By identifying 
these potential health impacts, one can identify a subset of cyberhealth problems 
which may deserve a greater level of funding, research, and regulation. Historical 
parallels include our shifting understanding of the health risk of nuclear fallout in the 
1950s,8 air pollution in the 19th century,9 and smoking in the mid-twentieth century.10 
Before the latter was recognized as causing various serious health problems, it was 
just a leisure activity, like reading a book. After those health issues were identified, 
governments introduced regulations, launched education campaigns, and allocated 
funds for treatment and research.  
Some aspects of cyberhealth are already recognized as affecting health but are 
conceptualized using the Cybersecurity LoA (e.g. the security of medical devices). 
Given the limited role of states within this framework, these devices are under-
regulated compared to their potential to impact health. Other cyberhealth issues, 
meanwhile, are like smoking prior to the link with lung cancer; the potential for these 
problems to impact health has yet to be studied in depth (e.g. reliable access to the 
internet). Others still have little to no impact on human health, for example, a targeted 
cyberattack to steal the IP of a clothing company. However, bundling the three types 
of cyberhealth problems together as strictly matters of IT security makes it difficult to 
create nuanced and effective technology policy and to determine proportional 
responses to specific threats.  
 
8 “Fact on the Fall-Out,” The Washington Post, December 16, 1954, pg. 20. 
9 Peter Thorsheim, Inventing Pollution, (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2006). 
10 K. Michael Cummings and Robert N. Proctor, “The Changing Public Image of 
Smoking in the United States: 1964–2014,” Cancer, Epidemiology, Biomarkers & 
Prevention 23, no. 1 (2014): 32-36. 
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Furthermore, if some issues of cyberhealth are matters of health or public 
health, then it is particularly appropriate to apply a public health inspired framework 
to these problems. First, the Public Cyberhealth LoA places more focus on the harm-
sufferer and less on the adversary. And second, the Public Cyberhealth LoA will be 
more sensitive to possible ethical concerns. For instance, returning to the example 
from Chapter 2, to one using the Cybersecurity LoA a robotic prosthetic infected with 
malware may be seen as just a technical problem to be solved with an automatic 
update, whereas a public health frame would be more likely to flag issues related to 
consent and bodily integrity. I will return to this issue in Section 3.4. 
 Finally, this exercise is important not only because it forces us to re-evaluate 
the nature of digital problems, but because it encourages a re-evaluation of what 
counts as a health problem—this point will be explored in Section 3.4. As individuals 
rely ever more on digital devices and networks, traditional boundaries between 
humans and our environment need to be reassessed. If we say a person with a slow 
heartbeat is unhealthy, what is that person’s health status when that heartbeat is 
corrected by a pacemaker? And then what if that device malfunctions or is 
maliciously compromised? Our traditional notions of health and disease may provide 
an answer, but I will argue that these answers are outdated and inadequate given the 
increasing sophistication and ubiquity of networked biotechnologies.  
  
3.1.1 Health and Public Health Issues 
Having demonstrated that there is value in identifying which cyberhealth issues are 
health or public health issues, the question then becomes: What is a health or public 
health issue? In Section 3.3, I will explore definitions of disease in depth, but for now 
it is sufficient to rely on a more intuitive definition:  
Something can be classified as a ‘health issue’ if it is either [a] typically a 
proximate cause of a harmful biological condition (e.g. environmental 
hazards, occupational hazards, unhealthy behaviours, disease vectors) or [b] 
prevents an existing harmful biological condition from being fixed (e.g. a lack 
of roads; a shortage of hospitals, medical equipment, or shortage of medical 
professionals; a lack of insurance). 
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Within the context of cyberhealth, the former may include a cyberattack leading to 
contaminated water supplies, while the latter may include ransomware which blocks 
medical professionals from accessing a hospital’s computer network, as was the case 
with the 2017 WannaCry attack on the NHS. It is worth noting that this definition of a 
‘health issue’ is rather limited, in that it does not include distal causes of poor health 
(e.g. poverty). In this chapter, I want to illustrate that even within the bounds of this 
modest definition, the health impacts of network robustness and resiliency are 
potentially significant.   
One subcategory of ‘health issues’ that is particularly relevant for this 
discussion of cyberhealth is that of ‘public health issues.’ Public health is often 
described as some variation of the “efforts of society as a whole to improve the health 
of the population and prevent illness.”11 While I introduced what makes something a 
public health issue in Chapter 2.4.1, it is worth expanding upon that definition a bit 
here, as in the last chapter the scope of the discussion was limited by the task at hand. 
By ‘public health issue’ I will mean an issue which should concern public health 
policymakers because it has the ability to impact the collective health of a population. 
While different states may have different views on what makes something a public 
health issue, in broad strokes, public health issues generally fall within one or more of 
the following categories: shared health issues, overlapping health issues at scale, and 
certain kinds of health inequalities. 
The descriptions I use below should not be treated as a comprehensive picture 
of the field of public health, but rather as a useful set of categories for the discussion 
that follows. Additionally, as I wrote about the distinction between shared and 
overlapping health issues in Chapter 2, I will only briefly summarize them here.  
 
3.1.1.1 Shared Health Issues 
Shared health issues are those where one person’s health status affects the health 
status of others in the population. Paradigmatic cases include contagious diseases like 
TB or the flu. Governmental interventions in these types of cases is generally 
justifiable in liberal democracies under some version of Mill’s harm principle (see 
 
11 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, “Public Health: Ethical Issues,” V. 
 110
Section 2.4.1.1). Examples of specific public health policies to address shared health 
issues include vaccination campaigns, education programs, and quarantines. 
 
3.1.1.2 Overlapping Health Issues at Scale 
The second category is overlapping health issues which affect a very large number of 
people. While one person being obese is not a matter of public health, tens of millions 
of obese people might be a matter of public concern. When a sizeable portion of the 
population is obese, the health system may become overburdened. This may require 
the general population to pay higher taxes and insurance premiums to support the 
health system and wait longer for appointments, at least if one accepts Klosko’s 
argument that individuals have an obligation to contribute to presumptively beneficial 
public goods (see Section 1.3.2). Additionally, if obesity becomes common enough, 
harmful behaviours like frequent soda consumption and poor eating habits may be 
normalized, which increase the likelihood of obesity in others.  
 A subcategory of overlapping health issues worth specifically highlighting due 
to its relevance in the cyberhealth debate is public safety. Examples include hazardous 
workplaces, crime, and environmental pollution.12 In this chapter, the most relevant 
public safety concern is the fragility of certain forms of critical infrastructure (e.g. 
nuclear plants, chemical plants, dams). While some threats to public safety are treated 
as public health issues, many others are not. However, these distinctions are due 
primarily to the way bureaucracies have historically carved up responsibilities and 
should not be used to make a normative claim about what should fall inside and 
outside the bounds of public health. Crime for instance is usually seen as separate 
from public health, but, as a result, many of the health effects of crime on a 
community go unaddressed (see discussion on LoAs and illegal drug use in 2.1).  
 
 
12 Stephen John, “Why ‘Health’ Is Not a Central Category for Public Health Policy,” 
Journal of Applied Philosophy 26, no. 2 (2009): 129-143. 
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3.1.1.3 Promoting Equal Access to Healthcare and Reducing Health Inequality 
Finally, public health policies may be targeted at reducing certain kinds of health 
inequalities between populations.13 These policies may be targeted at improving 
access to healthcare for certain disadvantaged groups or on closing the health gap 
between different groups in a society.14 Examples include school lunch programs and 
opening health clinics in underserved areas.15 It is important to note that not all health 
inequalities are morally significant. I will discuss this topic in greater depth in Section 
3.2.3.   
  
3.2 Poor Cyberhealth and Public Health 
If one sorts cyberhealth problems into the categories above, there are four contexts in 
which poor cyberhealth may appropriately be considered a public health issue: critical 
infrastructure, medical devices, hospital infrastructure, and a lack of access to the 
internet. While hospitals can also be considered a part of critical infrastructure, I am 
choosing to discuss hospital infrastructure separately from other forms of critical 
infrastructure due to its high potential to impact health directly. It is important to 
remember throughout this section that labelling certain cyberhealth problems as 
public health issues does not mean the Cybersecurity LoA is irrelevant in these cases. 
In many cases, we will be looking at instances of overlapping magisteria where both 
the Cybersecurity LoA and the Public Cyberhealth LoA have value.  
 
 
13 Yukiko Asada, Health Inequality, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 4. 
14 Department of Health and Social Care, Our Healthier Nation: A Contract for 
Health, Cm 3852, Feb. 9, 1998: 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/265721/title.pdf. 
15 Donald Acheson, Independent Inquiry into Inequalities in Health Report, (The 
Stationary Office, 1998): 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachme
nt_data/file/265503/ih.pdf. 
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3.2.1 Failure of Critical Infrastructure 
The first and most significant way in which poor cyberhealth can adversely affect 
health is the fragility and insecurity of the networks which underpin critical 
infrastructure. While the United States identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors 
ranging from banking to wastewater treatment, the following seven forms of critical 
infrastructure are typically viewed as relevant to health or public health: the chemical 
sector, dams, emergency services, food and agriculture, healthcare and public health, 
nuclear reactors, and water and wastewater.16 Each of these sectors are underpinned 
by digital networks, and when those networks fail or are compromised there may be 
substantial health impacts. The following table summarizes the health risks associated 
with the poor cyberhealth of critical infrastructure: 
Table 4 
Sector Cyberhealth Risk Public Health or Health Issue 
Chemical Example Vulnerabilities:  
• Stuxnet style attack on SCADA system 
causing infrastructure damage and leak of 
chemicals into the environment. 
• Natural disaster damages digital 
infrastructure 
• Bad code/poor testing 
 
Known Threat:  
• In 2007, at the Idaho National Laboratory, 
the US government demonstrated for 
journalists how they were helpless to stop 
hackers from destroying a mock chemical 
plant.17 
• Instrumental effect on 
health due to 
environmental 
contamination 
• Public safety 
 
 
 
 
16 Department of Homeland Security, “Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” Department of 
Homeland Security, July 11, 2017, https://www.dhs.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors 
(accessed Jan. 5, 2018). The complete list of sectors is: chemical sector, commercial 
facilities sector, communications sector, critical manufacturing sector; dams sector; 
defence industrial base sector; emergency services sector; energy sector; financial 
services sector; food and agriculture sector; government facilities sector; healthcare 
and public health sector; information technology sector; nuclear reactors, materials, 
and waste sector; transportation systems sector; and water and wastewater sector. 
17 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 37. 
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Dams Example Vulnerabilities:  
• Cyberattack taking control of system and 
opening dams or damaging infrastructure 
causing flooding. 
• Natural disaster damages digital 
infrastructure 
• Bad code/poor testing 
 
Known Threat:  
• Iranian hackers attempt to take control of 
small Bowman Avenue Dam in New York. 
The dam was offline at the time. It is 
believed they thought they were attacking 
the much larger Arthur R. Bowman dam in 
Oregon.18  
• Instrumental effect on 
health due to flooding 
• Public safety 
 
 
Emergency 
Services 
Example Vulnerabilities:  
• Ransomware and other cyberattacks 
shutting down health centres, disrupting 
emergency dispatch systems.  
• Natural disasters disrupting digital 
networks. 
• Bad code/poor testing 
 
Known Threat:  
• WannaCry ransomware in 2017 briefly 
shut down a number of UK health centres.  
• Hurricane Maria knocking out networks on 
Puerto Rico. 
• Instrumental effect on 
health by limiting 
access to healthcare 
• Reduces capacity to 
respond to outbreaks 
 
 
Food and 
Agriculture 
Example Vulnerabilities:  
• Cyberattack taking control of system and 
contaminating food supply. 
• Bad code/poor testing of software used for 
food purity and logistics 
• Instrumental effect on 
health by 
contaminating food 
supply 
• Public safety 
Health Care and 
Public Health 
Example Vulnerabilities: 
• Ransomware shutting down health centres 
and locking medical records, insecurity of 
hospital equipment. 
• Cyberattacks could give access to hospital 
systems to unauthorized users. 
• Bad code/poor testing 
 
Known Threat:  
• WannaCry (2017), see above. Isolated 
ransomware attacks somewhat frequently 
block individual health centres’ access to 
medical files. 
• Instrumental effect on 
health by limiting 
access to healthcare 
• Reduces capacity to 
respond to outbreaks 
• Potentially increases 
inequality of access to 
healthcare/ health 
outcomes 
 
 
18 Joseph Berger, “A Dam, Small and Unsung, Is Caught Up in an Iranian Hacking 
Case,” The New York Times, March 25, 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/nyregion/rye-brook-dam-caught-in-computer-
hacking-case.html?_r=0 (accessed Nov. 17, 2017). 
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Nuclear 
Facilities 
Example Vulnerabilities:  
• Natural disaster damaging digital control 
systems leading to meltdown and 
environmental contamination.  
• Cyberattack on SCADA system leading to 
meltdown and environmental 
contamination. 
• Bad code/poor testing 
 
Known Threats:  
• Stuxnet (2005-2010), the jointly built 
American/Israeli worm attacked SCADA 
system controlling centrifuges. Ultimately 
destroyed roughly a fifth of Iran’s 
centrifuges.19  
• Department of Homeland Security and FBI 
issued a report in 2018 outlining Russian 
state actors’ attacks on nuclear power 
plants, water facilities, and other forms of 
critical infrastructure in the US. Hackers 
were able to infiltrate the systems and 
conduct reconnaissance on the workings of 
the Industrial Control Systems.20 
• Instrumental effect on 
health due to 
environmental 
contamination, loss of 
electricity  
• Public safety 
Water and 
Wastewater 
Example Vulnerability: 
• Stuxnet style attack on SCADA system 
causing infrastructure damage,  
• Cyberattackers taking control of system  
• Bad code/poor testing 
 
Known Threats:  
• Department of Homeland Security and FBI 
issued a report in 2018 outlining Russian 
state actors’ attacks on nuclear power 
plants, water facilities, and other forms of 
critical infrastructure in the US. Hackers 
were able to infiltrate the systems and 
conduct reconnaissance on the workings of 
the Industrial Control Systems. 
• Instrumental effect on 
health due to water 
contamination.  
• Public safety 
  
 
19 William J. Broad, John Markoff and David E. Sanger, “Israeli Test on Worm 
Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Delay,” The New York Times, January 15, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html (accessed Nov. 
17, 2017). 
20 US-CERT, “Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other 
Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” US-CERT, March 16, 2018, https://www.us-
cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A (accessed May 25, 2018). 
 115 
The cyberhealth threats to critical infrastructure are diverse. Common threats include 
targeted cyberattacks (e.g. Stuxnet), untargeted cyberattacks (e.g. WannaCry), human 
error, and natural disasters (e.g. Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico). These in turn can 1) 
create unsafe environments (e.g. chemical or nuclear leaks), 2) limit access to 
healthcare (e.g. disrupting healthcare infrastructure), 3) limit a state’s ability to 
respond to an outbreak (e.g. disruption of emergency services), and 4) limit access to 
basic biological needs (e.g. food and water contamination).  
One major technical vulnerability worth highlighting is the vulnerability of the 
supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) that manage many types 
of critical infrastructure. SCADA systems may stay in place for decades, can be very 
expensive or difficult to update, and in many cases were never meant to be connected 
to an external computer (let alone the entire internet).21 The first successful 
cyberattack on a SCADA system was the Stuxnet worm (discovered in 2010), which 
destroyed nearly a fifth of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges. Similar attacks could threaten 
other sectors. Jan Kallberg and Rosemary Burk describe a scenario where taking 
control of a dam’s SCADA system could allow one to open the floodgates and 
overwhelm dams and reservoirs downstream.22 In areas where dam systems are near 
dense population centres (e.g. Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Yunnan Province, Hubei 
Province), flooding could be severe and deadly.  
Contributing to the danger of this type of risk is the privatization of critical 
infrastructure. In the United States, 90 per cent of critical infrastructure is in the hands 
of private corporations.23 In the UK that number is around 85 per cent.24 According to 
Singer and Friedman, “Several major American power companies have told Congress 
that they judge the known loss of revenue needed to take plants offline for just a few 
 
21 Jan Kallberg and Rosemary A. Burk, “Cyberdefense as Environmental Protection—
The Broader Potential Impact of Failed Defensive Counter Cyber Operations,” in 
Conflict and Cooperation in Cyberspace, eds. Panayotis Yannakogeorgos and Adam 
Lowther (Boca Raton, London, Paris: Taylor and Francis, 2014). 
22 Ibid., 270. 
23 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 15. 
24 Charlie Edwards, National Security for the Twenty-first Century, (London: Demos, 
2007), 64. 
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hours to upgrade their cyber systems is greater than any unknown cyber risks.”25 
Unfortunately, this narrow financial cost/benefit approach to thinking about the 
problem has led to upgrades in sectors where the financial benefit is clear, such as in 
banking—bank hacks can directly lead to substantial monetary losses, and customers 
will take their money elsewhere if it is not secure. Meanwhile, the most critical types 
of infrastructure for human health are often the least well prepared for modern 
network threats.26 While the private sector argues that private business will always 
know best how to protect their own infrastructure, Singer and Friedman note that the 
same arguments were deployed by the shipping industry prior to the Titanic and the 
nuclear industry before Three Mile Island.27 In addition to often overlooking potential 
health impacts, corporations frequently do not adequately account for (or value) the 
positive externalities associated with proactive investments in cyberhealth, nor the 
negative externalities generated by underinvestment, as discussed in Chapter 1. As a 
result, allowing companies to determine what counts as adequate cyberhealth 
investments will often lead to underinvestment compared to what would be best for 
society on the whole.   
 While many of the threats listed above may look like paradigmatic security 
threats rather than health issues (e.g. vulnerable chemical plants), three things are 
important to note. First, as previously noted, calling something a public health issue 
does not mean it cannot also be simultaneously addressed using the Cybersecurity 
LoA. Second, historic bureaucratic distinctions are frequently fluid and somewhat 
arbitrary, such that what seems like a security issue today may be clearly understood 
as a matter of public health in the future.28 And third, while I am identifying threats to 
health and collective health, this is not supposed to imply that public health policy 
must swoop in with new regulations. Rather, the threats should be identified and 
measured, and then appropriate policies should be created as needed. The overarching 
point of this dissertation is not to create a bunch of new public health regulations, but 
rather to understand what risks are posed by poor cyberhealth and to think about how 
 
25 Singer and Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, 209. 
26 Ibid., 202. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Dorothy Porter, Health, Civilization and the State: A History of Public Health from 
Ancient to Modern Times, (London: Routledge, 1997). 
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public health experts might frame and address the problem. Sometimes the answer 
might be to monitor the situation, sometimes it might be to intervene, and sometimes 
it may be to do nothing.29 
 
3.2.2 Insecurity of Medical Devices and Hospital Infrastructure 
The second significant way in which poor cyberhealth can impact health or be 
considered a matter of public health is the security and robustness of medical devices 
and other hospital technologies. In this section, I will primarily focus on “external” 
sensors, monitoring equipment, hospital digital networks, and electronic medical 
records. I will only mention internal devices, such as pacemakers, in passing as I will 
discuss these devices in greater depth in Section 4.  
Despite the importance of medical devices and hospital digital infrastructure 
to health, their cybersecurity is notoriously poor. According to May Wang, the Chief 
Technology Officer of Internet of Things (IoT) security firm ZingBox, “For the past 
three years the healthcare sector has been hacked even more than the financial sector. 
And more and more hacking incidents are targeting medical devices.”30 The main 
problems affecting the cyberhealth of these devices are: 1) the ubiquity of devices, 2) 
proprietary software gives little visibility into potential security flaws, 3) many 
devices run out-of-date software. While cybersecurity experts do acknowledge these 
problems, the Cybersecurity LoA’s downplaying of health impacts and treatment of 
cybersecurity as a private good has not led to effective risk mitigation strategies in 
this sector.  
The potential health risks associated with the poor cyberhealth of hospitals and 
medical devices are significant. Hospitals in the United States tend to average 
between ten and fifteen connected devices per hospital bed, and large hospital system 
can have several thousand beds.31 A 2017 survey of IoT search engine Shodan, 
showed over 30,000 healthcare related devices connected to the internet—three per 
cent of these devices were still running Windows XP, which Microsoft stopped 
 
29 See 2.4.2.2.1 The Intervention Ladder. 
30 Lily Hay Newman, “Medical Devices Are the Next Security Nightmare,” Wired, 
Mar. 2, 2017, https://www.wired.com/2017/03/medical-devices-next-security-
nightmare (accessed Nov. 20 2017). 
31 Ibid. 
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issuing security updates for in 2014.32 One effect of this outdated software is that old 
threats continue to plague healthcare devices. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in 2017, 
nearly ten years after Conficker appeared, there were over 2.5 million new Conficker 
infections. 41 per cent—over 1 million infections—were machines being used in the 
healthcare industry.33 While Conficker is a relatively benign piece of malware by 
modern standards, new threats could exploit the same vulnerabilities.  
We should be concerned about insecure healthcare devices because they can 
directly impact an individual’s health and serve as an insecure gateway to the rest of a 
hospital’s network. As Anthony James, vice-president of TrapX describes the 
problem:  
Most of these [healthcare] facilities have no clue, because no one [at the 
facilities] is monitoring their healthcare devices for the presence of an 
attacker. No one is thinking about a CT scanner or an MRI machine and 
seeing a launchpad for a broader attack.34 
Researchers have demonstrated the ability to hack insulin pumps to alter doses of 
insulin; 35 pacemakers to run down batteries and alter heartbeat;36 temperature control 
on refrigeration devices which hold medicines and samples; CT scanners; Bluetooth 
enabled defibrillators; and infusion pumps, which control morphine, chemotherapy 
 
32 Ibid. 
33 O’Neill, “Conficker Worm Still Spreading Despite Being Nearly 10 Years Old.”  
34 Lily Hay Newman, “Medical Devices Are The Next Security Nightmare.” 
35 Jim Finkle, “J&J warns diabetic patients: Insulin pump vulnerable to hacking,” 
Reuters, Oct. 4, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-johnson-johnson-cyber-
insulin-pumps-e/jj-warns-diabetic-patients-insulin-pump-vulnerable-to-hacking-
idUSKCN12411L (accessed Dec. 3, 2017). 
36 St. Jude had to push out a emergency patch to over 500,000 devices in summer of 
2017 after the discovery of this vulnerability. [Alex Hern, “Hacking Risk Leads to 
Recall of 500,000 Pacemakers Due to Patient Death Fears,” The Guardian, Aug. 31, 
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/aug/31/hacking-risk-recall-
pacemakers-patient-death-fears-fda-firmware-update (accessed Dec. 3, 2017).] 
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drugs, and antibiotics.37 While many of the most devastating consequences require a 
dedicated, malicious actor, these devices can also simply malfunction due to bad code 
or a faulty update, or be collateral damage in poorly targeted cyberattacks. For this 
reason, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is superior to the Cybersecurity LoA for thinking 
about the robustness and resiliency of these devices more broadly. While the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA can be used to address malicious threats, it is also useful for 
addressing these non-malicious threats. 
While I have singled out healthcare devices, many of the same problems exist 
for any set of networked devices. Smart homes, autonomous vehicles, and the Internet 
of Things all have the potential to impact physical health in meaningful ways, but the 
connection to health is more tenuous than in the case of healthcare devices which 
deserve a special level of scrutiny.  
 
3.2.3 Network Access and Health Inequalities 
The final issue I will consider is unreliable or sporadic access to ICT networks. This 
cyberhealth issue can both directly lead to poor health outcomes or contribute to 
unjust health inequalities. In some cases, this sporadic access is due to straightforward 
cyberhealth issues, such as faulty or inadequate hardware. In other cases, it is that 
someone lacks access to ICTs as a result of their geography or socio-economic status. 
Health inequalities that arise from socio-economic status are the paradigmatic 
example of unjust health inequality.38 While lacking access to the internet is not a 
matter of network robustness or resilience, per se, the Public Cyberhealth LoA is still 
well-suited for conceptualizing this issue due to 1) its inclusion of variables and 
observables related to impacts on health, wellbeing, and individual rights, and 2) its 
use of the philosophy of public health, which contains rich discussion of health 
inequalities. This suitability can be contrasted to the Cybersecurity LoA, which has 
limited use beyond addressing malicious threats. How precisely network access fits 
into the Public Cyberhealth LoA will become clearer in Chapter 4 once I have defined 
my theory of informational wellbeing.  
 
37 Kim Zetter, “It's Insanely Easy to Hack Hospital Equipment,” Wired, April 25, 
2015, https://www.wired.com/2014/04/hospital-equipment-vulnerable (accessed Dec. 
3, 2017). 
38 Asada, Health Inequality. 
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The first way that limited network access can harm one’s health is by limiting 
the feature set of networked biotechnologies. Devices like digital pacemakers and 
internal defibrillators not only regulate heart rhythm, but also serve as data gathering 
tools which allow physicians to remotely monitor “metrics of device integrity (e.g. 
battery status, lead impedance), programming issues (e.g. disabling of ventricular 
fibrillation therapy, insufficient safety margins for sensing or capture), or medical 
data (e.g. arrhythmias, indication of lung fluid accumulation).”39 As such, individuals 
who are unconnected to ICTs may receive a lower standard of care if this information 
is delayed in reaching their doctor.  
In addition to limiting the feature set of biotechnologies, a lack of reliable 
connectivity can also impact an individual’s ability to communicate with their doctor 
(e.g. email, video consultations) and ability to access public health information. While 
lack of network access is probably a relatively minor contributory factor to the 
emergence of health problems, it may be a substantial factor in determining whether 
patients receive adequate levels of care. Assuming these individuals lack network 
access due to their socio-economic status and not simply because they are choosing to 
live off the grid, then this inequity would be a good candidate for being considered 
unjust and a possible target for public health interventions.40 
In fact, there is good evidence that socio-economic status is largely to blame 
for being unconnected to ICTs. In the United States, 87 per cent of those who earn 
over $75,000 a year have access to broadband at home, compared to 45 per cent who 
earn less than $30,000. Rural communities are also disproportionately unconnected.41 
An electrophysiologist in Western North Carolina estimated that approximately 10-25 
per cent of his patients who receive digital pacemakers or internal defibrillators are 
 
39 Haran Burri and David Senouf, “Remote Monitoring and Follow-Up of Pacemakers 
and Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators,” Europace 11, no. 6 (2009): 701–709. 
40 Asada, Health Inequality, 38.; This also implicitly assumes there is some kind of 
right to health (or right to the social basis of health). This is also the basis of my 
assumption in Chapter 1, that states have an obligation to provide certain public goods 
required for one to be able to live a minimally decent life.  
41 Pew Research Center, “Internet/Broadband Fact Sheet,” Pew Research Center, Feb. 
5, 2018, http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/internet-broadband/ (accessed May 
23, 2018). 
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unconnected from all forms of ICT networks at home.42 As many of these individuals 
lack network access for similar reasons, such as poverty or living in an area of poor 
network infrastructure, in specific geographic pockets these percentages will be 
significantly higher.   
The connectivity gap also impacts health providers. In the United States, 1 per 
cent of small providers lack broadband access, but an estimated 7 per cent of small 
providers in rural communities remain unconnected.43 Some services, such as 
telemedicine, require higher and more reliable broadband, which may require 
providers to have Dedicated Internet Access (DIA)—a special class of internet access 
that is often several times as expensive as mass-market products. In rural areas, DIA 
can be three times as expensive as in urban areas. This has led providers in some rural 
parts of the United States to transport medical records by thumb-drive rather than via 
digital networks.44 In the United States, the Rural Health Care Program provides 
subsidies to help close the connectivity gap, but the program has been underutilized 
with only a fraction of the annual spending limit being distributed.45 Together these 
various pieces of data suggest that socio-economic inequalities are one of the main 
causes of the connectivity gap.   
It must be acknowledged that not all health inequalities are unjust or require a 
public health intervention, some differences in health are simply differences. For 
example, people who engage in risky leisure activities might be more likely to get 
 
42 This fact was relayed to me in conversation. 
43 Kate Samuels, et al., “Closing the Rural Health Connectivity Gap: How Broadband 
Funding Can Improve Care,” USC-Brookings Schaeffer On Health Policy, April 1, 
2015, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-health-
policy/2015/04/01/closing-the-rural-health-connectivity-gap-how-broadband-funding-
can-improve-care/ (accessed May 26, 2018). 
44 Steve Lohr, “Digital Divide Is Wider Than We Think, Study Says,” New York 
Times, Dec. 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/technology/digital-divide-
us-fcc-microsoft.html (accessed Dec. 5, 2018). 
45 Kate Samuels, et al., “Closing the Rural Health Connectivity Gap: How Broadband 
Funding Can Improve Care.”  
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injured, but this health inequality would not be considered unjust.46 Within the 
philosophy of public health there are numerous theories about what makes a health 
inequality unjust, of which I will mention three. The first approach argues that health 
inequalities are unjust if they are the result of socio-economic status.47 The second 
approach argues health inequalities are unjust if they are the result of factors outside 
of an individual’s control (e.g. a skydiver getting injured is not an unjust health 
inequality).48 And a third approach argues that health inequalities are unjust if an 
intervention exists to solve the problem which is not being deployed.49 Assuming 
unjust health inequalities should be a target of public health interventions, each of 
these approaches may lead one to adopt different policies in regard to the connectivity 
gap. The third approach might suggest states should provide network access to 
everyone (if that is possible), while the second approach would make room for people 
to choose to live off the grid, come what may. While the Public Cyberhealth LoA 
does not suggest one straightforward public solution to closing the connectivity gap, 
by linking issues of internet access to debates about health inequalities one can create 
more thoughtful and consistent technology policy. 
 
3.2.4 Quantifying the Public Health Impact of Poor Cyberhealth 
While the poor cyberhealth of critical infrastructure, hospitals, and medical devices 
clearly have the ability to impact health, it is difficult to assess how significant the 
risk to health is with the tools which are currently available. As mentioned in 
Chapters 1 and 2, we currently suffer from a lack of research into the likelihood of 
 
46 Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels, Daniel Wikler, “Introduction,” in 
From Chance to Choice, eds. Allen Buchanan, Dan Brock, Norman Daniels, Daniel 
Wikler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 17-18. 
47 Paula Braveman, “Health Disparities and Health Equity: Concepts and 
Measurement,” Annual Review of Public Health 27 (2006): 167-194, 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.27.021405.102103. 
48 Julian Le Grand, Equity and Choice: An Essay in Economics and Applied 
Philosophy, (London: HarperCollins Academic, 1991). 
49 Emmanuela Gakidou, Christopher Murray, and Julio Frenk, “Defining and 
Measuring Health Inequality: An Approach Based on the distribution of Health 
Expectancy,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization 78 (2000): 42-54. 
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cyberattacks, the costs of various network failures, and the effectiveness of 
interventions. Additionally, while the potential health effects of the connectivity gap 
are widely acknowledged, there have been no studies thus far that quantify this 
impact.  
 One particular challenge of assessing the health impacts of poor cyberhealth is 
the interrelated nature of network threats. For example, the failure of one critical 
infrastructure sector could cause others to fail (e.g. damaged cell networks would 
affect emergency services). Or in the case of medical devices, how does the risk of the 
least secure device jeopardize the security of more secure devices on the same 
network? For each of the vulnerabilities listed in the preceding sections, millions or 
even billions—in the case of critical infrastructure—of people worldwide are at a 
slightly higher risk of ill-health than they would be if these vulnerabilities were 
addressed, but how that risk translates into quantifiable health outcomes is beyond the 
scope of this work and unfortunately has yet to be tackled by other researchers. Such 
analyses will be essential for nor only determining efficient and effective levels of 
government funding and regulations, but for ensuring state interventions are 
proportional and just.  
A further challenge, apart from measuring the potential health effects of 
network failure, is measuring the impact of living in the state of risk caused by poor 
cyberhealth. Living in a state of risk or vulnerability can adversely impact wellbeing 
and lead to inefficient investment of resources (as individuals or companies must 
guard against future shocks).50 As Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit put it, 
“exceptional risk and vulnerability is itself a disadvantage, whether or not the feared 
event ever actually happens.”51 
 
3.2.5 Recommendations 
As it is difficult to measure the potential health impacts of poor cyberhealth with 
existing tools, it is hard to determine what counts as a proportional response. 
Therefore, my policy recommendations are conservative. States should focus funding 
efforts on fixing the most egregious security lapses (e.g. updating or phasing out 
 
50 Stefan Dercon, “Risk, Poverty, and Vulnerability in Africa,” Journal of African 
Economies 14, no. 4 (2005): 483-488. 
51 Jonathan Wolff and Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage, 9. 
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devices using out-of-date operating systems), creating standards and testing 
procedures for new devices and networked systems that have yet to be deployed, and 
increasing network access for individuals (in part because this has positive effects on 
wellbeing beyond strictly improving access to healthcare).52 Focusing on new devices 
avoids the tricky issue of requiring owners of critical infrastructure and manufacturers 
of devices to make costly changes with little guarantee that they have meaningfully 
reduced their risk. Additionally, it is cheaper to improve the robustness of new 
devices than to attempt to modify old hardware and software, which is prone to 
breaking and perhaps is already being phased out. New devices can also be sold for 
more money to offset security investments, while patching old devices only costs a 
manufacturer. All of these steps should be filtered through institutional ethical review 
processes, as discussed in Chapter 2, to ensure that the pursuit of cyberhealth is not 
unnecessarily or unacceptably harming personal rights.  
 Lastly, one issue which greatly contributes to device and network vulnerability 
is a lack of visibility into proprietary software. For instance, while the United States’ 
Food and Drug Administration began considering cybersecurity as part of the medical 
device approval process in 2013, testing is the responsibility of the device 
manufacturer.53 In the European Union, meanwhile, manufacturers have been left to 
develop standards for medical device IT security. The cybersecurity of devices is only 
mentioned in passing in the EU’s current medical device regulations (adopted in 
2017).54 Third party—or government—code validation and penetration testing would 
help ensure that devices were adequately protected. While frequently those using the 
“feudal” Cybersecurity LoA are hesitant to expose proprietary code for fear that 
vulnerabilities and valuable IP will become public, in practice dedicated hackers can 
 
52 The connection between network access and wellbeing will be revisited in Chapter 
4. 
53 U.S. Food & Drug Administration, “Cybersecurity,” U.S. Food & Drug 
Administration, https://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/digitalhealth/ucm373213.htm 
(accessed March 4, 2019). 
54 Regulation (EU) 2017/745 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 
April 2017 on medical devices, amending Directive 2001/83/EC, Regulation (EC) No 
178/2002 and Regulation (EC) No 1223/2009 and repealing Council Directives 
90/385/EEC and 93/42/EEC: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/745/oj. 
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almost always discover these vulnerabilities. It is far superior from the standpoint of 
society at large that the vulnerabilities are found by friendly eyes and able to be 
addressed proactively. 
While it is possible that one may come to similar recommendations without 
the Public Cyberhealth LoA, the Public Cyberhealth LoA highlights the urgency of 
these improvements and provides a justification for a more robust government 
response (see the discussion of public goods in Chapter 1). Additionally, the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA is useful for thinking through issues like the expansion of network 
access, which may weaken cybersecurity in a narrow sense, but nonetheless improve 
a more equitable distribution of health and wellbeing.  
 
3.3 Definitions of Disease 
In Section 2, I explored a few of the more straightforward ways in which poor 
cyberhealth can impact health. In the second half of this chapter, I will argue that 
when a digital technology is closely linked to a biological system (e.g. a digital 
pacemaker), poor cyberhealth should be considered itself a pathology or disease. 
Calling a cyberhealth issue a disease is potentially significant for at least three 
reasons. First, there may be a moral claim to treatment for some or all diseases, 
(depending on how one defines the term). This is a vast departure from the traditional 
way of conceiving of cyberhealth issues as hindrances to business or state strategic 
interests (see the Cybersecurity LoA in Section 2.2). Second, if poor cyberhealth can 
be a disease, then this strengthens the justification for using the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA, which being grounded in the philosophy of public health is better suited to 
conceptualizing ethical questions related to bodily-integrity, health inequality, and the 
moral right to treatment than the Cybersecurity LoA. And third, it may affect how we 
think about the distinction between biotech treatments and enhancements. This, in 
turn, has ramifications for deciding which biotechnologies states and insurance 
companies are willing to pay for.  
Before discussing how a cyberhealth issue can be a constitutive part of a 
disease state, it is necessary to first define what is meant by the term disease or 
pathology (throughout this section, I will use these terms interchangeably, following 
the practice of one of two main theorists I will discuss in this section, Christopher 
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Boorse).55 As there is not one agreed upon definition, I will present two of the most 
commonly used definitions below, which I will reference throughout the next section. 
Broadly speaking, definitions of disease fit into two categories—naturalist definitions, 
which define disease as some form of biological dysfunction, and hybrid definitions, 
which define disease as a harmful biological dysfunction, where harmful is a 
sociocultural designation.56 In Section 4, I will argue that within both accounts of 
disease, certain cyberhealth issues should be considered as constitutive parts of 
pathologies.  
 
3.3.1 Boorse’s Biostatistical Theory 
The first definition of disease I will employ is Boorse’s influential biostatistical 
theory. The essential formulation of Boorse’s theory, directly quoted, is as follows:  
1) The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform functional 
design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species 
2) A normal function of a part or process within members of the reference 
class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their individual survival 
and reproduction 
3) A disease is a type of internal state which is either an impairment of 
normal functional ability, i.e. a reduction of one or more functional 
abilities below typical efficiency, or a limitation on functional ability 
caused by environmental agents. 
4) Health is the absence of disease.57 
If a person breaks their ankle, we would say they have a pathology according to BST 
because their ability to walk is far below typical efficiency for their reference group 
and being able to walk is important to one’s ability to survive. Boorse argues that the 
term disease is value-free. As such, not all diseases according to BST need be 
considered harmful by society or the person with the pathology. For example, BST 
typically classifies homosexuality as a disease, as it generally reduces one’s 
 
55 Christopher Boorse, “A Rebuttal on Health,” in What Is Disease?, eds. James M. 
Humber and Robert F. Almeder (Totowa, NJ: Humana Press, 1997), 7. 
56 Jerome C. Wakefield, “The Concept of Mental Disorder: Diagnostic Implications of 
The Harmful Dysfunction Analysis,” World Psychiatry 6, no. 3 (2007): 149–156. 
57 Boorse, “A Rebuttal on Health,” 7-8.  
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functional ability to reproduce.58 The fact that in many countries homosexuality is not 
generally considered a harmful or undesirable state does not factor into this 
determination.  
 
3.3.2 Wakefield’s Harmful Dysfunction Approach 
The second definition of disease I will consider is Jerome Wakefield’s ‘harmful 
dysfunction’ approach—one of the most influential hybrid accounts of disease. While 
Boorse argues that disease is a value free term, Wakefield’s approach explicitly 
combines value judgments with scientific assessments of functionality. Wakefield 
describes his ‘harmful dysfunction’ approach saying, “a disorder is a harmful 
dysfunction, where ‘harmful’ is a value term, referring to conditions judged negative 
by sociocultural standards, and ‘dysfunction’ is a scientific factual term, referring to 
failure of biologically designed functioning.”59   
There are two primary differences between Boorse and Wakefield’s accounts. 
The first difference is in how they define dysfunction. In BST dysfunction is a 
departure from the species typical contribution of a part or process to an individual’s 
capacity to survive and reproduce. In contrast, Wakefield defines dysfunction in 
relation to the evolutionary purpose of a part. The second difference, meanwhile, is 
that Wakefield argues that a dysfunction is only a disease if it is considered harmful. 
‘Considered’ is the important word here. Within BST, dysfunctions are harmful in the 
sense that they reduce an individual’s survivability or reproducibility but need not be 
considered harmful by the individual or the culture to count as diseases (e.g. 
homosexuality, being on birth control). In contrast to BST, Wakefield would argue 
that in cultures where homosexuality is not generally considered harmful, it should 
not be considered a disease—even if the trait is, in an evolutionary sense, a 
dysfunction. While this may seem like a preferable conclusion to some, it is important 
to reiterate that within BST disease is a value-free term; i.e. to say an individual is 
 
58 Christopher Boorse, “On the Distinction Between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 5, no. 1 (1975): 63. 
59 Wakefield, “The Concept of Mental Disorder: Diagnostic Implications of The 
Harmful Dysfunction Analysis.”; While Wakefield tends to use the term disorder 
rather than disease, I will treat the two terms as synonymous. As Wakefield and 
Boorse compare their respective theories to the other, I believe this is reasonable. 
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diseased is not to imply any further moral claim. Additionally, Wakefield’s approach 
also may lead one to some surprising conclusions. Tim Lewens60 and Rachel Cooper61 
have argued in different works that depression may not be a disease within 
Wakefield’s approach, as it may not qualify as a failure of biologically designed 
functioning. I mention this example merely to dissuade one of the simplistic notion 
that Wakefield’s approach is on its face clearly preferable to BST. 
 By arguing that diseases are only those biological dysfunctions which are 
considered harmful, Wakefield imbues the term disease with an ethical salience that 
Boorse’s value-free conception lacks. As such, a ‘disease’ by Wakefield’s definition 
is more likely to carry a claim to care than a ‘Boorsean disease,’ although the strength 
of this claim varies considerably depending on the degree of harm and the cause of 
the pathology. Lastly, it is worth noting that in most cases, these two approaches lead 
one to the same designation. Wakefield and Boorse would both agree that someone 
with malaria, a broken hip, or a torn ACL have a pathology. With these two 
definitions in mind, in the next section I will argue that under certain conditions we 
should consider poor cyberhealth a pathology. While this claim may seem rather odd, 
I will argue that both Boorse and Wakefield’s accounts of disease can accommodate 
such a claim with only minor, independently plausible, changes. 
 
3.4 Poor Cyberhealth as Pathology  
The underlying assumption of both Wakefield and Boorse’s accounts of disease is 
that the constitutive causal basis of dysfunction must be some organic part or 
biological system. As such, when determining if a person has a dysfunction, one 
assesses the functioning of organic parts or biological systems without counting the 
contribution of artificial components or tools. For example, when determining if one 
is myopic, one assesses the functional efficiency of one’s vision without glasses and 
contact lenses even though these devices play a role in one’s ability to see on a day to 
day basis. While that distinction may be appropriate in the case of eyeglasses (I will 
revisit this later in the chapter), the assumption that one should not count the 
 
60 Tim Lewens, The Biological Foundations of Bioethics, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), 188. 
61 Rachel Cooper, “Disease,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and 
Biomedical Sciences 33 (2002): 263-282. 
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contribution of artificial parts when determining if someone has a disease is 
complicated by the intimate integration of artificial and biological parts in many 
modern medical interventions.  
 To motivate this claim, I will now work through the following (somewhat 
complicated but plausible) example. Consider the following: 
Jim has bradycardia (a slow heart rhythm) due to sinus node dysfunction. 
When Jim’s bradycardia is symptomatic it causes fatigue, weakness, and can 
lead to fainting.62 Within both Boorse and Wakefield’s accounts of disease, 
Jim has a pathology. Jim receives a digital pacemaker which corrects his heart 
rhythm when it is too slow, relieving his symptoms. The digital pacemaker 
can run without maintenance for 15 years, and Jim can resume all normal 
physical activities, including hobbies like mountain biking and hiking. As with 
other patients with bradycardia who have digital pacemakers, Jim’s life 
expectancy is normal. After a number of years, Jim’s digital pacemaker is 
infected with malware, leading to a drop in the functional efficiency of his 
circulatory system. He has a second intervention to replace the device, and he 
returns to his active lifestyle. 
This example highlights the oddness of only considering biological parts when 
determining dysfunction and, by extension, disease. When Jim’s pacemaker is 
working, he seems healthy; he can pursue an active lifestyle, and his lifespan is 
expected to be normal. Additionally, the pacemaker can only be separated from his 
circulatory system via surgical intervention. Based on this example, I will argue for 
the following three claims: 
1) For the purpose of determining if Jim is healthy, we should count the 
contribution of Jim’s pacemaker towards the functional efficiency of his 
circulatory system.  
2) We should consider Jim to be disease-free when his pacemaker is working 
properly, assuming that a) the functional efficiency of Jim’s circulatory system 
is typical for his reference class and b) that his circulatory system adequately 
performs its ‘biologically designed’ purpose of circulating blood. 
 
62 Mayo Clinic Staff, “Bradycardia,” Mayoclinic.org, Aug. 23, 2017, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/bradycardia/symptoms-causes/syc-
20355474 (accessed Dec. 6, 2017). 
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3) When Jim’s pacemaker is infected with malware, we should consider this a 
distinct disease or pathology from the underlying sinus node dysfunction.  
I will defend these claims by addressing a series of objections, and then I will discuss 
the potential ramifications for health and cyberhealth policy. 
 
Objection: A malfunctioning pacemaker cannot itself be considered a constitutive 
part of a disease state because it is not a biological dysfunction.  
 
Response: When we speak of a biological function, we should separate two senses of 
the word biological. The first sense refers to a function that biological creatures 
normally must perform in order to go about their life, such as pumping blood, moving 
around, eating and digesting, thinking, seeing, etc. The second sense refers to a 
function that is being performed solely by organic parts—the pumping of blood is 
being performed by the heart as opposed to a heart-lung machine. I suggest that only 
the first of these senses should be relevant to diagnosing someone with a disease—in 
determining if Jim is healthy, we should care that his heart is beating at the 
appropriate rate and not that it is being regulated by a pacemaker. This can be 
intuitively understood in the case of less technologically sophisticated devices, such 
as an artificial hip. Consider the following example: 
Barbara fractures her hip. She is in pain and cannot walk. By any common 
definition Barbara has a pathology. Barbara has surgery to fix her hip. The 
surgery entails replacing part of the hip socket and the upper portion of the 
femur with artificial components. Once Barbara recovers from surgery, her 
new hip performs at least as well as her old one, if not better.  
While Barbara has a pathology when her hip is broken, once she has recovered from 
her hip surgery and regained her ability to walk, she should be considered disease-
free. Lewens, for one, argues that artificial hips are indeed often thought of as cures.63 
However, this is only the case if we take into account her artificial hip when 
measuring her functional efficiency. If we only consider her organic parts when 
evaluating her functional efficiency, she is in fact worse-off than when she had a 
broken hip, as now she is also missing the top half of her femur and a sizeable portion 
of her hip socket. Measuring functionality in this way would be a ridiculous thing to 
 
63 Lewens, Biological Foundations of Bioethics, 180. 
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do. For clinicians—and most everyone else—the determining factor as to whether 
Barbara is diseased is whether or not she can perform the biological function of 
walking, not the artificial or organic nature of her hip. In all clinically important 
senses, the artificial parts are now simply a part of her ambulatory system. If Barbara 
broke her artificial hip, I suspect that most people would simply say she broke her hip. 
As with an artificial hip, we should count the contribution of Jim’s pacemaker 
when measuring the functional efficiency of his circulatory system, given that it is the 
functioning of this system that matters for Jim’s survivability and ability to reproduce 
and not the performance of each individual part. I admit that the two cases are not 
identical. For instance, one might argue that 1) the pacemaker is an addition to the 
circulatory system rather than a direct one-in-one-out replacement of a dysfunctional 
part, and 2) the original underlying part-dysfunction remains in the case of the 
pacemaker. However, if what one ultimately cares about is an organism’s ability to 
survive and reproduce—as is the case in Boorse’s account—then these differences are 
immaterial.64 This argument is similar to Lewens’ argument for a pluralistic 
naturalism, which I will return to later in this section.65   
In the case of Wakefield’s hybrid account, we should say Jim is disease free 
for two reasons. The first reason is that even if the heart’s sinus node remains 
dysfunctional, Jim’s condition (having a pacemaker) should no longer be considered 
harmful given that he can live an active life of normal length. And second, it is not 
exactly clear that “part” dysfunctions, per se, qualify as a dysfunction within 
Wakefield’s account. Wakefield argues that dysfunction, “refers to failure of an 
internal mechanism to perform one of its naturally selected functions,” and he defines 
internal mechanism as, “a general term to refer both to physical structures and organs 
as well as to mental structures and dispositions.”66 If the mechanism in question is 
treated as the circulatory system as a whole, rather than simply the problematic sinus 
 
64 As Boorse’s goal is to describe how pathologists use the term disease or pathology, 
he could maintain that Jim has a disease despite the fact that in practice Jim is 
performing at a statistically normal level. In most cases, including the clinical context, 
we should accept that Jim is healthy. 
65 Lewens, The Biological Foundations of Bioethics, 179. 
66 Wakefield, “The Concept of Mental Disorder: Diagnostic Implications of The 
Harmful Dysfunction Analysis.”  
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node, then there is no dysfunction when Jim’s pacemaker is working as designed. The 
corollary to this is that when the pacemaker malfunctions (for whatever reason), such 
that it meaningfully reduces the functionality of the circulatory system, we should 
think of this as a different dysfunction than the underlying sinus node dysfunction. 
 
Objection: While one may count the contribution of an artificial hip when measuring 
one’s ability to walk, this is not the case for many other types of medical devices, 
such as glasses. If a person, David, uses glasses to correct his near-sightedness, he 
still has a disease. The glasses merely mitigate the symptoms of that disease. If 
David’s glasses break or are smudged, we do not think David has a new disease. 
 
Response: Glasses are substantially different from the case of the artificial hip or the 
pacemaker because glasses are not as integrated into the visual system of the near-
sighted individual. If one pictures a spectrum of integration, on one side you have 
devices like glasses which I will call “tools,” and on the other side there are 
technologies like pacemakers which once installed become a “part” of a given 
biological system. While there may not be a clear threshold between tools and parts, 
one can identify paradigmatic cases on either side. Paradigmatic tools include glasses 
and crutches. Meanwhile, paradigmatic parts include pacemakers, cochlear implants, 
and intraocular lenses used in cataract surgery. In between these poles would be 
devices such as wheelchairs and oxygen delivery systems.  
One helpful set of criteria for determining which devices should be considered 
a part of a biological system and which should be thought of as tools has been 
developed by Andy Clark and David Chalmers as part of their work on the concept of 
the ‘extended mind.’ Below, I will outline their framework and then modify it for 
non-cognitive biological systems. 
In brief, Clark and Chalmers’s theory of extended mind says that a person’s 
mind does not need to be defined only by the mental activity which occurs inside their 
skull.67 Instead, what makes something a mind is that it is performing a cognitive task, 
 
67 Andy Clark and David Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” InterAction 8, no. 1 
(2016): 48-64, https://search.proquest.com/docview/1808003977?accountid=9851 
(accessed March 28, 2019). 
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such as remembering, reasoning, or observing the world.68 In arguing this, Clark and 
Chalmers implicitly distinguish between the two sense of biological that I described 
previously. Their classic example of an ‘extended mind’ is of a man named Otto and 
his notebook.69 Otto (who has Alzheimer’s disease) and Inga (who does not) are both 
going to the Museum of Modern Art in New York. Upon deciding to go to the 
museum, Inga searches through her memory to recall where the museum is located. 
Otto, meanwhile, checks his notebook (which he always has with him) for the 
address. They both find the information and successfully make it to the museum. 
Clark and Chalmers argue that the two instances of address retrieval “are 
entirely analogous.”70 Inga’s memory is stored solely ‘inside’ her brain, while Otto’s 
is distributed between his brain and his notebook. As Clark and Chalmers say, “The 
information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an 
ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the 
skin.”71 Clark and Chalmers argue that the notebook and Otto’s brain are a coupled 
system. They describe a coupled system saying: 
All the components of the system play an active causal role, and they jointly 
govern behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we 
remove the external component the system’s behavioral competence will drop, 
just as it would if we removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of 
coupled process counts equally well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is 
wholly in the head.72  
Returning to my case, a device should be considered a part of a biological system if 
the system and device form a coupled system. For Clark and Chalmers, the key 
criteria for this coupling are that the constituent parts are 1) constantly available, 2) 
the information is easily and directly accessible, and 3) once received the information 
is readily endorsed.73 Within Clark and Chalmers’ framework, not all notebooks are 
 
68 Andy Clark and David J. Chalmers, “The Extended Mind,” Analysis 58, no. 1 
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part of minds (some are merely what I called tools), but Otto’s is because he 
constantly keeps it with him and accepts its contribution as if it came from his brain. 
While one can lose a notebook or it can contain some inaccurate information, Clark 
and Chalmers argue that these limitations are not fundamentally different from the 
brain which can be injured, contain faulty memories, and can become temporarily 
inaccessible through inebriation or sleep.  
For now, put to the side whether or not a notebook can be part of a mind. 
While I find it convincing, it is controversial. I would argue that the basic idea behind 
Clark and Chalmers’ coupling criteria is less controversial and more intuitive when 
applied to ‘non-cognitive’ functions, such as the ability to see or walk. First, here is a 
modified version of the coupling criteria for non-cognitive systems:  
An artificial component is coupled to a biological system if: 
1) It is contributing to the function of a biological system.  
2) It is constantly available.  
3) Its contribution to the functioning of the system is readily and directly 
provided. 
4) The contribution is automatically endorsed/accepted by the system in 
question.  
Applying these criteria to David and Barbara, one can say that David’s glasses and 
vision system are not coupled, while Barbara’s artificial hip and her ambulatory 
system are coupled. While David’s glasses contribute to the functioning of this vision 
system, they are not always available (e.g. can be easily lost or stolen, prescription 
needs adjusting) and the contribution is not always readily provided (e.g. smudged 
lenses, glare). Barbara’s artificial hip, meanwhile, is always available,74 it directly and 
readily offers its contribution to her ambulatory system, and Barbara’s ambulatory 
system automatically accepts the contribution. As a result, we should (and I would say 
generally do) think of Barbara’s artificial hip as just another part of her body, but we 
do not and should not consider David’s glasses a part of his body—despite their 
value, they remain a tool. Other forms of vision interventions, meanwhile, would pass 
the criteria of being closely coupled to the biological vision system. As mentioned 
previously, during cataract surgery the biological lens is removed and replaced with 
 
74 While Barbara’s artificial hip could break, it is as reliable (at least) as her non-
artificial hip. 
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an artificial lens. As with Barbara’s hip, the lens is always available, performs 
reliably, and its contribution is automatically endorsed. Intuitively we accept that the 
new artificial lens is a part of one’s vision system—almost no one with cataract 
surgery goes around talking about their bionic eye.75  
Returning to the case of Jim and his digital pacemaker, using Clark and 
Chalmers’ criteria for coupling, it seems like we should consider Jim’s pacemaker a 
part of his circulatory system—an “extended heart” in a manner of speaking. The 
device is always available, its contribution is reliable and automatically endorsed, and 
it is performing a heart-like function. If we accept the pacemaker as essentially a part 
of Jim, then 1) as long as it is working we should consider Jim disease-free, and 2) if 
a computer virus or other malfunction affects the performance of the device, we 
should consider this condition as much a dysfunction as his original sinus node 
dysfunction.  
The fact that Jim’s pacemaker is capable of transmitting data via digital 
networks does not change the fact that it is coupled to his circulatory system. Imagine 
Barbara’s hip had sensors that sent her doctor data on her activity levels, or imagine 
that the cataract patient’s artificial lens could measure glucose levels—a feature that 
was developed by Google and Novartis before ultimately being abandoned due to 
inconsistent results.76 These additional features—assuming the base components are 
still readily available, reliable, and perform tasks associated with walking and seeing 
respectively—should not alter our fundamental belief that the hip and lens are now 
simply part of a person’s functional systems. However, this should also be true if the 
core functionalities of the device depend on digital networks. In these cases, we 
should think of the network and external computing resources as also part of the 
coupled system. While the network enabled features of a digital pacemaker probably 
do not rise to this level, it is easy to imagine devices that would. For example, 
 
75 It is worth noting that these intuitions may not extend to how we think about the 
mind, but this may be that the workings of the mind are more mysterious than joints 
or the heart. Perhaps with greater clarity into the workings of the brain, our intuitions 
may change. 
76 Jihun Park, et al., “Smart Contact Lenses With Integrations Of Wireless Circuits, 
Glucose Sensors, And Displays,” Science Advances 4, no. 1 (2018): DOI: 
10.1126/sciadv.aap9841. 
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imagine contact lenses with facial recognition capabilities that compensate for an 
individual with face blindness. Likely, this function would require cloud computing 
resources in order to work properly. In this case, the cyberhealth of the network and 
the shared computing resources are partly constitutive of one’s health status.  
There is certainly something a bit odd about the idea that a shared resource 
like a cloud server could be a part of multiple people’s coupled systems. While we do 
not usually think of body parts as being shared, it is not without precedent. Conjoined 
twins can share a single liver, heart, pelvis, spine, part of the intestine and 
occasionally even brain tissue.77 Yet, we recognize conjoined twins as separate people 
despite their shared resources. The case of cloud resources may also seem different 
because the parts are physically distant, whereas the pacemaker or hip are “internal.” 
Again, this is not normally how we think of bodies working, but I do not think it 
should affect whether we treat the resources as being part of a coupled system as long 
as the contribution is reliable, always available, and readily accepted. One could 
surgically implant a small computer into a person to perform sophisticated feats of 
computing like facial recognition, but it just seems like a worse medical and technical 
solution than letting the server sit in a warehouse.  
As an aside, while the digital pacemaker case still might feel a bit different 
than the hip, I chalk this up mostly to the terminology involved. An artificial hip is 
called a hip, something each of us naturally have two of. In contrast, a ‘pacemaker’ 
sounds more like it belongs on a racetrack than inside a human body. If the 
pacemaker was instead called an artificial heart or artificial sinus node, I think we 
would feel more comfortable accepting it as part of Jim.  
 
Objection: While the clinician or philosopher may consider Jim to be disease-free 
when his pacemaker is working properly, Jim may still think of himself as having a 
pathology. He may even want the pacemaker removed or the network connected 
features turned off despite the physical benefit. It should be the patient who decides 
whether or not the artificial device or the shared computing resources it uses are 
considered a part of their body.  
 
77 Mayo Clinic Staff, “Conjoined Twins,” Mayoclinic.org, March 7, 2018, 
https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/conjoined-twins/symptoms-
causes/syc-20353910 (accessed March 6, 2019). 
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Response: The objection above conflates two different questions. The first question is 
whether one should consider artificial parts and their associated functions—especially 
parts and functions which rely on digital networks—as part of biological systems (e.g. 
the circulatory system) for the purpose of disease diagnosis. The second question is 
whether one should consider those parts and functions to be part of a person’s body 
apart from the diagnosis of disease.  
 In regard to the first question, an individual’s feelings about whether or not the 
artificial parts should be considered a part of their body is irrelevant for determining if 
the individual has a disease within both Boorse and Wakefield’s accounts. In both 
Boorse and Wakefield’s account of disease, if there is no dysfunction, then there is no 
disease. While Jim may be experiencing harm in the form of mental distress at the 
idea of having a pacemaker, the mental distress is not related to a physical 
dysfunction—his circulatory system is both performing its evolutionarily designed 
function (relevant to Wakefield)78 and performing at typical efficiency (relevant to 
Boorse).  
This leads us to the second question of whether or not we should consider 
artificial parts to be part of one’s body apart from the context of disease diagnosis. 
The argument I presented in this section was not intended to provide an answer to this 
question. While this question is largely beyond the scope of this particular chapter, 
empirical research suggests that whether or not people do in fact consider these 
devices to be a part of their body is highly context dependent. While some children 
who depend on medical devices incorporate these devices into their self-presentation, 
others try to conceal the device and pass as ‘normal.’79 In the case of prosthetics, the 
degree to which individuals think of the device as embedded, or a part of the bodily 
assemblage, depends on both the purpose of the prosthetic (e.g. functional 
replacement, aesthetic addition, rehabilitative) and external factors (e.g. appearance, 
 
78 In the case of Wakefield, even if one argued there was a still dysfunction, this likely 
would not matter given that the condition of having a pacemaker is generally not 
thought of as being harmful. 
79 Susan Kirk, “How Children and Young People Construct and Negotiate Living with 
Medical Technology,” Social Science & Medicine 71, no. 10 (2010): 1796-1803.  
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capabilities, who controls the device).80 One famous example is how Stephen 
Hawking came to accept his ‘robotic’ voice as part of his identity and refused to adopt 
more natural sounding voice synthesizers.81  
Given these empirical findings, one could imagine that some networked 
features may be more easily incorporated into one’s bodily identity if they use cloud 
computing resources rather than a cumbersome physical device one must constantly 
lug around. This research also suggests potentially new ways of thinking about the 
ownership and control of shared computing resources. While today cloud computing 
resources are typically owned and controlled by a company (e.g. Amazon Web 
Services), it is also possible for such resources to be owned and controlled by a group 
of individuals, such as a community of people with the same disease, members of the 
same family, or a group of friends. Perhaps if individuals incorporate these devices 
into their bodily identity then there is a prima facie argument that they should have 
greater control over how these devices are managed, maintained, and improved. 
However, much more work is needed to draw any definitive conclusions.82 
One set of concepts which might be useful for thinking about artificial parts 
and bodily identity are Havi Carel’s concepts of bodily certainty and doubt. Carel 
defines bodily certainty as “the natural confidence in [one’s] bodily abilities,” while 
bodily doubt is a doubt in those bodily abilities that can lead to “helplessness, alarm, 
and distrust in [one’s] body.”83 Carel speaks about illness as being one state which 
 
80 Abbe Brown, Shawn H. E. Harmon, Rory O’Connor, Sita Popat and Sarah 
Whatley, “Body Extension And The Law: Medical Devices, Intellectual Property, 
Prosthetics And Marginalisation (Again).” 
81 Rachel Martin, “Stephen Hawking Gets A Voice Upgrade.” Weekend Edition 
Sunday, Dec. 7 2014, https://www.npr.org/2014/12/07/369108538/stephen-hawking-
gets-a-voice-tech-upgrade?t=1549637874457 (accessed Feb. 8, 2019). 
82 For example, Martha Nussbaum includes the ability to have bodily integrity on her 
list of core human capabilities, see Chapter 4.1.1. If cloud-computing hardware and 
software is incorporated into one’s bodily identity, then the ability to achieve bodily 
integrity may require that one has some measure of control over these external 
devices.   
83 Havi Carel, “Bodily Doubt,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 20, Issue Nos. 7-8 
(2013): 184. 
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leads to bodily doubt, but one could imagine other (new) sources of doubt which may 
be unique to networked devices, such as not living in an environment with adequate 
cyberhealth or relying on shared computing resources that one does not control. In my 
conversations with doctors, I have found that the mere presence of artificial parts in 
one’s body may lead to bodily doubt. This is even the case when the artificial part is 
beneficial to the overall physical health of the individual. For example, while an 
individual’s capacity to survive and reproduce may not be harmed by leaving rods in 
their leg that have been used to fix a fracture, the bodily doubt that accompanied the 
fracture may persist as long as the foreign objects remain. This mental distress should 
be taken seriously when determining whether or not the artificial parts should remain 
in place.  
While the philosophies of public health, medicine, and biology do not provide 
a single answer as to whether or not one should consider artificial parts and their 
network enabled functions to be a part of one’s body in non-diagnostic contexts, these 
philosophies do provide theoretical tools for thinking about the question, which are 
absent from security LoAs, like cybersecurity. By incorporating concepts like bodily 
certainty and doubt, bodily integrity, and definitions of disease into how we think 
about ICTs, the Public Cyberhealth LoA can help one to craft technology policies and 
products that are sensitive to individuals’ rights and encourage those in the public 
health and medical fields to think more deeply about how traditional network threats 
like malware and network fragility can impact health. One context in which this is 
particularly salient is in the regulation of medical devices. As Richard Clayton, Ross 
Anderson, and Éireann Leverett have argued, as networked devices become 
increasingly ubiquitous, “many regulators who previously thought only in terms of 
safety will have to start thinking of security as well.”84 I would add that even beyond 
security, they must think about robustness and resilience, or in one word—
cyberhealth. 
  
 
84 Ross Anderson, Richard Clayton, Éireann Leverett, “Standardisation and 
Certification Of Safety, Security And Privacy In The ‘Internet Of Things,’” Joint 
Research Centre, (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU, 2018), 
https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/80bb1618-16bb-
11e8-9253-01aa75ed71a1/language-en. 
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3.4.1 Significance for Cyberhealth Policy 
Identifying certain cyberhealth issues as diseases may have a number of significant 
impacts on technology and public health policy. First, technology policymakers and 
producers must not only think about technology products as commercial products but 
as constitutive parts of individuals’ health state and (possibly) even bodily identity. 
As an example, let us return to the idea of contact lenses that use cloud computing 
resources to treat people with face blindness. If the product is not as financially 
successful as expected, a company may want to shut down the product line and 
quickly phase-out support for the product. However, for individuals with face 
blindness, this particular product may have become an integral part of their health 
status and self-identity. For someone whose face blindness was effectively cured 
through the use of the product, shuttering the product may be akin to a form of brain 
damage. As such, for certain types of products, policymakers may want to require 
companies to support products for a certain number of years, or force companies to 
transfer maintenance of the product to another entity rather than allowing companies 
to summarily drop support.  
 Second, device manufacturers who have largely been focused on safety of 
their devices should be more thoughtful about how their networked digital devices 
interact with the broader Internet of Things. As with the previous point, the cost of 
failure is higher for the individual who has incorporated the device into their bodily 
identity and sense of bodily certainty. As such, these devices should be held to higher 
standards of robustness and resiliency than technologies that might just be considered 
tools. While one might argue that medical devices are already regulated to a greater 
degree than non-medical devices, as highlighted in Section 3, the regulations 
regarding the cybersecurity of medical devices are minimal—states typically do not 
require third party code review or penetration testing.  
 Third, if we are going to treat digital devices as being part of someone’s body, 
then threats like malware start to look a lot more like traditional health threats (e.g. 
malaria, the flu) than matters of property destruction (e.g. someone breaking my 
laptop). If we think of cyber threats in this way, then improving the cyberhealth of the 
internet is akin to draining malarial swamps—the removal of a hazardous 
environment. In Chapter 1, I argued that protecting individuals from hazardous 
environments, such as malarial swamps, is one of the most fundamental 
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responsibilities of the state and a core aspect of public health policy. Klosko put it in 
the same category as public goods like national defence and clean water.85 If states are 
justified in draining (or have an obligation to drain) malarial swamps, then it seems 
reasonable that they might also be justified in mitigating (or have an obligation to 
mitigate) malware and ensure a sufficient level of cyberhealth more generally. At 
least this might be the case when networked biotechnologies become more common. 
Additionally, from the perspective of public health policymakers, just as draining 
malarial swamps is a core part of public health policy, so may be ensuring a robust 
internet.  
Lastly, categorizing certain cyberhealth issues as pathologies may give one a 
stronger claim to have those cyberhealth issues addressed than if they were not 
considered pathologies. I say “may” because a right to treatment often depends on 
how one defines disease. Lewens has argued persuasively that naturalist theories of 
disease, like BST, are unable “to serve as the basis for views that hold the 
health/disease distinction to be an ethically salient one in itself.”86 However, Lewens 
does temper this point by arguing that certain classes of disease such as chronic pain 
and degenerative diseases may be ethically salient categories, given the degree to 
which these diseases limit one’s ability to function in the world and the fact that they 
clearly require medical treatment.87 Within Wakefield’s account of disease, it is easier 
to argue for a right to treatment given that diseases are by definition harmful 
dysfunctions. Given this, one may have a claim that a company should address a 
cyberhealth vulnerability that could lead to a pathology before developing new 
discretionary features. Based on my personal experience developing technology 
products, there is a constant debate over how to allocate resources between fixing 
bugs, improving security, and developing new features. While the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA does not suggest one clear solution to how companies and policymakers should 
balance these various priorities, the discussion in this chapter suggests that the 
philosophies of biology and public health can add a level of theoretical sophistication 
to the discussion which is lacking when one only views the problem through the 
cybersecurity lens described in Chapter 2. 
 
85 Klosko, “Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation.” 
86 Lewens, The Biological Foundations of Bioethics, 177. 
87 Ibid., 191-192. 
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3.4.2 An Alternative Approach: Pluralistic Naturalism 
It is worth noting that in this section I have made a stronger claim than I really needed 
to by arguing that we should consider artificial parts and their associated functions as 
essentially a part of the individual’s body. I have done this, in part, to show how 
cyberhealth issues can be pathologies even within some of the most popular existing 
definitions of disease. However, Lewens presents an alternate approach to Boorse’s 
naturalism called ‘pluralistic naturalism,’ which leads to some of the same 
conclusions. He argues that when talking about health and disease we should consider 
whether “the overall ability of the organism to survive and reproduce is at a normal 
level,” and not simply the functional efficiency of specific biological parts.88 In 
making this assessment, Lewens argues we should take into account both technology 
and environmental adaptations as humans are “niche constructors par excellence.”89 
For example, he argues that no humans would survive very long without clothes and 
shelter, yet we do not consider the health of people who use these technologies to be 
artificial. Applying Lewens’ standard, we can say a person in a wheelchair is 
essentially healthy as long as they live in an environment with ramps.  
However, pluralistic naturalism does not include an account of the boundary 
between an organism and its environment, and thus is neutral as to whether one 
should consider pacemakers or wheelchairs to be a part of the individual. In some 
cases, whether or not these devices are considered a part of the individual may be 
inconsequential. For instance, Lewens would likely reach the same conclusion I have 
about whether or not Jim (with his pacemaker) is healthy. In other cases, however, it 
may matter whether or not these devices are considered a part of the individual. In 
some cases, the difference may be one of degree. For example, one might think 
companies have some responsibility to support unprofitable devices for a period of 
time simply because these devices are important to one’s health, but if the device is 
also a part of one’s bodily identity then this claim may be stronger. In other cases, 
whether or not the device is considered a part of the individual may lead one to 
fundamentally different conclusions. While further research will be needed, one area 
where this may be the case is the question of who should own and operate shared 
 
88 Ibid., 179. 
89 Ibid. 
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computing resources, as in the hypothetical face-blindness example discussed 
previously. If one does not consider these shared devices to be part of the organism, 
one may be much more comfortable with these devices being owned and operated by 
private corporations compared to someone who thinks of these devices as part of 
one’s bodily assemblage.   
 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that poor cyberhealth has the ability to impact health in a 
number of significant and sometimes surprising ways. In Section 2, I described four 
contexts in which matters of cyberhealth impact health or public health in 
straightforward ways: select sectors of critical infrastructure, hospital networks, 
medical devices, and network access. In each context, I argued that the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA was better suited to addressing the health risks than the 
Cybersecurity LoA, given the Cybersecurity LoA’s narrow focus on adversary-based 
threats and treatment of cybersecurity as a private good. Then, in Sections 3 and 4, I 
argued that when networked devices are coupled to biological systems, we should 
consider the functioning of the coupled system when determining if someone has a 
disease. In these cases, when cyberhealth problems, such as malware or buggy code, 
reduce the functioning of the coupled system, we should consider the reduction in 
functioning of the artificial devices to be a pathology. In the case of devices with 
network enable features, this may require one to accept that the cyberhealth of cloud 
computing resources and even network infrastructure is part of one’s health status. 
Finally, this argument not only suggested we need to rethink how we define disease 
but raised interesting questions about how medical devices with networked features 
should be maintained, developed, regulated, and even owned.  
 It is clear that poor cyberhealth has the potential to significantly impact 
individuals’ health and potentially exacerbate health inequalities. As networked 
biotechnologies become more sophisticated and commonplace, these effects will 
likely become more significant. In some cases, the risks are substantial and actual, as 
in the case of critical infrastructure’s vulnerability to natural disasters and 
sophisticated cyberattacks. Other risks, such as those associated with speculative 
biotechnologies, are only now becoming visible on the horizon. 
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Chapter 4: 
Informational Wellbeing 
 
 
In Chapter 3, I explored the ways in which a matter of poor cyberhealth (i.e. a lack of 
network robustness and resiliency) could also be considered a matter of public health. 
This included rather straightforward vulnerabilities, such as the fragility and 
insecurity of medical devices, hospital networks, and critical infrastructure, as well as, 
more unusual cases where poor cyberhealth could itself be thought of as a pathology. 
Given that digital networks are often important determinants and constituents of 
health, I argued it was appropriate and useful to think about these networks using the 
tools of public health policy. The move to such a framework was driven, in part, by a 
recognition that the cybersecurity framework, with its focus on financial harm, fails to 
capture the diversity of roles that information networks play in modern lives. 
However, the impact of these networks not only goes beyond financial losses to 
health, but beyond health to other aspects of our lives. Therefore, in this chapter, I 
will widen my focus and explore how the control, use, accessibility and accuracy of 
digital information impacts personal wellbeing—of which health is but one important 
part. By wellbeing I mean essentially “what is non-instrumentally or ultimately good 
for a person.”1 These impacts, in turn, link back to my argument in Section 1.3 that 
the state should promote cyberhealth as part of its responsibility to ensure its citizens 
can live a minimally decent life.  
 While there are many definitions of wellbeing, information is an even more 
difficult term to define. As Floridi says, “Information is notoriously a polymorphic 
phenomenon and a polysemantic concept.”2 In this chapter I will use the General 
Definition of Information (GDI), which defines information as data plus meaning.3 
When I speak of ‘digital information,’ I am referring to the information stored in or 
transmitted by digital technologies like computers, smartphones, servers, the internet, 
 
1 Roger Crisp, “Well-Being,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Sep. 6, 2017, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/well-being (accessed 30 May 2018). 
2 Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, 81. 
3 Ibid, 83. 
 145 
etc. (as opposed to paper records or magnetic tape), and by ‘personal information’ I 
mean information whose semantic content is about an individual (e.g. medical 
records, one’s address, photos of a person, a social media profile). In this chapter, I 
will focus my examples on the control, use, accessibility and accuracy of digital 
information, although much of what I will say about digital information will also be 
true about non-digital information. For instance, having the ability to ensure the 
accuracy of one’s medical records is valuable regardless of whether or not that record 
is digital. Focusing on information, as opposed to solely the robustness and resiliency 
of network infrastructure, is appropriate considering that digital networks are valuable 
only insofar as they facilitate the movement of information. 
 Understanding the connection between wellbeing and digital information and 
its use, control, accessibility and accuracy is central to my overall project for two 
reasons. First, as was the case with health impacts, if digital information and its use, 
control, etc. significantly impact wellbeing, then for the purposes of creating 
technology policy one would want to use a LoA which includes wellbeing as an 
important variable. While wellbeing impacts are an important variable in the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA outlined in Chapter 2, wellbeing is almost never included in 
cybersecurity cost/benefit analyses. Second, understanding the connection between 
wellbeing and digital information is necessary to operationalize the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA. In Chapter 2, I defined the goal of the Public Cyberhealth LoA as: 
to promote cyberhealth as part of a broader goal of promoting human health and 
wellbeing. One cannot create and maintain networks that promote wellbeing, if one 
does not have a clear idea of how wellbeing is impacted by digital information and its 
use, control, accessibility, and accuracy.  
 In this chapter, I will define a theory of informational wellbeing that enables 
one to identify and measure how various information practices and policies impact 
personal wellbeing. First, in Section 1, I will introduce one way of talking about 
wellbeing—the capability approach to wellbeing. This approach defines wellbeing in 
terms of one’s “ability to do valuable acts or reach valuable states of being”4 (e.g. the 
ability to live a normal lifespan, the ability to be healthy, etc.). I will then outline one 
 
4 Amartya Sen, “Capability and Wellbeing,” in The Quality of Life, eds. Martha 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 30. 
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theory of wellbeing which uses the capability approach—Martha Nussbaum’s list of 
Central Human Functional Capabilities.  
 In Section 2, I will then demonstrate that certain ‘informational capabilities’ 
are central to one’s ability to achieve the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list, and thus are 
central to achieving a high degree of wellbeing according to at least one influential 
account of wellbeing. The informational capabilities I will focus on are:  
1) the ability to control access to one’s personal information  
2) the ability to use one’s personal information  
3) the ability to ensure the accuracy of one’s personal information  
4) the ability to live in an environment with an adequate degree of 
cyberhealth.  
In Section 3, I will then formalize this relationship by articulating a theory of 
informational wellbeing, which defines the relationship between informational 
capabilities and overall wellbeing. This concept of informational wellbeing is akin to 
the way we might, as a shorthand, discuss one’s athletic wellbeing or professional 
wellbeing, i.e. the aspect of one’s overall wellbeing concerned with one’s profession. 
While I will discuss the theory in depth in Section 3, the essential form is as follows:  
An individual has a high degree of informational wellbeing to the extent they 
have achieved the ‘informational capabilities and functionings’ (e.g. the 
ability to control access to their personal information, etc.) which are 
necessary to achieve fundamental human capabilities (e.g. the ability to live a 
natural life span, etc.). 
This theory is primarily intended to guide social scientists as they seek to measure the 
impacts of digital technologies on wellbeing and to help technology policymakers 
assess the success of technology policies in wellbeing terms rather than benchmarks 
like financial impact and the establishment of infrastructure.5  
 
5 While this theory shares many traits with what Anna Alexandrova calls mid-level 
theories of wellbeing, its scope is wider than most mid-level theories—more akin to 
physical wellbeing than child-wellbeing or the wellbeing of mothers. As such, I 
generally do not refer to this theory as ‘mid-level.’ Having said this, if one localizes 
the general theory (e.g. the informational wellbeing of displaced persons), the 
localized version would likely qualify as a mid-level theory. Anna Alexandrova, The 
Science of the Philosophy of Wellbeing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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 While this theory is central to the Public Cyberhealth LoA for the reasons 
stated above, one need not fully adopt that LoA to find this theory useful. I believe 
this detachability is a feature. It may be of particular use in the fields of development 
studies and sociology as part of efforts to understand the role digital information and 
ICTs play in people’s lives. Additionally, it may be of use to technology policymakers 
who are not willing to accept the value of the broader public health inspired approach. 
Having said this, precisely how the theory would be used and the policies it would 
inspire would likely depend on the LoA one is using.  
 While this is the first attempt to use the capabilities approach to create a 
theory of informational wellbeing, the capabilities approach has been selectively 
applied to the use of ICTs in the past. Nicholas Garnham has explored the application 
of the capability approach to communications, 6 Shirin Madon has outlined a 
capability approach to evaluating e-governance reforms in India,7 and Björn-Sören 
Gigler suggested using ‘informational capabilities’ to measure the impact of ICTs in 
the development context.8 In each case, the capability approach was determined to be 
a better approach for assessing the impact of ICTs on people’s lives compared to 
metrics like the establishment of infrastructure.9  
Gigler’s work is closest to my own but differs in two fundamental ways. First, 
his work is grounded in development economics, specifically the context of rural 
Bolivia. By contrast, I intend my theory of informational wellbeing to be more widely 
applicable. Second, Gigler focuses on capabilities that one actively performs, such as 
 
6 Nicholas Garnham, “Amartya Sen's 'Capabilities' Approach to the Evaluation of 
Welfare: Its Application To Communications,” in Beyond Competition: Broadening 
the Scope of Telecommunication Policy, eds. Bare Cammaerts and Jean-Claude 
Burgelman (Brussels: VUB University Press, 2000), 25-36. 
7 Shirin Madon, “Evaluating The Developmental Impact Of E-Governance Initiatives: 
An Exploratory Framework,” The Electronic Journal of Information Systems in 
Developing Countries 20, no. 5 (2004): 1-13. 
8 Björn-Sören Gigler, “‘Informational Capabilities’- The Missing Link for the Impact 
of ICT on Development,” The World Bank, working paper series no. 1, (March 2011), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/227571468182366091/pdf/882360NWP0
Box30series0no10March2011.pdf (accessed Oct. 24, 2018). 
9 Ibid. 
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using the internet to access the price of grain at the market. While these “athletic” 
capabilities (to use G.A. Cohen’s term)10 are important in my work, I also will stress 
the importance of more “passive” informational capabilities, such as simply having 
the ability to live in an environment with an adequate degree of cyberhealth. While 
using the internet may be a valuable functioning in certain contexts, one’s wellbeing 
may be substantially impacted by the use, control, accessibility and accuracy of 
digital information even if one has never personally used an ICT. For example, many 
of those without internet access nonetheless depend on bureaucratic services and 
critical infrastructure that do rely on digital networks and information. My theory is 
intended to capture these broader effects of cyberhealth on wellbeing in a way in 
which Gigler’s does not. 
 
4.1 The Capability Approach to Wellbeing 
In this section I will introduce Amartya Sen’s capability approach to wellbeing and 
outline one influential version of this approach—Martha Nussbaum’s list of Central 
Human Functional Capabilities.11 In Section 2, I will then demonstrate how one’s 
ability to achieve these fundamental capabilities—and by extension a high degree of 
wellbeing—depends on one achieving certain ‘informational capabilities,’ such as the 
ability to control access to one’s personal information.  
The capability, or capabilities, approach is a theoretical framework for 
describing wellbeing in terms of one’s ability to achieve certain ‘valuable 
functionings.’12 Within the capability approach, functionings are the various states of 
 
10 G.A. Cohen, “Equality of What? on Welfare, Goods, and Capabilities,” in Quality 
of Life, eds. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 25. 
11 It is necessary to note that Nussbaum speaks of this list in terms of justice as 
opposed to wellbeing. By this she means the list is not a comprehensive account of 
what is good for a person, but that these capabilities are the ones that governments 
have a responsibility to provide their citizens. In this sense, we are both speaking to 
what might more accurately be described of as advantage. Jonathan Wolff and Avner 
De-Shalit, Disadvantage, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).; Martha 
Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
12 Amartya Sen, “Capability and Wellbeing.” 
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being and doing. Examples of functionings include being vaccinated, living in a warm 
house, or going to school. A capability, meanwhile, is one’s ability to achieve various 
combinations of valuable functionings. An example from Nussbaum’s list of 
capabilities, which I will describe presently, is the ability to enjoy recreational 
activities.13 This capability would be measured by assessing one’s ability to enjoy 
various leisure activities such as games, art, theatre, or watching TV, etc. This may, in 
turn, include assessments of whether one has free time, the necessary financial 
resources, people to play with, and knowledge of games.  
The capability approach is not a complete theory of wellbeing in and of itself, 
as Sen does not specify which capabilities contribute to wellbeing. As Serena 
Olsaretti says, “[The capability approach] only identifies a space for individual and 
social evaluation, a standard of advantage, which can then be used for descriptive 
purposes.”14 As a way of talking about wellbeing, it is flexible enough to work with a 
number of different conceptions of what it means to live a good life. While I will 
focus on one conception in this chapter—Nussbaum’s list of Central Human 
Functional Capabilities —one can still use the capability approach even if one does 
not agree that Nussbaum’s list is canonical.  
In addition to being flexible, a second advantage of the capability approach is 
that it is not overly prescriptive. For instance, within the capability approach, one 
should assess whether agents have the ability to participate politically, not whether 
they actually vote. As Nussbaum says:  
The conception does not aim at directly producing people who function in 
certain ways. It aims, instead, at producing people who are capable of 
functioning in these ways, who have both the training and the resources so to 
function, should they choose. The choice itself is left to them.15 
While ultimately one must specify the relevant valuable functionings and capabilities, 
in theory the capability approach has a greater respect for individual freedom and 
 
13 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach, 78-79. 
14 Serena Olsaretti, “Endorsement and Freedom in Amartya Sen's Capability 
Approach,” Economics & Philosophy 21, no. 1 (2005): 91. 
15 Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in Liberalism and the Good, 
eds. R. Douglas, G. Mara and H. Richardson, 203–252 (New York, NY: Routledge, 
1990). 
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avoids some of the dangers associated with paternalism compared to other objective 
list approaches to wellbeing, such as Hurka’s perfectionism.16 However, in practice 
one must be careful not to overly rely on the measurement of functionings (compared 
to capabilities), as doing so undermines Nussbaum’s defence of the theory as 
compatible with liberal norms.17   
For my purpose, two types of capabilities are important: ‘fundamental 
capabilities’ and ‘informational capabilities.’ By fundamental capabilities I mean the 
capabilities which enable a person to pursue a minimally decent, or “minimally 
flourishing life”18 (e.g. the ability to be healthy, the ability to live a normal lifespan). 
An ‘informational capability,’ meanwhile, is one’s ability to achieve various valuable 
informational functionings. An example of an informational capability is the ‘ability 
to control who has access to one’s personal information,’ while valuable 
informational functionings which contribute to this capability may include living in a 
country with data regulations that require positive consent for the use of one’s 
information, understanding how one’s personal information is used, using strong 
passwords, and using an email client with end-to-end encryption. The value of 
specific informational capabilities and functionings will be dependent on the local 
context. For example, having strong passwords is not a valuable functioning if one 
does not have personal access to ICTs that require passwords. 
 
4.1.1 Nussbaum’s List of Central Human Functional Capabilities 
While Sen does not specify the list of relevant capabilities for wellbeing, one such 
influential list is Nussbaum’s Central Human Functional Capabilities. This list is 
Nussbaum’s attempt to identify the capabilities which are required for a life to be “not 
so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of a human being.”19 The list is 
not intended to be a comprehensive account of all that is good for a person, but a list 
of capabilities that states should provide to ensure individuals have the ability to 
 
16 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
17 Claassen Rutger, “Capability Paternalism,” Economics and Philosophy 30, no. 1 
(2014): 57-73.  
18 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 33. 
19 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach, 72. 
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pursue a “minimally flourishing life.”20 I will use Nussbaum’s list as an example of a 
set of ‘fundamental capabilities,’ with the understanding that future research may 
reveal additional fundamental capabilities or suggest alterations to the list below.21 
Below I will quote at length from Nussbaum’s Women and Human Development: The 
Capabilities Approach, although I have cut down the descriptions of each capability 
as appropriate:  
1) Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length… 
2) Bodily Health. Being able to have good health… 
3) Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; 
having one’s bodily boundaries treated as sovereign… 
4) Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to 
imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a ‘‘truly human’’ 
way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education… Being 
able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing 
and producing self-expressive works and events of one’s own choice, 
religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one’s mind 
in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect 
to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. 
Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own way. 
Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-
necessary pain.    
5) Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside 
ourselves… 
6) Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to 
engage in critical reflection about the planning of one’s life…   
7) Affiliation.  
A. Being able to live with and toward others… to have the 
capability for both justice and friendship… 
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; 
being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is 
equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections 
 
20 Martha Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 32-33. 
21 Wolff and De-Shalit, Disadvantage, 9. 
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against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual 
orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin…. 
8) Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to 
animals, plants, and the world of nature. 
9) Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.    
10) Control over One’s Environment.  
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political 
choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political 
participation, protections of free speech and association.  
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable 
goods), not just formally but in terms of real 
opportunity;…having the right to seek employment on an equal 
basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search 
and seizure.22 
Nussbaum compiled this list after years of cross-cultural discussion, making it the 
product of a kind of Rawlsian ‘overlapping consensus.’23 As Nussbaum 
acknowledges, some of these goods (e.g. health) are ‘natural goods.’ Whether or not 
one acquires these natural goods is in part due to luck. For these goods, the role of the 
state is to try to provide the social basis for the good (e.g. access to healthcare, clean 
water) rather than the good itself (e.g. health).24  
While acknowledging that this list is not without controversy,25 I will use it to 
demonstrate that informational capabilities are central to at least one influential 
account of wellbeing. Furthermore, it is worth stating that even if one subscribes to a 
very different ultimate account of wellbeing, one may still be able to accept that the 
capabilities on Nussbaum’s list are useful for some policy purposes. For example, one 
may think that wellbeing is ultimately about satisfying one’s preferences, but 
nonetheless accept that having the ability to receive an adequate education and the 
 
22 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach, 78-80. 
23 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Revised Ed., (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1971, 1999), 340. 
24 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach, 81-82. 
25 Richard Arneson, “Perfectionism and Politics,” Ethics 111 (2000): 37–63. 
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ability to access healthcare furthers that goal. I will address the concern that 
Nussbaum’s account limits the utility of my theory in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Informational Capabilities and Wellbeing 
In this section, I will demonstrate how certain ‘informational capabilities’ play a 
central role in one’s ability to secure the fundamental capabilities listed by Nussbaum. 
The ‘informational capabilities’ I will focus on include:  
1) the ability to control access to one’s personal information  
2) the ability to use one’s personal information  
3) the ability to ensure the accuracy of one’s personal information  
4) the ability to live in an environment with an adequate level of cyberhealth.  
While there are other valuable informational capabilities, these four are adequate to 
illustrate the importance of informational capabilities (as a class) to one’s ability to 
achieve the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list.  
In the following subsections, I will present examples which illustrate the 
importance of each informational capability. For instance, I will look at India’s 
Aadhaar program as an example of having the ability to use one’s personal 
information. While exploring each example, I will highlight the relevant intersections 
with Nussbaum’s list by bolding the relevant fundamental capability. As I could write 
an entire chapter on each capability, these examples should be treated as being 
illustrative of the importance of the given informational capability and not as a 
comprehensive treatment of the topic. 
 
4.2.1 The Ability to Control Access to Personal Information 
While there are many examples of the importance of being able to control access to 
one’s personal information, here I will focus on the inability to control access to 
personal photos. First, I will explore the example of the actress Jennifer Lawrence, 
who had a series of nude photos stolen in 2014, and then I will widen the discussion 
to revenge pornography more generally.  
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In 2014 hundreds of images of celebrities stored on Apple’s iCloud service 
were stolen and subsequently released online.26 Many of these images depicted the 
celebrities in various states of undress. While many celebrities were affected, the 
actor Jennifer Lawrence was particularly vocal about what the experience was like. 
She described how the theft was not merely a property crime, but a violation of her 
bodily integrity. In describing the theft, Lawrence said, “It's taking somebody's 
intellectual property but also my body. It was violating on a sexual level.”27 As the 
photos began to appear online, she tried to work on a public statement, but she says, 
“every single thing that I tried to write made me cry or get angry.”28 She described 
herself as, “Just so afraid.” The leak caused her unnecessary emotional pain (Senses, 
Imagination Thought), caused her to lose social bases of self-respect and non-
humiliation (Affiliation), and plausibly led to employment discrimination (Control of 
One’s Environment, i.e. having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with 
others). Certainly, with more conservative fans, the leaking of the photos harmed 
Lawrence’s reputation—although the scale of this harm is hard to assess. She also 
acknowledged the important social role of these photos in maintaining her 
relationship with her partner (Affiliation) saying, “I started to write a [public] 
apology, but I don't have anything to say I'm sorry for. I was in a loving, healthy, 
great relationship for four years. It was long distance, and either your boyfriend is 
going to look at porn or he's going to look at you.”29 In one particularly revealing 
 
26 Charles Arthur, “Naked Celebrity Hack: Security Experts Focus on iCloud Backup 
Theory,” The Guardian, Sep. 1, 2014, 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/01/naked-celebrity-hack-icloud-
backup-jennifer-lawrence (accessed Jan. 24, 2019). 
27 Oprah Winfrey, “The Jennifer Lawrence Interview, by Oprah Winfrey,” The 
Hollywood Reporter, Dec. 6, 2017, 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/features/jennifer-lawrence-interview-by-oprah-
winfrey-1064576 (accessed April 18, 2018). 
28 Sam Kashner, “Both Huntress and Prey,” Vanity Fair, November 2014, 
https://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2014/10/jennifer-lawrence-photo-hacking-
privacy. 
29 Ibid. 
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quote, Lawrence captures how all these impacts made her question her self-identity 
and self-worth: 
 I think, like, a year and a half ago, somebody said something to me about how 
I was 'a good role model for girls,' and I had to go into the bathroom and sob 
because I felt like an imposter — I felt like, 'I can't believe somebody still 
feels that way after what happened.’ It's so many different things to process 
when you've been violated like that.30  
In this reaction she both reveals how the experience not only cost her the ‘social bases 
of self-respect and non-humiliation,’31 but also in a sense the ability to define her self. 
By saying she felt like an ‘imposter,’ she is acknowledging that she had internalized 
the idea that she was no longer worthy to be a role model for girls despite believing 
she did not do anything inherently shameful. While Nussbaum does not specifically 
identify the ability to define one’s self as a fundamental capability, the value of self-
determination underlies the entire capability approach’s focus on freedom and is 
present in many of the fundamental capacities Nussbaum lists, including Practical 
Reason; Emotions; Sense, Imagination and Thought. However, this is a subtle and 
tricky issue, and I will revisit it in more depth in Section 4.6.2, at which point I will 
argue that we should consider the ability to define one’s self as a fundamental 
capability on par with the other capabilities on Nussbaum’s list.  
 While Lawrence has been particularly vocal about her experience, her 
experience is not uncommon. Mudasir Kamal and William J. Newman describe the 
mental effects of revenge pornography more generally: 
The distress includes anger, guilt, paranoia, depression, or even suicide. There 
may also be deterioration in personal relationships and feelings of isolation. 
The humiliation, powerlessness, and permanence associated with these… 
crimes leave victims engaged in a lifelong battle to preserve their integrity. 
Consequently, victims of revenge pornography suffer from similar enduring 
 
30 Erika W. Smith, “Jennifer Lawrence Speaks Out About Reclaiming Her Body After 
Her Nude Photos Were Published Without Her Consent,” Bust, 
https://bust.com/feminism/194242-jennifer-lawrence-reclaiming-body-after-nude-
photos.html (accessed April 18, 2018). 
31 Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capability Approach, 78-80. 
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mental health effects as described by victims of child pornography, such as 
depression, withdrawal, low self-esteem, and feelings of worthlessness.32 
Often an individual’s name, address, and social media account are posted alongside 
the photographs, significantly heightening the mental distress of the primary 
violation.  
 The capabilities approach is particularly useful in this context because it 
emphasizes that it is the loss of the ability to control who has access to one’s photos 
rather than the voluntary sharing of the photos themselves that is the problem. 
Lawrence not only did not feel shame about taking the photos and sharing them with 
her boyfriend, but she specifically acknowledged that this activity strengthened their 
relationship. The capabilities approach values one’s freedom by acknowledging that 
what constitutes a good life is not the same for everyone. While for some people 
taking nude photos and sharing them with one’s romantic partner is not a valuable 
functioning, for others it is. A more simplistic objective list approach to wellbeing 
may fail to account for the positive aspects of this activity.  
 
4.2.2 The Ability to Use One’s Personal Information 
The second informational capability I will highlight is the ability to use one’s 
personal information to achieve a host of secondary goods. This informational 
capability is particularly important because bureaucracies have typically used 
identifying informational artefacts (e.g. IDs, biometrics) as the gateway to everything 
from securing a home loan, to receiving government benefits, to participating 
politically. While this informational capability is important in non-digital contexts 
(e.g. paper passports, drivers’ licenses, etc.), I will explore a contemporary digital 
example—Aadhaar, India’s biometric ID program.  
The Aadhaar program uses citizens’ iris scans, fingerprints, and photographs 
to generate a twelve-digit ID number and an ID card. The aim of the program is for 
that ID card and one’s biometrics to be the mechanism by which one claims welfare, 
health services, food rations, pension benefits, registers for certain schools, and votes. 
In theory at least, having the ability to use one’s biometric information is central to 
 
32 Mudasir Kamal and William J. Newman, “Revenge Pornography: Mental Health 
Implications and Related Legislation,” Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law Online 44, no. 3 (2016): 359-367. 
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many Indians’ ability to live a normal lifespan (Life), be healthy (Health), participate 
politically (Control of One’s Environment), and receive an adequate education 
(Senses, Imagination, Thought). One example of Aadhaar’s promise is the 
experience of Manisha Kamble, a homeless seventeen-year-old living in Mumbai. 
Speaking of her experience, Manisha said, “In India, you're nothing without 
Aadhaar.”33 Without a birth certificate or address, Manisha was essentially invisible 
to the state. After a charity helped her get a card, she was able to register for a school 
(Senses, Imagination, Thought), and when she turns 18 she will be able to use her 
card to register to vote (Control of One’s Environment).34  
 In practice, the program has often failed to achieve its purpose and has been 
plagued with technical and logistical problems. While Manisha’s experience 
illustrates the promise of Aadhaar, others have lost previously available resources, 
such as food rations, due to technical problems with the program. In some cases, these 
technical issues are paradigmatic cyberhealth issues, such as unreliable internet 
(especially in rural regions), faulty fingerprint readers, and insecure databases.35 In 
other cases, individuals who lack fingerprints through a lifetime of manual labour, 
age, or amputation can be turned away from food ration offices or other essential 
services.36 Jean Dreze, an economist studying Aadhaar, has identified at least a dozen 
individuals who died of hunger in 2018 after either being unable to enrol in the 
program or being turned away when their information could not be accessed.37 This is 
 
33 Lauren Frayer, “India's Biometric ID System Has Led to Starvation For Some Poor, 
Advocates Say,” NPR, Oct. 1, 2018, 
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/01/652513097/indias-biometric-id-system-has-led-to-
starvation-for-some-poor-advocates-say?t=1538831766242. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Indrani Basu, “AADHAAR: Fading Fingerprints Mean This Ageing Space Scientist 
Can't Care For His Son,” Huffington Post, April 19, 2018, 
https://www.huffingtonpost.in/2018/04/19/an-81-year-old-space-scientist-wants-the-
supreme-court-to-save-senior-citizens-from-aadhaar_a_23414358 (accessed April 6, 
2019). 
37 Frayer, “India's Biometric ID System Has Led To Starvation For Some Poor, 
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a particularly stark example of a cyberhealth issue being a literal health issue, which 
was the focus of Chapter 3. For my purposes, Aadhaar’s successes and failures 
highlight the importance of being able to use one’s personal information in the digital 
age. 
One instance where the language of informational capabilities is particularly 
useful is for assessing the impact of the program’s poor cybersecurity. As the 
technology lawyer Mishi Choudhary says, “any compromise of such a database is 
essentially irreversible for a whole human lifetime: no one can change their genetic 
data or fingerprints in response to a leak.”38 Unfortunately, the system has already 
been hacked. One investigative journalist was able to buy access to a billion people’s 
information for a mere seven dollars.39 While this seems problematic, it is not always 
easy to point to immediate financial or reputational harm resulting from such 
breaches. As a result, one may (and courts often do) conclude that no harm has 
actually occurred from the breach.40 However, using the language of capabilities one 
can argue that one’s wellbeing has been affected by these breaches as one has lost the 
ability to control access to one’s personal information and the ability to use one’s 
biometric information in the future; once biometric data is compromised, it is far less 
secure as a means of identity in other contexts. These impacts are realized the moment 
the database is compromised regardless of whether or not one’s identity is ever 
actually stolen. 
One may want to argue that the ability to use one’s personal information is 
specifically important in the context of Aadhaar and not necessarily generalizable, but 
personal information is used to achieve goods and services in many different contexts. 
Biometrics are now frequently used for identification purposes at border crossings, in 
refugee camps to register individuals and disburse benefits, and increasingly for 
 
38 Mishi Choudhary, “Viewpoint: The Pitfalls Of India's Biometric ID Scheme,” BBC 
News, April 23, 2018, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-43619944. 
39 Frayer, “India's Biometric ID System Has Led To Starvation For Some Poor, 
Advocates Say.” 
40 Daniel Solove, “’I’ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of 
Privacy,” San Diego Law Review 44 (2007): 768. 
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everyday tasks like banking.41 Meanwhile, non-biometric personal information is used 
even more frequently. One’s name, address, date of birth, email address, and the 
ubiquitous mother’s maiden name are a few examples of pieces of personal 
information that enable one to enrol in schools, vote, bank, own property, travel, 
work, and receive government benefits. Just because we frequently have the ability to 
use this information, does not mean that the capability is not important, nor that one 
will always be able to use that information in the future. Combining massive data 
breaches with sophisticated AI capable of imitating individual’s speech patterns may 
make identity theft much easier and more common in the future, significantly 
diminishing our ability to use that information to obtain goods and services.   
 
4.2.3 The Ability to Ensure the Accuracy of Personal Information 
The third informational capability I will highlight is the ability to ensure the accuracy 
of one’s personal information. As should be obvious, all of these informational 
capabilities are to some degree entwined. The ability to ensure the accuracy of one’s 
information contributes to one’s ability to use one’s information and is dependent 
upon (to some degree) the ability to control access to one’s personal information. This 
entwinement is not unique to informational capabilities. If we look at Nussbaum’s 
list, capabilities like the ability to be healthy and the ability to live a normal lifespan 
potentially impact one’s ability to achieve all the rest of the capabilities on her list. A 
person in a vegetative state, for instance, cannot build relationships, own property, 
participate politically, etc. As such, some of the examples I will use to discuss this 
capability will touch on or be relevant to the capabilities already discussed.   
There are numerous examples of the importance of the ability to ensure the 
accuracy of one’s personal information ranging from the accuracy of one’s digital 
medical records (Health, Life, Bodily Integrity) to the odd case of Constantin 
Reliu—a Romanian man who was incorrectly declared dead after having lived abroad 
for several decades. Despite appearing in court in person, he was told that his appeal 
was too late, and he would have to remain officially deceased. Speaking of the 
impact, Reliu said, “I am officially dead, although I’m alive…I have no income and 
 
41 Anna Lodinová, “Application Of Biometrics As A Means Of Refugee Registration: 
Focusingon UNHCR’s Strategy,” Development, Environment and Foresight 2, no. 2 
(2016): 91—100. 
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because I am listed dead, I can’t do anything [emphasis mine].”42 This inaccuracy and 
Reliu’s inability to correct it prevents him from voting (Political Control Over 
One’s Environment), accessing health services (Life, Health), owning property or 
working (Material Control Over One’s Environment). While Reliu’s case may 
seem like a surreal edge case, less dramatic examples are common, such as 
individuals having difficulty scrubbing erroneous incidents from their credit history 
(Material Control Over One’s Environment) or struggling to recover from identity 
theft.43  
The more a society uses personal information for, the more important it is to 
be able to ensure its accuracy. China’s new social credit system (SCS) is a case in 
point. This mandatory program assigns points based on what the government 
considers good behaviour and docks points for what the government considers bad 
behaviour in four areas: government affairs, judicial affairs, social activities, and 
commercial behaviours.44 Data sources include, but are not limited to, financial 
records, tax records, social media, and travel information. This data is collected by 
disparate sources and then shared and integrated into a centralized system.45 
Examples of bad behaviour include bad driving, buying too many video games, and 
bribing officials.46 People with low scores can be banned from traveling by train and 
plane, prevented from leaving the country (Bodily Integrity), barred from hotels, 
 
42 Shaun Walker, “Romanian Court Tells Man He Is Not Alive,” The Guardian, 
March 16, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/16/romanian-court-
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43 Charlene Jennett, Sacha Brostoff, Miguel Malheiros, and M. Angela Sasse, 
“Adding Insult to Injury: Consumer Experiences Of Being Denied Credit,” 
International Journal of Consumer Studies 36 (2012): 549-555. doi:10.1111/j.1470-
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44 Fan Liang, Vishnupriya Das, Nadiya Kostyuk, Muzammil M. Hussain, 
“Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China's Social Credit System as a State 
Surveillance Infrastructure,” Policy & Internet 10, no 4 (2018): 415-453. 
45 Ibid.  
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have their internet speed throttled, lose out on certain types of jobs (Material Control 
of One’s Environment), and possibly be publically shamed (Affiliation).47 
Inaccuracies may occur because of slander, human error, buggy code, or because the 
data scheme cannot account for the complexities of real life. I will sidestep the 
question of whether this is a good or bad social program. What is important for my 
purposes in this chapter is that when such a program is in place, it is important that 
one has the ability to ensure the information being used is accurate. 
This case is similar to the Aadhaar case in a number of ways. In both 
examples, ensuring the accuracy of one’s information is important. In the case of 
Aadhaar, however, the personal information that is used is more limited in scope and 
it is more likely the information will be accurate—one’s biometric information should 
stay mostly static over time. By contrast, the SCS is using information from a 
diversity of sources, that information will need to be standardized as it is aggregated, 
and then will be run through algorithms to adjust one’s credit score—at least for now 
these algorithms are not publicly available.48 Each step could potentially erode the 
accuracy of one’s information. As such, while the ability to ensure the accuracy of 
one’s information is important in many contexts, the SCS highlights the importance of 
this capability and the ways in which it may be more difficult to achieve in the future 
as big data-driven systems become more common, automated, and potentially opaque.     
While one might want to argue that it is simply better for one’s information to 
actually be accurate than to have the ability to ensure that it is accurate, there are 
cases where it might be in one’s advantage for one’s personal information to be 
inaccurate. For example, someone who has served time in prison may not want their 
criminal record to show up on their Facebook page, a shorter individual may not mind 
that their dating profile adds a few inches to their height, or a human rights worker in 
China may be better off if the SCS says they were playing video games while they 
were actually meeting with a pro-democracy activist. This is not to say that it is 
unproblematic for people to make things up or to say that they should have the ability 
to deliberately falsify personal information. Rather, it is to say that one’s wellbeing 
 
47 Ibid.  
48 Fan Liang et al., “Constructing a Data-Driven Society: China's Social Credit 
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depends on having the ability to ensure one’s information is accurate, not necessarily 
on it actually being accurate.  
 
4.2.4 The Ability to Live in an Environment with an Adequate Level of 
Cyberhealth 
The final informational capability I will highlight is the ability to live in an 
environment with an adequate level of cyberhealth. As discussed in Chapter 3, this 
ability is essential to being able to rely on critical infrastructure, such as water 
treatment plants, emergency services, and chemical plants. Additionally, in the digital 
age, it is critical to the proper functioning of digital voting machines (Political 
Control of One’s Environment), hospital infrastructure (Health, Life), government 
systems like Aadhaar (see 4.2.2), and one’s ability to communicate with friends 
(Affiliation). While this ability is less important in societies which do not rely heavily 
on digital networks, in regions like North America and Europe the reliance of critical 
infrastructure and bureaucracy on digital networks means the cyberhealth of one’s 
environment impacts one’s ability to achieve nearly all of Nussbaum’s fundamental 
capabilities.49 
 
These four informational capabilities are merely illustrative of how digital 
information and its use, control, accessibility, and accuracy can impact one’s ability to 
achieve Nussbaum’s fundamental capabilities. Other potentially important 
informational capabilities include the ability to avoid algorithmic bias, the ability to 
communicate confidentially, and literacy. In the next section, I will more formally 
define informational wellbeing and discuss a number of potential applications.  
 
 
49 It is worth noting that this is a capability—like the ability to live in a malaria-free 
environment—where it is unclear that it is the capability that matters as much as 
achieving a specific functioning. Would anyone be better off living in a malarial zone 
or in an environment with poor cyberhealth? This question is also a feature of some of 
the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list, such as health. For further discussion on this 
matter see: Olsaretti, Serena. “Endorsement and Freedom in Amartya Sen's Capability 
Approach.”  
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4.3 A Theory of Informational Wellbeing 
In the last section, I argued that given the ubiquity of digital technologies and their 
role in 21st century bureaucracies, one’s ability to achieve the fundamental 
capabilities listed by Nussbaum depends on one’s ability to achieve certain 
informational capabilities. Given this importance, there is value in a concept of 
‘informational wellbeing’ that can act as a shorthand for all of the various ways 
informational capabilities impact our ability to achieve fundamental capabilities. I 
will define informational wellbeing as: 
An individual has a high degree of informational wellbeing to the extent they 
have achieved the ‘informational capabilities and functionings’ (e.g. the 
ability to control access to their personal information, etc.) which are 
necessary to achieve fundamental human capabilities (e.g. the ability to live a 
normal life span, etc.). 
This is certainly not the only way one could define a concept of informational 
wellbeing, but it has a number of features that make it useful for both policymakers 
and technology producers seeking to promote personal wellbeing.  
First, the theory is flexible enough to work in a wide variety of cultural 
contexts. While I have used Nussbaum’s list of fundamental capabilities, one could 
substitute another list of fundamental capabilities without altering the definition I 
have presented above. Nussbaum has even acknowledged each entry on her list can be 
“more concretely specified in accordance with local beliefs and circumstances.”50 The 
same can be said for informational capabilities and functionings. In some contexts, 
internet access may be central to one’s ability to use one’s information, in other 
contexts having access to a telephone or the postal service may be sufficient. This 
theory of informational wellbeing does not assume that just because someone lives in 
a less technologically advanced society that they necessarily have worse 
informational wellbeing. In this sense, my concept of cyberhealth can be understood 
as a subset of a broader notion of information system robustness. My focus on 
cyberhealth, as opposed to this broader notion, has largely been driven by my interest 
in the huge growth of digital networks and how they make these capabilities more 
central to flourishing.  
 
50 Martha Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach, 
77. 
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 Second, the theory is sufficiently non-technical to be understood by 
policymakers, politicians, technology producers, and citizens. This makes it easier for 
social scientists to tailor the theory to local contexts and for local stakeholders to 
participate in the process of specifying valuable capabilities and functionings. This is 
not to say that technical measures (e.g. encryption strength, bandwidth) should be 
avoided when measuring one’s ability to achieve certain functionings. In some cases, 
technical assessments may be the best way to measure a given informational 
capability. 
 Third, the theory is measurable. Measurability is important for policymakers 
and technology producers. Without being able to quantify impacts to one’s wellbeing, 
it is difficult to determine proportional responses and to set appropriate funding 
levels. Furthermore, my theory of informational wellbeing can likely be measured 
using data available to civilians. Examples include data related to technological 
literacy, access to and usage of the internet, what technological services people use, 
and network reliability. If my theory relied upon non-publicly accessible data, its 
utility as a policy tool would decrease as it would be challenging to verify that 
assessments of informational wellbeing were defensible and accurate. While 
intelligence agencies like the NSA or GCHQ may have greater visibility into the 
security of our personal information, without sophisticated spy tools one can still 
assess whether the services an individual uses follow security standards, whether 
these services have had known breaches, whether an individual has strong passwords 
and two-factor authentication in place, and whether their passwords have shown up in 
databases of stolen information. Much of this data is already collected for different 
purposes.  
 Fourth, my theory takes into account the perception gap. By the perception 
gap I mean that we generally cannot sense changes to the state of our personal 
information. If one breaks one’s arm, one can immediately perceive that one’s 
physical wellbeing has decreased. Similarly, the concept of mental wellbeing, is 
largely based on the quality of one’s immediately perceptible mental experience. By 
contrast, one could have one’s identity stolen, but only realize the harm when 
applying for a loan, checking one’s bank account, or attempting to log into an online 
account that has been compromised. The ‘perception gap’ suggests that objective list 
theories, like the capability approach, are better suited to measuring informational 
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wellbeing than approaches which rely on one reporting one’s affect or satisfaction, 
such as the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS).  
 One might want to object to the notion that one’s wellbeing can be affected 
despite one not perceiving the change.51 While this might be true for assessing the 
experiential quality of one’s life, 52 informational wellbeing is not intended to describe 
this aspect of wellbeing. Rather it is a standard of advantage—a way to make 
comparison’s between people to guide political action.53 In this context, objective 
measures are appropriate. These four features are not necessary conditions for a 
theory of informational wellbeing—a theory would not have to be flexible or 
measurable or non-technical to count as a plausible account of informational 
wellbeing. However, they are positive features which make my approach a useful tool 
for assessing the impact of technology policies and products on people’s lives.  
Within the context of the Public Cyberhealth LoA, this theory provides value in 
three primary and interrelated ways: 
1) It helps one craft technology policies, respond to cyber threats, and design 
technology products in a manner which improves wellbeing.  
2) It strengthens the normative justification for states to ensure that certain public 
goods for cyberhealth are adequately produced. 
3) It helps one to determine at which point a public good for cyberhealth has 
been adequately produced. 
I will discuss each in turn, although this discussion should only be treated as an 
introduction to these uses. Further research will be needed to determine precisely how 
policymakers and producers may use this theory. 
 
 
51 For a summary of various objective and subjective accounts of wellbeing see Derek 
Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), Appendix I. 
52 T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 1998), 112. 
53 Wolff and De-Shalit, Disadvantage. 
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4.4 Value of the Theory 
4.4.1 Creating Policies, Interventions, and Products Which Improve Wellbeing 
The first use of informational wellbeing within the Public Cyberhealth LoA is to 
assess how technology products and policies impact wellbeing. This is the first step to 
being able to intentionally design technology policies and products that improve 
personal wellbeing, which, in turn, is essential to fulfilling the goal of the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA—to promote cyberhealth (network robustness and resilience) as 
part of a broader goal of promoting human health and wellbeing.  
If one was only interested in the impacts of poor cyberhealth and 
informational use on health, one could use existing (albeit controversial) metrics like 
QALYs. However, as I have demonstrated that digital information and its use, 
control, etc. affect our lives in a myriad of ways, a new approach which takes these 
impacts into account is needed. Using the theory of informational wellbeing laid out 
in this chapter, one can systematically think through how a given policy, intervention, 
or product may impact one’s ability to achieve fundamental capabilities. Depending 
on one’s purpose, there are a number of ways one can make these assessments. As an 
example, consider the ‘right to erasure’—a key part of the EU’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR).54  
As background, the GDPR is a set of data regulations that brings all 
companies operating within the EU under one set of rules. The regulations seek to 
give individuals greater control over how their personal information is used and 
ensure companies are operating on a level playing field.55 The right to erasure—
Article 17 of the GDPR—requires companies to delete personal information, under 
 
54 “Right to Erasure,” Information Commissioner’s Office, accessed 30 January 2019: 
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-
data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-erasure/. 
55 European Commission, “2018 Reform Of EU Data Protection Rules,” European 
Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/justice-and-fundamental-
rights/data-protection/2018-reform-eu-data-protection-rules_en#background 
(accessed March 8, 2019). 
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certain circumstances, if an individual requests that they do so.56 Requests should 
generally be complied with if the data is no longer needed, if the individual revokes 
consent for the data to be used, if a person objects to the information being used in a 
way where they are being profiled, to comply with a legal obligation, and if the 
information was collected illegally.57 Companies may refuse the request if the 
information is needed for archiving or public health purposes in the public interest, 
exercising the freedom of expression, establishing a legal defence, and where there is 
a conflicting compliance obligation.58 The ‘right to erasure’ is an updated version of 
what was previously known as ‘the right to be forgotten.’59  
The first way one can use the theory of informational wellbeing to assess the 
impact of technology policies on personal wellbeing is to systematically consider how 
a given technology policy will impact each fundamental capability on Nussbaum’s 
list. In the table below, I have provided an example of what that could look like in the 
case of the right to erasure: 
 
Table 5 
Fundamental Capability Impact of Right to Erasure 
Life 
Likely minimal impact for most people. Potentially significant for 
those with certain jobs (e.g. human rights workers, some 
journalists).    
Health 
Likely minimal impact for most people. Potentially significant for 
those with certain jobs (e.g. human rights workers, some 
journalists).    
Bodily Integrity Empowers individuals to remove personal photos, medical information from the internet. 
 
56 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj.  
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
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Senses, Imagination, and 
Thought None or minimal. 
Emotions None or minimal. 
Practical Reason None or minimal. 
Affiliation 
Empowers individuals to remove embarrassing information from 
the internet. Removes barriers to appearing in public without 
shame. 
Other Species None. 
Play None. 
Control Over One’s 
Environment 
May contribute to one’s ability to speak freely and avoid 
unreasonable search and seizure.  
 
Another way would be to build a canonical list of informational capabilities that are 
instrumental to achieving fundamental capabilities, and then assess a policy’s impact 
on those informational capabilities. As an example, in the table below I will assess the 
right to erasure’s impact on the four capabilities discussed in this chapter: 
 
Table 6 
Informational Capability Impact of Right to Erasure on Informational 
Capabilities 
Ability to Control Access to 
One’s Personal Information 
Makes it easier for individuals to revoke access to one’s personal 
information by 1) providing mechanism for individuals to delete 
information and 2) requiring companies to comply with requests. 
Ability to Ensure the Accuracy 
of One’s Personal Information 
Makes it easier for individuals to delete inaccurate information.  
Ability to Use One’s Personal 
Information 
Potentially increases ability by preserving the security of private 
information which can be used for other purposes. 
 
Potentially increase ability of the individual to sell their information 
to other parties as it is less readily available to third parties. 
Ability to Live in an 
Environment with Sufficient 
Cyberhealth 
Minimal impact.  
 
These two tables set out at a schematic level how we might assess policies. Of course, 
full assessment would require further operationalizing these concepts, and specifying 
modes of measurement. These tasks are outside the scope of this work, but there are 
 169 
useful examples in the literature. Two of these include Wolff and De-Shalit’s version 
of the “York Model,” which uses both objective and subjective assessments to 
measure each relevant functioning,60 and Sen’s work with Mahbub ul Haq creating 
the Human Development Index (HDI). The first is a more detailed assessment of 
advantage, while the second is a very high-level index that measures three metrics 
intended to be indicative of one’s general capability—life expectancy, years of 
schooling, and per capita gross national income.61  
 In addition to assessing policies, one can also then use the theory of 
informational wellbeing to design policies, products, infrastructure, and responses to 
cyber threats which can improve personal wellbeing. If certain informational 
capabilities are central to one’s ability to achieve fundamental capabilities, one can 
design policies or products with the promotion of those informational capabilities as 
an explicit goal from conception. For example, if one wanted to create a laptop that 
improved an individual’s wellbeing, one could design the product to have the security 
and accessibility features that enable one to achieve valuable informational 
capabilities. Or in the case of malware mitigation efforts, such as the work of the 
Conficker Working Group discussed in Chapter 1, one could compare how various 
mitigation strategies would impact one’s informational wellbeing by performing the 
types of simple assessments illustrated above.  
As this approach is not how technology policymakers and product designers 
typically create policies and products today, it represents another context where using 
an LoA grounded in the philosophy of public health will be helpful, given that public 
health policies often use more complicated, human-centred metrics to judge the 
success of various policies and interventions. One example of such a metric is the 
Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY). The QALY attempts to combine “the effects of 
health interventions on mortality and morbidity into a single index,” and thus take 
into effect the quality of one’s life in addition to the quantity of an individual’s life for 
 
60 Wolff and De-Shalit, Disadvantage, 110-118. 
61 United Nations Development Programme, “Human Development Index (HDI),” 
United Nations Development Programme: Human Development Reports, 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi (accessed 12 October 
2018). 
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assessing the value of interventions.62 Researchers in the field of public health are 
also currently exploring the feasibility and value of a Well-being Adjusted Life Year, 
which uses wellbeing, rather than just health, to judge quality of life.63 This is not to 
imply that QALYs are unproblematic. For example, some argue that QALYs are 
limited in the health-benefits they capture and that they do not take into account 
existing social inequalities.64 However, I would argue that it is precisely because 
metrics like QALYs raise complicated practical and theoretical questions that public 
health experts may be well-suited to thinking through the complexities of 
operationalizing a theory of informational wellbeing. 
 
4.4.2 Strengthening the Justification for the Production of Public Goods for 
Cyberhealth 
The second way in which my theory of informational wellbeing is useful within the 
Public Cyberhealth LoA is that it can help states determine which public goods for 
cyberhealth are most worth producing. Here we can return to the example of the 
mitigation of malware, one of the public goods for cyberhealth discussed in Chapter 
1. While containing malware like Conficker may be valuable for states for numerous 
reasons (e.g. economic, strategic), the theory of informational wellbeing can help 
provide a way for states to assess how a given threat might impact individuals’ ability 
to achieve fundamental capabilities. While states may not be justified in protecting or 
promoting all of the fundamental capabilities on Nussbaum’s list, many of the 
fundamental capabilities listed by Nussbaum (e.g. the ability to live a normal lifespan, 
ability to access healthcare, and the ability to avoid discrimination) do traditionally 
fall within the purview of the state. Normally, in cases like the Conficker infection the 
 
62 Paul Kind, Jennifer Elston Lafata, Karl Matuszewski, and Dennis Raisch, “The Use 
of QALYs in Clinical and Patient Decision-Making: Issues and Prospects,” Value in 
Health 12, supplement 1 (2009): S27-S30. 
63 John Brazier and Aki Tsuchiya, “Improving Cross-Sector Comparisons: Going 
Beyond the Health-Related QALY,” Applied Health Economics and Health Policy 
13, 6 (2015): 557–565. 
64 Sarah J. Whitehead and Shehzad Ali, “Health Outcomes in Economic Evaluation: 
the QALY and Utilities,” British Medical Bulletin 96, no. 1 (2010): 5–21. 
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problem is measured in terms of metrics like the number of infected machines, which 
only hint that there may ultimately be human costs. By helping states think through 
how a million-machine botnet has the potential to impact one’s informational and 
fundamental capabilities, the theory can help states have a clearer sense of the scope 
of the threat. This, in turn, can help a state to determine its proper role in mitigation 
and prevention efforts.  
States could use similar assessments for determining the value of any public 
good for cyberhealth, including basic research, standards, and regulatory regimes. If a 
given public good, such as the creation of tighter standards for critical infrastructure, 
improves individuals’ informational wellbeing (and by extension one’s ability to 
achieve certain fundamental capabilities), then there is (prima facie) a stronger 
justification to promote this good than simply correcting for market failure alone. 
 
4.4.3 Determining Levels of State Support 
Third, in addition, to helping states determine which informational capabilities and 
functionings they may be justified or obligated to expand access to, the theory of 
informational wellbeing can help states determine the appropriate level of support. 
Let us assume a state is trying to ensure individuals have access to healthcare, and as 
part of this responsibility the state is justified in promoting cyberhealth more 
generally due to its role in the health system (e.g. availability of medical records, 
security of devices, etc.). The state must then determine what is an adequate degree of 
cyberhealth. The theory of informational wellbeing provides at least one answer to 
this question by connecting informational capabilities, such as living in an 
environment with adequate cyberhealth, to fundamental capabilities, such as the 
ability to be healthy. In this context, an adequate level of cyberhealth is the level 
which enables individuals to achieve the fundamental capability of health. While this 
answer will not be the only factor a state uses to determine the adequate level of 
cyberhealth, it can help guide funding decisions and network standards.   
Thresholds like this are also potentially important for limiting overinvestment 
or overly restrictive policies. For instance, in this chapter I have described a number 
of reasons why it may be important to control access to one’s personal information, 
including being able to appear in public without shame and avoid discrimination. 
While this informational capability may be generally valuable, one should not assume 
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that all personal information is equally precious. It may be that certain kinds of 
personal information are relatively unimportant to one’s ability to achieve 
fundamental capabilities (e.g. one’s height), and therefore they need not be highly 
protected. When I worked in the technology industry, I frequently had to push back 
against company lawyers who wanted all forms of personal information, no matter 
how insignificant, treated as if it were someone’s social security number. The theory 
of informational wellbeing presented in this chapter would have been a valuable tool 
for determining which pieces of personal information truly deserved a heightened 
level of protection and which could be used more freely.65 It must be noted that one of 
the benefits of the capabilities approach is that it allows one to make these 
assessments based on local context. If in a given state one’s height is used as a 
valuable identifying piece of information, then controlling access to that piece of 
information would be a valuable functioning which would count as part of an 
assessment of one’s capabilities.66   
 
4.5 Generalizability 
One concern one may have about this theory is that its utility is limited to those 
subscribing to a eudaimonist account of wellbeing, i.e. a theory which equates 
wellbeing with some notion of human flourishing. Eudaimonism is most famously 
associated with Aristotle, although more recent accounts have been developed by 
 
65 A number of the ways that personal information is protected (e.g. encryption, 
anonymisation) can make it more difficult to work with. For example, information 
may need to be decrypted before it can read by a person, which depending on the 
number of records can take significant computing resources.  
66 In regard to the importance of local context, Sen is fond of referencing Adam 
Smith’s discussion of necessities and luxuries. While acknowledging that the Greeks 
and Roman’s got by just fine without linen garments, Smith argues that in 18th 
century Europe “a creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in publick 
without a linen shirt, the want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful 
degree of poverty, which, it is presumed, no body can well fall into without extreme 
bad conduct.” Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, Vol II, eds. R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1976), 870. 
 173 
Thomas Hurka (perfectionism),67 Stephen Darwall,68 and Richard Kraut 
(developmentalism).69 Typically, in eudaimonist theories of wellbeing the conditions 
of human flourishing are placed on a list (like Nussbaum’s), which is why these 
theories are often referred to as objective list theories. One might argue that hedonists, 
who argue that wellbeing is the positive balance of pleasure and pain, and 
subjectivists, who argue that wellbeing is one’s ability to satisfy one’s preferences, 
will not buy into the concept of informational wellbeing as a valid account of 
wellbeing.70  
While the capabilities approach is an objective list approach to wellbeing, one 
need not subscribe to an eudaimonist account of wellbeing to use the theory as a way 
of measuring advantage. As Sen says, “Quite different specific theories of value may 
be consistent with the capability approach, and share the common feature of selecting 
value-objects from functionings and capabilities.”71 While Nussbaum’s list represents 
one value system, another list of fundamental capabilities reflecting a different value 
system could easily be substituted. If one wanted to emphasize pleasurable 
experiences or desire fulfilment, one could select different fundamental capabilities to 
reflect these values. One example of the former is Martin Binder’s attempt to bridge 
the gap between the capability approach and research into subjective wellbeing. In his 
approach, the capabilities which are relevant for wellbeing are ‘Subjective Well-being 
Capabilities’—capabilities that enable “individuals to pursue and achieve 
happiness.”72  
 
67 Thomas Hurka, Perfectionism. 
68 Stephen Darwall, Welfare and Rational Care, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2002). 
69 Richard Kraut, What Is Good and Why: The Ethics of Well-being, (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
70 Anna Alexandrova, The Science of the Philosophy of Wellbeing, Appendix A. 
71 Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” 49. 
72 Martin Binder, “Subjective Well-Being Capabilities: Bridging the Gap Between the 
Capability Approach and Subjective Well-Being Research,” Journal of Happiness 
Studies 15, no. 5 (2014): 1197-1217.  
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Hedonists and subjectivists will not accept that the achievement of a set of 
capabilities is constitutive of wellbeing, however, they can still accept that the 
capabilities approach is useful way of indirectly promoting and measuring wellbeing 
for policy purposes. For example, consider a subjectivist who believes that wellbeing 
is equivalent to desire satisfaction. While capabilities like the ability to be healthy and 
the ability to avoid discrimination might not be constitutive of wellbeing, they 
nonetheless help enable people to satisfy their preferences. As it may be easier or 
more politically acceptable to craft policies that promote the ability to be healthy (i.e. 
access to healthcare) than to craft policies that directly satisfy people’s preferences 
(whatever that might entail), the subjectivist can find value in the capabilities 
language while denying that capabilities constitute wellbeing. Similarly, for 
measurement purposes, it may be easier to measure if people have the ability to be 
healthy or the ability to avoid discrimination than to measure if they are satisfying 
their preferences.  
In the specific case of digital networks, there is an additional reason to believe 
that the hedonist and subjectivist may find value in the capabilities approach—the 
‘perception gap.’ As a reminder, by the perception gap I mean our inability to 
immediately perceive the status of our personal information. For example, one is not 
immediately able to perceive that one’s identity is stolen. As such, until one is aware 
of this fact it will not impact one’s affect or one’s self-reported preference 
satisfaction. Yet, it still makes sense to say this individual is worse off than if their 
information were secure. As such, while admitting that hedonists and subjectivists 
will likely object to treating Nussbaum’s list of capabilities as an account wellbeing, I 
believe the theory of informational wellbeing, which I have derived from her theory, 
should be broadly acceptable in policy contexts as a measure of advantage. 
 
4.6 Informational Wellbeing as a Fundamental Capability 
In the last section, I explored what informational wellbeing might mean for hedonists 
and subjectivists. In this section, I will narrow my focus to those who subscribe to 
eudaimonist theories similar to Sen and Nussbaum’s. By this I mean eudaimonists 
who believe the achievement of a set of capabilities, such as those described by 
Nussbaum, constitutes wellbeing. Specifically, I will argue that for these eudaimonists 
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the ability to achieve an adequate degree of informational wellbeing should be 
considered a fundamental capability on par with the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list.  
 
4.6.1 Health and Informational Wellbeing 
The first reason that eudaimonists of the Sen/Nussbaum variety should think of 
informational wellbeing as a fundamental capability is that informational wellbeing is 
partly constitutive of health. While people may not accept that all the capabilities on 
Nussbaum’s list are essential, the ability to be healthy is widely (if not universally) 
considered to be valuable.73 Even Sen, who has resisted making a fixed list of 
valuable capabilities, frequently mentions the capability to be healthy as valuable.74  
The argument in this section is an extension of the argument in Section 3.4 
regarding the coupling of artificial parts to biological systems.75 As a reminder, in 
Chapter 3, I argued that when artificial parts are coupled to a biological system, then 
we should consider them a part of the organism, and when a coupled artificial part 
functions poorly we should consider this reduction in functionality a pathology.76 
While this may be intuitive in the case of artificial hips, I argued that we should think 
 
73 See Section 3.1. 
74 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, 40.; Martha Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 
19-20. 
75 While there are competing sets of coupling criteria, I argued for a modified version 
of the criteria used by Clark and Chalmers in their work on the extended mind. An 
artificial part may be considered coupled to a biological system if: 1) it is performing 
a task associated with that biological system (e.g. the pacemaker regulates heart 
rhythm), 2) it is constantly available, 3) its contribution to the proper functioning of 
the system is readily and directly provided, and 4) the contribution is automatically 
endorsed/accepted by the system in question. (Clark and Chalmers, “The Extended 
Mind.”) 
76 This assumes that the other necessary criteria of a pathology are met. In the case of 
Boorse, this would be that the reduction in function impacts survivability and one’s 
ability to reproduce. In the case of Wakefield, the reduction of function would have to 
be considered harmful. 
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of digital devices with networked capabilities in the same way. Examples of such 
digital devices include digital pacemakers and defibrillators.  
 When digital devices which use digital networks are considered a part of one’s 
biological systems, informational wellbeing—in particular the ability to live in an 
environment with an adequate degree of cyberhealth—is not merely instrumental to 
health, but partly constitutive of what it means to be healthy. There are many things 
which are instrumental to health, such as poverty. While being poor or rich may 
impact one’s health, one’s wealth is not constitutive of one’s health. Likewise, one 
can argue that many aspects of cyberhealth are instrumental to health. One example 
may be the cyberhealth of a water treatment facility. If the water treatment facility’s 
network is hacked or fails due to a software bug, individuals may experience poor 
health outcomes, but the cyberhealth of the facility would not be constitutive of an 
individual’s health. However, as digital pacemakers should be thought of as a part of 
the organism to which they are coupled, the cyberhealth of the device is not only a 
determinant, but partly constitutive of the organism’s health status. For 
biotechnologies that require the use of digital networks and cloud computing, then the 
cyberhealth of those networks and cloud services will also in part constitute what it 
means to be healthy.  
 
4.6.2 Informational Wellbeing and the Self 
While the above argument is rather straightforward, the second reason to consider 
informational wellbeing a fundamental capability is more complex and will require a 
little set-up. The second reason to consider informational wellbeing a fundamental 
capability is that it is central to what I will call the ‘capability to be a liberal agent.’ 
While this capability is not listed by Nussbaum, it is central to Sen and Nussbaum’s 
conception of human flourishing.77 Specifically, I will argue that having an adequate 
degree of informational wellbeing partly constitutes one aspect of this capability—the 
ability to define one’s self. First, I will define what I mean by the ‘capability to be a 
liberal agent’ in the context of Sen and Nussbaum’s eudaimonism. Then, I will 
 
77 While acknowledging that the term liberal can mean different things to different 
theorists, Nussbaum explicitly cites liberal theorists like Kant, Mill, Adam Smith, and 
T.H. Greene as philosophical influences on the capabilities approach. Nussbaum, 
Creating Capabilities, 123-143.  
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explore the role information plays in the definition of the self using Daniel Dennett’s 
narrative conception of the self. Finally, I will argue that when the self is conceived of 
in informational or narrative terms, then informational wellbeing partly constitutes the 
ability to define one’s self and, by extension, the ability to be a liberal agent.  
 
4.6.2.1 The Capability to be a Liberal Agent in Sen and Nussbaum’s Eudaimonism 
Comprehensively exploring and defining the notion of liberal agency in Sen and 
Nussbaum’s eudaimonism is a dissertation of its own, but a comprehensive analysis is 
not needed for my purpose. While Sen and Nussbaum do not give us a complete 
conception of the person, we can piece together a sketch of this conception by looking 
at how they describe the capabilities approach and by considering the kinds of 
capabilities they think are valuable.  
 First, let us consider the motivating principles of the capabilities approach as 
listed by Nussbaum. The first of these principles is that individuals are always to be 
treated as ends and never means. The capabilities approach is primarily focused on 
individual wellbeing, not collective wellbeing. Nussbaum underscores this point by 
arguing that the main question to ask when comparing societies is: “’What is each 
person able to do and to be?’”78 The second principle Nussbaum lists is freedom or 
choice. This is the primary motivating factor behind focusing on capabilities as 
opposed to functionings. As Nussbaum says, “It [the capabilities approach]…commits 
itself to respect for people’s powers of self-definition.”79 One example of the 
importance of choice in Sen and Nussbaum’s eudaimonism is Sen’s example of a man 
who is fasting. In his example, there are two starving men. The first man is choosing 
to fast, while the second does not have access to food. Sen argues that while both men 
may have the same level of health, it is necessary to account for the fact that the 
fasting man has chosen to starve when determining the two men’s overall wellbeing.80 
For Sen and Nussbaum the freedom to choose how one lives has intrinsic value.81  
 We also see the importance of freedom to Sen and Nussbaum’s conception of 
human flourishing in our second source—the set of capabilities on Nussbaum’s list. 
 
78 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 18. 
79 Ibid., 18. 
80 Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined, 52-53. 
81 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 25. 
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As a reminder, the capabilities Nussbaum lists represent what a person needs to 
secure a ‘minimally flourishing life.’82 Below are a number of capabilities from 
Nussbaum’s list that are relevant for the current discussion: 
• Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with 
experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one’s 
own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. 
• Being able to use one’s mind in ways protected by guarantees of 
freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, 
and freedom of religious exercise. 
• Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one’s own 
way… 
• Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one’s life…83 
Each of these capabilities suggest that the freedom of choice Nussbaum values is an 
expansive freedom of choice. It is not the freedom to simply choose between two 
options (e.g. the freedom to be a Catholic or a Protestant), but the freedom to decide 
the kind of life one wants to live broadly construed. This freedom is also central to 
Sen’s notion of flourishing. In his account of the capabilities approach, he refers to 
this freedom as “agency freedom”—the “freedom to achieve whatever the person, as a 
responsible agent, decides he or she should achieve.”84  
These two sources—the motivating principles of the capabilities approach and 
the kinds of capabilities Nussbaum selects—suggest that for Sen and Nussbaum 
flourishing requires that one is able to exercise the freedom to choose one’s own path 
in life based on one’s own desires. It is this capability that I am calling the ‘capability 
to be a liberal agent.’ This capability may, in turn, be comprised of multiple aspects. 
For instance, in order to be the kind of agent that can exercise “agency freedom,” one 
may need to have a certain degree of psychological robustness and a certain degree of 
autonomy. I will not attempt to list all of the aspects that comprise the capability to be 
 
82 Ibid., 33. 
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84 Amartya Sen, “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 82, No. 4 (1985): 203-204. 
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a liberal agent, but rather I will focus on one which is relevant to the notion of 
informational wellbeing—the ability to define one’s self.  
While acknowledging that the meaning of the term ‘self’ can be elusive, by 
defining one’s self I mean the process of individuation—what makes a person one 
individual and not another. I do not mean this in a biological sense, i.e. the physical 
boundaries of the organism, but psychologically or narratively.85 This is the self 
Daniel Dennett calls the “owner of record.”86 It is the you that owns your desires, your 
values, your path in life. According to narrative conceptions of the self, the self is, as 
Floridi puts it, a “socio- or auto-biographical artifact”87—a web of stories and facts 
which gravitate around a ‘centre of narrative gravity.’  
In the following section, I will provide an account of the self based on Daniel 
Dennett’s narrative theory of the self. Then, I will argue that when the self is 
conceived of in narrative terms, having an adequate degree of informational wellbeing 
partly constitutes the ability to define one’s self. From this claim it follows that 
informational wellbeing is important to one’s capability to be a liberal agent, which I 
have just argued is central to Sen and Nussbaum’s conception of flourishing. 
 The theory of the self I introduce below is similar to Floridi’s informational 
conception of the self (which is also based on Dennett’s work).88 However, while 
Floridi attempts to show how the self—and nearly everything else in the world—can 
be entirely conceived of in informational terms, I aim to demonstrate the weaker 
claim that certain informational capabilities are central to one’s ability to define one’s 
self. While it may seem like I am making a grand metaphysical claim about the nature 
of selves, I believe, like Floridi, that we should think of the informational conception 
 
85 Daniel Dennett, Consciousness Explained (London: Penguin Books, 1993), 418. 
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87 Luciano Floridi, “The Informational Nature of Personal Identity,” Minds & 
Machines 21 (2011), https://libsta28.lib.cam.ac.uk:2090/10.1007/s11023-011-9259-6. 
88 Informational conceptions of the self need not be based on narrative conceptions of 
the self. For example, Locke’s conception of the self is grounded in the continuity of 
consciousness. Floridi argues that this approach to the self is also fundamentally 
informational in nature as consciousness, thoughts, and memories can also ultimately 
be reduced to states of information and information processing.; Floridi, The Ethics of 
Information, 211-260.   
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of the self as an LoA, not as the only way in which to conceive of the self. As a 
reminder, a LoA is a way of modelling the world for the purpose of answering 
specific questions. This is the same conceptual tool I used to describe the 
Cybersecurity and Public Cyberhealth frameworks in Chapter 2. In this light, the 
informational conception of the self is a way of describing the self using variables like 
personal information, narratives, and other people’s beliefs about a person, while 
downplaying phenomena like consciousness, the soul, and the continuity of mental 
states, which feature prominently in other conceptions. By saying that this 
informational conception of the self is a LoA, I am not saying that it is merely a 
convenient metaphor. LoAs can be assessed on their coherence and utility, and if 
found to be useful and coherent in the long run, one should accept, modestly and 
provisionally, that they accurately describe reality. I will explore this connection 
between LoAs and truth in greater depth in the Conclusion to this dissertation. 
If we are seeking to understand how information and its use, control, accuracy, 
and accessibility impact how we define ourselves, then it is useful to think of the self 
in informational terms. However, note that there are good reasons to use an 
informational conception of the self apart from my account of informational 
wellbeing. Informational conceptions of the self (in the form of narrative conceptions 
of the self) have been around for decades, with Paul Ricoeur and Daniel Dennett 
developing their (surprisingly similar) theories in the 1980s.89 Informational theories 
of the self are appealing because informational artefacts like pictures, stories, 
journals, medical records, and the like do intuitively seem to play an important role in 
the process of self-definition. This has become increasingly clear in the digital age 
with the advent of online identities and digital avatars.90  
While I will use Dennett and Floridi’s theories to illustrate the importance of 
information to the process of self-definition, it is important to note that my argument 
is not dependent on their specific approaches. Information plays a central role in all 
 
89 Paul Ricoer, Oneself as Another (Soi-même Comme un Autre), trans. Kathleen 
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(1989): 163-73. 
90 Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1995). 
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narrative theories of the self, and thus my central point would not fundamentally 
change if I replaced Dennett or Floridi’s theory with another narrative conception of 
the self.   
 
4.6.2.2 Dennett’s Narrative Conception of the Self 
Dennett grounds his concept of the self in the narratives that consciousness produces 
when making sense of information. In this view, consciousness works like an 
algorithm automatically generating narratives when presented with related pieces of 
information.91 These narratives gravitate around what Dennett calls a ‘centre of 
narrative gravity’—which like the centre of gravity of a hoop is both real and yet 
abstract. As Dennett puts it: 
A self, according to my theory, is… an abstraction defined by the myriads of 
attributions and interpretations (including self-attributions and self-
interpretations) that have composed the biography of the living body whose 
Center of Narrative Gravity it is.92 
It is important to clarify that while Dennett uses terms like narrative and biography in 
the quote above, the “the myriads of attributions and interpretations” should be 
thought of as informational building blocks of narrative, rather than narratives as 
such. For example, an individual’s blood pressure is not a narrative on its own, but 
when it is added to other information about a person—one’s personal and family 
medical history, place of birth, diet, etc.—it contributes to a certain narrative about 
one’s life.  
 Within Dennett’s theory, all manner of information can contribute to how 
one’s self is defined: your memories, informational artefacts (emails, text messages, 
letters, photographs), your physical characteristics, and the things others say about 
you. It is important to note that as an abstraction, the centre of narrative gravity is 
inseparable from the ‘myriad of attributions and interpretations’ which define it. This 
leads Dennett to occasionally refer to the self as an “organization of information.”93  
While Dennett focuses on one’s centre of narrative gravity from one’s own 
perspective, I believe it makes sense to identify two types of centres of narrative 
 
91 Dennett, “The Origins of Selves.” 
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93 Ibid., 430. 
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gravity. The first is one’s centre of narrative gravity from one’s own perspective, 
while the second is one’s centre of narrative gravity from the perspective of others. 
Within this view, everyone who interacts with you may have a slightly different sense 
of your self. For the capability to be a liberal agent, the centre of gravity from one’s 
own perspective is of primary importance. However, this third-person perspective is 
important as other people’s conception of a person can influence how one thinks of 
oneself. As Dennett says, “Parents, friends, and even enemies may all contribute to 
the image of ‘what it means to be me.’”94  
To illustrate this point, let us say a doctor knows that an individual called 
Adam is HIV positive, but the doctor has yet to share that information with Adam. 
Without this information Adam has a certain conception of his self as a completely 
healthy middle-aged person who will live to a ripe old age. On the one hand, it is clear 
that until he becomes aware of his diagnosis, this information does not change 
Adam’s sense of self. But on the other hand, from the perspective of the doctor, 
Adam’s centre of narrative gravity has changed. From the doctor’s perspective, 
Adam’s diagnosis may in fact be one of Adam’s defining features. The figure below 
illustrates this example: 
 
 
94 Daniel Dennett, “The Origins of Selves,” Cogito, 3 (1989): 
10.5840/cogito19893348 
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In this illustration, the blue dots represent all known information about Adam. 
Some of that information is known to Adam, and within that cloud of information 
there is a centre of narrative gravity which represents Adam’s self. There is then 
another set of information which the doctor knows about Adam. This set has its own 
centre of narrative gravity and represents Adam’s self from the perspective of the 
doctor. While one can say that Adam’s sense of self is not directly impacted by 
information of which he is not aware, this information may still influence his centre of 
narrative gravity insofar as those that are aware of it may treat him differently. 
Additionally, while Adam is not currently aware of the diagnosis, he could very easily 
become aware of it, at which point it would dramatically shift his centre of narrative 
gravity. As such, while information one is not aware of may not yet influence one’s 
sense of self, one may still have an interest in how that information is treated if it will 
either impact how others treat one, or if one is likely to become aware of that piece of 
information in the future.  
We can also use this diagram to think about the role of misinformation, by 
which I mean information which is not true. Let us say that Adam becomes aware of 
his HIV diagnosis, but that the diagnosis is incorrect. Until that error is corrected, that 
incorrect diagnosis will shift both the doctor’s concept of who Adam is and Adam’s 
own sense of self. Even after the diagnosis is revealed to be incorrect, Adam will 
always have the experience of having lived with a HIV diagnosis. That experience 
will indelibly shift his own sense of self and likely his centre of narrative gravity from 
a third person perspective as well. Some lies are in fact stickier than the truth. For 
instance, some parents will tell their children that they (the child) are worthless, until 
the child accepts this as fact. This piece of misinformation may have a long-lasting or 
permanent impact on that child’s sense of self even after the child recognizes 
intellectually that this belief is untrue. As such, it seems reasonable to conclude that 
both information and misinformation can contribute to one’s centre of narrative 
gravity from a first- and third-person perspective.   
To summarize up to this point, I first argued that the capability be a liberal 
agent, i.e. the ability to choose one’s own path in life, is fundamental to Sen and 
Nussbaum’s conception of human flourishing. I then argued that this capability was 
comprised of a number of aspects, including potentially some measure of autonomy 
and psychological robustness. I argued that one of these aspects is the ability to define 
one’s self. I then defined what I meant by “self” using Dennett’s narrative theory of 
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the self. This LoA describes selves as a ‘centre of narrative gravity’ within an 
organization of personal information. Finally, I argued that misinformation can also 
influence one’s centre of narrative gravity from both a first- and third- person 
perspective. I will now argue that when the self is conceived of in informational 
terms, informational wellbeing in part constitutes the ability to define one’s self, and, 
therefore, partly constitutes the capability to be a liberal agent in the sense that is 
fundamental to Sen and Nussbaum’s concept of human flourishing.  
 
4.6.2.3 Informational Wellbeing and the Ability of Self-definition 
In the first half of the chapter, I defined informational wellbeing as one’s ability to 
achieve the informational capabilities and functionings which enable one to achieve 
fundamental capabilities. In this section, I will demonstrate that a number of the 
informational capabilities discussed in the first half are not merely instrumental to the 
ability to define one’s self, but partly constitutive of this ability. These informational 
capabilities include the ability to control access to one’s personal information, the 
ability to ensure the accuracy of one’s personal information, and the ability to use 
certain kinds of ICTs. Note that by the ability to define one’s self I do not mean that 
one has complete autonomy to compose one’s narrative self. As Floridi says, “Most of 
our selves, understood as narratives, are written by other authors, what is left to the 
each of us to contribute must be carefully protected and fostered.”95 Rather, this 
ability consists of having some reasonable ability to determine who one is as an 
individual apart from external influences. While what counts as reasonable is up for 
interpretation, I believe the discussion that follows will provide a clearer sense of 
what I have in mind. 
The first informational capability which enables one to define one’s self is the 
ability to control who has access to one’s personal information. As Dennett said, how 
one’s parents, friends, and even enemies think about one influences how one defines 
one’s self.96 While it is unreasonable to think one should have the ability to control all 
information about oneself, being able to limit access to certain types of personal 
 
95 Luciano Floridi, “On Human Dignity as a Foundation for the Right to Privacy,” 
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information ensures others’ opinions about oneself do not play an outsized role in 
one’s self-definition. I believe the Lawrence case discussed in Section 4.2.1 is useful 
for illustrating this impact. As a reminder, Lawrence took nude photos of herself to 
share with her boyfriend as a way of strengthening their relationship. When these 
photos were stolen and leaked online, her sense of self changed as a result of the 
public shaming. Despite not feeling like the photos were something to be ashamed of, 
she began sobbing and had to run away when someone called her a role model for 
girls. As she said, “I can't believe somebody still feels that way after what 
happened.’97 The public shaming that accompanied the information theft dramatically 
shifted Lawrence’s centre of narrative gravity such that she no longer saw herself as 
someone worthy of being a role model. Lawrence seems to have ultimately been able 
to reclaim the ability to define herself. Several years after the hack, she accepted a 
role which required her to do a nude scene. She described this choice as “taking 
something back”98 and said of the experience, “I walked off that set feeling like a 
different person [emphasis mine].”99 However, other victims of non-consensual 
pornography, according to Kamal and Newman, find themselves engaged in a 
“lifelong battle to preserve their integrity.”100  
The second informational capability which enables one to define one’s self is 
the ability to ensure the accuracy of one’s personal information. To illustrate the 
value of the capability, let us stay with the case of Lawrence. In addition to having her 
nude photos leaked online, she is also the frequent target of fake pornography, 
including sophisticated machine learning generated videos referred to as deepfakes.101 
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While today these videos are easy enough to expose as fake, it is easy to imagine that 
in the future they may be virtually indistinguishable from genuine videos and impact 
one’s self in similar ways as the leaking of real images or videos described above. 
Additionally, note that while I have focused on Lawrence in this section, this 
technology is also used to create fake non-consensual pornography of non-famous 
people and can be used in non-sexual contexts to create false narratives about a 
person (e.g. make it seem like they were somewhere they were not). In an age when 
many people take dozens of images of themselves a day and roughly 1 in 5 American 
adults between the ages of 25-34 have sent nude photos of themselves another 
person,102 ensuring the accuracy of one’s personal information may not be as simple 
as searching one’s memory for the truth or publishing a denial. 
While in the previous two paragraphs I have used examples of other people’s 
opinions about a person influencing that person’s self, these informational capabilities 
are also valuable for influencing how non-human agents define an individual. Retail 
companies, financial institutions, search engines, political campaigns, social media 
websites, and, in some cases, courts all use personal information to develop profiles 
of who a given person is—essentially your self from the perspective of that agent. 
These profiles are then used to shape the advertisements, search results, and news 
stories one sees, and may determine whether a person receives a loan or is granted 
bail. In each of these cases, it is as if these companies and institutions are essentially 
communicating something back to you about who you are. It is as if they are saying: 
you are a person who would buy X product, you are a person who would like X news 
story, you are a person who cannot be trusted to pay back a loan. While in most cases 
the most significant harm will have nothing to do with one’s ability to define one’s 
self (e.g. being denied bail restricts one’s freedom), we should not underestimate how 
in aggregate these machine generated versions of our selves can limit our ability to 
define ourselves.  
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One particularly dramatic example, described by Ysabel Gerrard, is how 
social media sites will recommend pro-eating disorder content to individuals based on 
who is in their social network. Gerrard describes the experience saying, “[pro-eating 
disorder content] became almost inescapable once I was embedded in these 
spaces.”103 This content would show up in her social media feeds, daily emails, and 
recommendations. Note that in this case the harm someone potentially faces is not just 
physical (developing an eating disorder), but to some degree the ability to define what 
one values and who one wants to be in life. Zeynap Tufecki has discussed this 
phenomenon in the context of YouTube’s recommendation engine leading to political 
radicalization.104 I do not mean to imply that this type of profiling is always harmful 
or unjustified, but rather that as it becomes more commonplace, the informational 
capabilities discussed in this chapter become increasingly important to being able to 
define one’s self and choose one’s own path in life.  
The third and final informational capability I will highlight is the ability to use 
certain kinds of ICTs. Floridi describes how certain ICTs influence one’s self, saying: 
Obviously, any technology, the primary goal of which is to manage memories, 
is going to have an immense influence on how individuals develop and shape 
their own personal identities. It is not just a matter of mere quantity; the 
quality, availability, accessibility, and replaying of…personal memories may 
deeply affect who we think we are and may become.105  
One example of this kind of ICT would be the photo sharing site Flickr which, as a 
cost cutting measure, deleted millions of personal photos in March 2019.106 The 
website, which at one point had close to 90 million users, was one of the most popular 
 
103 Ysabel Gerrard, “Beyond the Hashtag: Circumventing Content Moderation on 
Social Media,” New Media & Society 20, no. 12 (2008): 4505. 
104 Zeynap Tufekci, “YouTube, the Great Radicalizer,” The New York Times, March 
10, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-
radical.html (accessed 14 April, 2019). 
105 Floridi, The Ethics of Information, 223. 
106 Kaitlyn Tiffany, “Flickr Will Soon Start Deleting Photos — and Massive Chunks 
of Internet History,” Vox, Feb. 6, 2019, https://www.vox.com/the-
goods/2019/2/6/18214046/flickr-free-storage-ends-digital-photo-archive-history 
(accessed Feb. 7 2019). 
 188
ways people could store their personal photos as the company offered a terabyte of 
free storage. Within the narrative conception of the self, these photos are not merely 
property but data points which influence a person’s centre of narrative gravity. While 
Flickr is just one site, in 2012 Webshots shut down deleting 690 million photos,107 
and there is no guarantee the massive social media companies of today will not follow 
suit. As the technology journalist Katie Notopoulos said at the time of Webshots 
demise, “It's not a stretch to imagine a day when all our words and images hosted on 
these services are removed as the companies collapse or morph. Friendster is now a 
video gaming service, MySpace is music streaming.”108 The articles describing 
Flickr’s deletion of personal photos tend to lament the loss of internet history. While 
this may be a valuable observation, part of the value of the narrative conception of the 
self is that it highlights that this information loss can also profoundly impact 
individuals’ self from both a first- and third-person perspective. As Floridi says, 
“one’s informational sphere and one’s personal identity are co-referential, or two 
sides of the same coin.”109 Additionally, it is worth noting that while in the case of 
Flickr this information is being purposefully deleted, this type of information can also 
be deleted or become inaccessible due to any number of threats to cyberhealth (human 
error, natural disasters, buggy code, malware). For instance, the same month that 
Flickr began its purge, MySpace accidentally deleted twelve years worth of music, 
images, and videos during a botched server migration.110 
When one’s self is conceived of as an organization of information, having 
access to technologies like social media, blogging platforms, and the like is a valuable 
functioning which contributes to one’s ability to define one’s self. While people in the 
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past were able to define their selves without these technologies, they become 
increasingly central to one’s ability to define one’s self as a greater share of personal 
information migrates from journals and photo albums to social media sites, from 
people’s heads to cloud storage.  
I will readily admit that much of the personal information which makes up 
one’s narrative self is not the kind of digital information I have generally been 
discussing in this dissertation. While memories can be posted to blogs or recorded in 
digital photos, they can also simply exist in people’s minds. While one may record 
one’s emotional reactions, they also may just come and go without leaving a digital 
trace. Having said this, the ratio of digital information to non-digital information in 
one’s ‘cloud’ of personal information is only growing. Additionally, this digital 
information is the only information to which non-human agents often have access. As 
such, while having a high degree of informational wellbeing is not synonymous with 
the ability to define one’s self, it is becoming increasingly central to this ability.  
At the start of this section, I argued that when networked biotechnologies are 
considered a part of a person, then informational wellbeing in part constitutes what it 
means to be healthy. In the second half, I made a similar argument—when the self is 
conceived of as an organization of information, then informational wellbeing in part 
constitutes what it means to be able to define one’s self and, by extension, one’s 
capability to be a liberal agent in the sense valued by Sen and Nussbaum. As both the 
capability to be healthy and the capability to be a liberal agent are central to Sen and 
Nussbaum’s conception of human flourishing, they should also accept that ‘having 
the ability to achieve a sufficient level of informational wellbeing’ is a fundamental 
human capability on par with the other capabilities listed by Nussbaum.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I defined a theory of informational wellbeing that can help one to 
identify how digital information and its use, control, accessibility, and accuracy 
impact an individual’s wellbeing. Basing my theory on Sen and Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach to wellbeing, I defined informational wellbeing as:  
An individual has a high degree of informational wellbeing to the extent they 
have achieved the ‘informational capabilities and functionings’ (e.g. the 
ability to control access to their personal information, etc.) which are 
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necessary to achieve fundamental human capabilities (e.g. the ability to live a 
normal life span, etc.). 
This theory not only connects informational capabilities to an established theory of 
wellbeing, but it is flexible, measurable, and non-technical. 
I argued that this theory is valuable in at least three primary ways: 1) it helps 
one to create technology policies, cyber responses, and digital products which 
improve wellbeing; 2) it strengthens the normative justification for states to produce 
the public goods for cyberhealth discussed in Chapter 1; and 3) it helps one to 
determine when a given public good for cyberhealth has been adequately provisioned.  
In the second half of the chapter, I argued that those subscribing to Sen and 
Nussbaum’s version of eudaimonism should consider the ability to achieve an 
adequate degree of informational wellbeing to be a fundamental capability on par 
with the other capabilities listed by Nussbaum. First, I argued that informational 
wellbeing in part constitutes what it means to be healthy. Then, I argued that it partly 
constitutes the ability to define one’s self and, by extension, the capability to be a 
liberal agent.   
Finally, note that this theory is particularly useful for understanding why the 
promotion of cyberhealth is a worthwhile goal at all. As mentioned in the introduction 
to this chapter, digital networks are valuable because of the information they contain 
and transmit. By connecting this information and its use, control, accuracy, and 
accessibility to wellbeing, I have not only provided a way to more fully understand 
the value of—and justification for—the public goods for cyberhealth discussed in 
Chapter 1, but also the specific tools like ethical review boards and the Intervention 
Ladder discussed in Chapter 2. While promoting health (the focus of Chapter 3) may 
be a worthwhile reason to promote cyberhealth on its own, this chapter helped to put 
that capability in context by illustrating the complicated and interconnected ways that 
cyberhealth and technology policy can impact one’s life more broadly. 
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Conclusion 
This work was motivated by two primary concerns. The first concern was that despite 
the ubiquity of digital technologies, we often struggle to articulate how these 
technologies impact our wellbeing—data breaches rarely leave dead bodies. The 
second concern was that despite digital networks playing an ever larger role in 
everyday life, the dominant cybersecurity paradigm seemed to serve business interests 
at the expense of society on the whole. In some cases, this cybersecurity paradigm 
even seemed to make things worse by encouraging an increasingly dangerous cyber 
arms race.  
 In this dissertation, I presented an alternative framework for conceptualizing 
the digital landscape called Public Cyberhealth. This framework, or level of 
abstraction (LoA), was inspired by the philosophy of public health and differs from 
the dominant cybersecurity approach in four primary ways. First, while the 
Cybersecurity LoA is focused on malicious attacks, the Public Cyberhealth LoA aims 
to promote network robustness and resilience more generally. While taking malicious 
attacks seriously (see Conficker case in Section 1.2), it also highlighted and suggested 
ways to address non-malicious points of failure, such as buggy code, natural disasters, 
and human error, as seen in the formal articulation of the LoA in Section 2.3. Second, 
while the Cybersecurity LoA is largely focused on business and military interests, the 
Public Cyberhealth LoA captures the myriad of ways in which network threats and 
interventions can impact individuals’ health, wellbeing, and rights. Third, while the 
Cybersecurity LoA generally limits the role of the state to the protection of 
government information and the investigation of cybercrimes (see Section 2.2.2.1), 
the Public Cyberhealth LoA uses the philosophy of public health to establish the 
normative justification for—and ethical limits on—state interventions in cyberspace. 
This can most clearly be seen in my use of the LoA to define of spheres of public and 
private cyberhealth in Section 2.4.1. And fourth, while the goal of the Cybersecurity 
LoA is to prevent unauthorized access to information and networks, the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA promotes cyberhealth as part of a broader goal of promoting health 
and wellbeing.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that viewing the digital landscape 
through this public health inspired lens would profoundly change how one thinks 
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about technology policy, product design, and potentially even the concepts of health 
and wellbeing. In Chapter 1, using the example of the Conficker worm, I 
demonstrated how this public health inspired approach could help policymakers 
understand the value of public goods for cyberhealth and the obligations that states, 
corporations, and individuals have to contribute to said goods. In Chapter 2, I 
illustrated how the philosophy of public health could help define spheres of public 
and private cyberhealth, and how public health tools like ethical review boards and 
the Intervention Ladder could help ensure that cyberhealth interventions are 
justifiable and proportional. In Chapter 3, I explored how various health related 
concepts like health inequality, bodily integrity, disease, and bodily certainty and 
doubt can help policymakers think in more sophisticated and nuanced ways about 
how poor cyberhealth impacts health. And in Chapter 4, I defined a theory of 
informational wellbeing, which enables policymakers to better assess the impact of 
technology policies and products on personal wellbeing. Together these various 
elements form a cohesive way of thinking about the digital landscape and can help 
policymakers craft more consistent technology policies that positively impact 
wellbeing and protect individuals’ rights. 
 While the Public Cyberhealth LoA is useful for policymakers and product 
designers today, there are good reasons to believe that it will only become more 
useful in the future as digital technologies become increasingly sophisticated and 
ubiquitous. Programs like India’s Aadhaar program and China’s social credit system 
(see Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3) are new and continuing to evolve, but they suggest that 
in the future bureaucracies will increasingly rely on biometrics and AI systems to 
manage access to goods like health, education, and the ability to travel. While these 
programs can be plagued by traditional cybersecurity threats like malware, they can 
significantly impact one’s health and wellbeing in a myriad of ways that have nothing 
to do with traditional matters of cybersecurity. Another example is the growing 
sophistication of medical devices. In Chapter 3, I argued that in some cases 
cyberhealth problems should be thought of as pathologies. In that chapter, I largely 
focused on digital pacemakers because there are relatively few internal digital devices 
that meet the coupling criteria and use digital networks. However, this class of device 
will likely become increasingly common as the technology becomes more reliable and 
AI systems develop new ways of using real-time device data for predicting health 
outcomes and modifying treatment on the fly.  
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Future Research 
In this dissertation, I have presented an overview of the Public Cyberhealth LoA. 
While I have been able to describe its most fundamental features and a number of 
practical uses, many of the topics I have discussed are good candidates for further 
research. In many cases, this future research will need to be conducted in 
collaboration with experts from other fields, including economics, computer science, 
public health policy, technology policy, and development studies.  
First, in regard to public goods, I believe there is value in a more thorough 
comparison between public goods for public health and public goods for cyberhealth. 
In Chapter 1, I demonstrated there is a broad similarity between these two classes of 
public goods, but more work can be done to understand the similarities and 
differences of specific goods. For instance, while Conficker was a kind of weakest-
link problem (like infectious disease), not all kinds of malware follow this pattern. 
Additionally, further work must be conducted to determine precisely what obligations 
states, corporations, and individuals have to contribute to various public goods for 
cyberhealth—specifically we need a better sense of the likelihood and costs of various 
network threats and a clearer sense of the benefits of various interventions. This 
empirical work can help one determine which specific public goods for cyberhealth 
meet Klosko’s criteria described in Section 1.3.2. While computer scientists and 
social scientists are better suited to this kind of empirical work, the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA can help ensure that this empirical research takes into account 
health and wellbeing impacts alongside financial costs and benefits. 
The second area of future research is determining how best to operationalize 
the theory of informational wellbeing introduced in Chapter 4. I believe this theory 
might be the most useful contribution of this dissertation, but there is still much work 
to be done for the theory to be put to use. The next step to operationalize this theory is 
to develop a process for identifying the specific informational capabilities and 
functionings which constitute informational wellbeing in a given context.1 
Researchers from the field of development studies may be particularly helpful in this 
research, as the capabilities approach has most commonly been deployed in the 
development context. 
 
1 Alexandrova, A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being. 
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The third area of future research is further fleshing out the variables, 
observables, and behaviours that comprise the Public Cyberhealth LoA. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, it would often have been counterproductive to describe 
examples in the formalized LoA language introduced in Chapter 2. Having said this, 
for specific practitioners, such as policymakers, technology producers, lawyers, social 
scientists, and IT professionals, there is value in having a more detailed LoA to guide 
their work. For example, if a product manager is designing a product using the Public 
Cyberhealth LoA, it would be very useful to understand specifically what threats 
should be accounted for, what health risks should be assessed, and what individual 
rights should be considered. A detailed LoA is even more critical for researchers who 
are looking to build models of the digital landscape in order to estimate the cost of 
various threats and the benefits of various interventions. As with operationalizing my 
theory of informational wellbeing, this work will best be accomplished by working in 
collaboration with practitioners and subject matter experts, including computer 
scientists, public health experts, and policymakers. 
Lastly, there is substantial work to be done to figure out how best to 
incorporate the Public Cyberhealth LoA into the policymaking process. One of the 
main aspects of this work is determining how the Public Cyberhealth LoA can 
incorporate, or at least co-exist with, existing cybersecurity institutions and polices. A 
second, related aspect is determining how to weight informational wellbeing 
alongside the economic and strategic interests that I have largely ignored in this work. 
While public health policymakers have developed mechanisms for balancing health 
metrics (e.g. QALYs) and economic costs, there is less consensus about how to 
determine the economic value of wellbeing (let alone informational wellbeing).  
 
LoAs, Coherence, and Truth 
While the areas of research mentioned above will be the focus of research in the near 
future, there is also the longer-term project of assessing the coherence and utility of 
the Public Cyberhealth LoA over time. This work is not simply important for deciding 
if and how the LoA should be used as a policy tool, but for determining if the LoA is 
adequately describing the digital landscape. In this sense I follow William James in 
thinking that, “‘The true’, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our 
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thinking… Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the 
whole, of course.”2  
Putting to the side the larger debate about metaphysical realism, when one is 
speaking of complex human/object systems, it is reasonable to accept that one 
generally lacks direct experiential access to the system as a whole—one can hold an 
apple in one’s hands, but not the complicated relationship of humans and digital 
networks. To help us to understand these complicated systems, we can use LoAs to 
build models, make predictions, and answer specific questions. Floridi argues that 
LoAs are essentially interfaces which mediate between the world and epistemic 
agents, and in the case of complex systems these interfaces are all we have to 
determine how the world works. As such, he argues that the method of LoA supports 
a kind of ‘liminal realism,’ i.e. a realism which falls somewhere between an internal 
realism (rooted in conceptual schemes) and a strong metaphysical realism in which 
one can describe the world as is. While LoAs do not serve a mimetic function, 
through the creation of models one can generate reliable knowledge about the world.3  
While our experience is mediated, one need not fall into a relativistic trap. As 
Hasok Chang argues in his work on ‘pragmatic realism’: 
If our use of a theory has led to successful outcomes and not as a result of any 
strange accident or coincidence as far as we can see, then we can and should 
say, modestly and provisionally, that the relevant statements made in this 
theory are ‘true.’4 
As such, I am ‘modestly and provisionally’ suggesting that if the Public Cyberhealth 
LoA is found to be useful and coherent ‘in the long run and on the whole,’ it should 
be accepted as an accurate (and not merely convenient) way of modelling the digital 
landscape. That is to say informational wellbeing really is part of what is ultimately 
good for a person, cyberhealth is a constitutive part of a person’s health status, and 
our selves are truly informational in nature. 
 
2 William James, Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking, 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975, 106.  
3 While the world may not directly knowable, it is ‘epistemically interactable.’ 
Floridi, Philosophy of Information, 370. 
4 Hasok Chang, Pragmatic Realism, 118. 
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In thinking about assessing our two competing LoAs, it is important to 
recognize that Chang’s ‘pragmatic realism’ and Floridi’s ‘liminal realism’ encourages 
one to be more accepting of alternate approaches. As Chang argues:  
In the absence of what else we might operationally mean by ‘real’, and with 
the recognition that this concept of reality is not something we can do without, 
we should have the courage to admit that a lot of different kinds of things are 
real, even if the concepts pointing to them belong to mutually 
incommensurable systems of practice.5  
In the short term, we should have the open-mindedness to evaluate our competing 
LoAs without falling back on the lazy idea that the Cybersecurity LoA is the right 
frame simply because it is the dominate paradigm. If both approaches have utility and 
coherence, then we should accept both conceptions of the digital landscape as real. 
And, in the long run, if the Public Cyberhealth LoA is deemed more useful and 
coherent than the Cybersecurity LoA, we should be prepared to abandon that old 
paradigm as not only unhelpful, but also as essentially untrue. 
 
5 Chang, Pragmatic Realism, 119 
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